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This Article explores the use of the Petition Clause as a vehicle for gaining
access to courts. Professor Andrews reviews the English origins of the right to
petition, the formation of the American version of the right, and Supreme Court
decisions addressing court access generally and the right to petition in
particular, all with a view to determining whether the right to petition properly
extends to courts. She concludes that a right of access to the courts does exist via
the Petition Clause. However, she argues that this right is limited and "'protects
a person's right only to file winning claims within the court's jurisdiction."
Professor Andrews concludes by proposing protections borrowed from free
speech doctrine in order to ensure and to effectively broaden this right of court
access.
This nation has long viewed a person's ability to gain access to court as a
fundamental element of our democracy. Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison1 described the ability to obtain civil redress as the "very essence of civil
liberty."2 Yet, until recently, the Supreme Court has granted little constitutional
protection to court access in civil cases. Certain groups, such as prisoners, enjoy
a constitutional right of court access, but the average person in an ordinary civil
case has not had such a right. A universal right of court access is emerging,
though, and it is coming from an unlikely source, the Petition Clause of the First
Amendment. This Article looks at this "new" right of court access.
The right to petition the government is the last guarantee of the First
Amendment: "Congress shall make no law... abridging... the right of the
people ... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." 3 Relatively
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2 Id. at 163.
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few courts and academic commentators have addressed the meaning of the
Petition Clause.4 One of the only contexts in which the right to petition regularly
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of
grievances.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. In the text, I quote the right to petition without stating the right to
assemble. I address whether the right to assemble limits the right to petition in infra Part IHA.
4 For a survey of the academic literature on the Petition Clause, see Gregory A. Mark, The
Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of the Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2153, 2155 n.3 (1998). Almost every recent article that concerns the Petition Clause
begins by noting the dearth of academic or judicial analysis of the right to petition. Although
the sheer repetition of this "oversight" would seem to belie the point, it is a valid observation.
The Petition Clause, as a First Amendment freedom, has received some judicial and academic
attention, but this discussion is minimal compared to other First Amendment rights. For
example, the classic constitutional law hombook of Professors Nowak and Rotunda dedicates
345 pages to the First Amendment, but only four pages to the right to petition. See JOHN E.
NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW §§ 16.53-54 (5th ed. 1995). The
comparison is even more dramatic in Professor Tribe's treatise: the near 1800-page treatise
cites the right to petition only once, in a footnote. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 866 n.31 (2d ed. 1988).
Until recently, most cases and commentary concerning the Petition Clause fell into three
broad categories. First, courts and academic commentators analyzed the right to petition under
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, under which petitioning activity, such as lobbying, is immune
from antitrust liability. See Eastem RR. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1961) (recognizing petition immunity); see also Thomas A. Balmer,
Sham Litigation and the Antitrust Law, 29 BUFF. L. REv. 39 (1980); Daniel R. Fischel,
Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government Action: The Basis and Limits of the
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 80 (1977); David McGowan & Mark Lemley,
Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism, Petition and the First Amendment, 17 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 293 (1994); Gary Minda, Interest Groups, Political Freedom and'Antitrust:
A Modern Reassessment of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 905 (1990).
Second, courts and scholars debated whether the right of petition, in light of its long
history, is a "higher" right than other First Amendment freedoms. See McDonald v. Smith, 472
U.S. 479 (1985) (refusing to elevate the right of petition over other First Amendment rights);
Stephen A. Higginson, A Short History of the Right to Petition Government for the Redress of
Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142 (1986); Mark, supra; Eric Schnapper, 'Libelous' Petitions for
Redress of Grievances-Bad Historiography Makes Worse Law, 74 IOWA L. REV. 303 (1989);
Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging... " An Analysis of the Neglected, But
Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 1153, 1154-70 (1986); Julie M.
Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for a Redress of Grievances:
Cut from a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15 (1993); Robert A. Zauzmer, The
Misapplication of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine in Non-antitrust Right to Petition Cases, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1243 (1984).
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appears is antitrust. The Supreme Court holds, under its "Noerr-Pennington
doctrine," that petitioning activity, such as lobbying, cannot be subject to the
antitrust laws even if done for an anti-competitive motive.5 It was an application
of this doctrine in which the Supreme Court first recognized an individual's right
of access to court under the Petition Clause. In 1972, the Supreme Court
announced in an antitrust case that the right of access to courts is indeed but one
aspect of the right to petition.6
Though recognition of a right of court access under the Petition Clause is
more than twenty-five years old, it is only now taking hold as a constitutional
principle.7 The connection between "petitioning" and filing a civil suit initially
went unnoticed as anything other than an antitrust doctrine. Until recently, due
process was the primary battleground for attempts to gain a general right of court
access in civil suits. That battle is now over. The Supreme Court repeatedly has
held that the average person does not have a due process right to go to court
Third, scholars analyzed whether the Petition Clause is a proper basis for restricting
"SLAPP" suits (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public (or Political) Participation), the paradigm of
which is a defamation suit by a real estate developer against citizens who protest his
development. See, e.g., Barbara Arco, When Rights Collide: Reconciling the First Amendment
Rights of Opposing Parties in Civil Litigation, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 587 (1998); Thomas A.
Waldman, SLAPP Suits: Weaknesses in First Amendment Law and in the Courts' Response to
Frivolous Litigation, 39 UCLA. L. REV. 979, 1003 (1992). Professors Pring and Canan first
coined the term "SLAPP suit" in 1988 and today continue their work on SLAPP suit
deterrence. See GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPs: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING
OUT (1996); Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Political
Participation: Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 22 L. & Soc'Y REv. 385
(1988).
Scholars recently have begun to break new ground with regard to the right to petition.
Professor James Pfander, for example, questioned whether the right to petition the government
overrides sovereign immunity. See James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to
Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government,
91 Nw. U. L. REV. 899 (1997). Professor Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman have in turn
challenged Professor Pfander's proposition and that of other scholars, by arguing that the right
to petition is a narrow right. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right to
Petition, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999). In short, the Petition Clause is beginning to
spark new interest and debate.
5 See supra note 4 and accompanying text; infra notes 75-84.
6 See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972)
('hat right, [the right of access to the courts] is part of the right of petition protected by the
First Amendment."); see also infra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
7 See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 4, § 16.54, at 1192 ("Everyone has a
right to institute non-baseless litigation. A lawsuit is a form of a petition for the redress of
grievances.). For a non-exclusive list of authorities that recognize a Petition Clause right of
court access outside of antitrust, see infra notes 117-19.
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except in extraordinary cases.8 In the wake of these due process decisions, the
Petition Clause is becoming, slowly, the best avenue for asserting a right of court
access. Though many courts still summarily reject challenge under the Petition
Clause, some courts have begun to give it more serious considerations. In two
recent cases, for example, courts relied upon the Petition Clause to limit
application of the common law tort of abuse of process 9 and invalidate a statute
that authorized fee awards against winning plaintiffs.' 0
It is time to consider and define the right of court access under the Petition
Clause. There are several competing concerns that may frustrate proper
development and application of the right. On the one hand, this new principle has
great potential for protecting a long-neglected right; it can at least partially fill
the gap left by the Court's due process decisions. But it can not do so if it
becomes lost among, or confused with, the Court's existing court access
doctrine. The new principle presents dangers in the other extreme as well. It
could wreak havoc upon the very courts it purports to protect by calling into
question the system by which courts operate. First Amendment rights are
"supremely precious" freedoms and are subject to heightened protection." An
undefined right of judicial access under the First Amendment could call into
question any law that purports to limit or regulate civil filings, including existing
rules of procedure. The need to properly define this new right may be
particularly pressing now, in the era of outcry about "lawsuit abuse." The debate
about "tort reform" could take on constitutional proportions under a broad view
of the Petition Clause.12
8 See infra Part I.A.2.
9 The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the Petition Clause protected both
petitioning at "the town-council level" and "access to court" and thus limited application of the
state common law torts of abuse of process and interference with contractual relations. In other
words, liability could not attach to the mere filing of a meritorious civil suit, even if filed for an
improper motive. See Cove Rd. Dev. v. Western Cranston Indus. Park Assocs., 674 A.2d 1234,
1237-38 (R.I. 1996).
10 The Eighth Circuit applied the Petition Clause to invalidate a Minnesota statute that
required plaintiffs to pay all of the state's costs in defending challenges to a new workers'
compensation refund statute, regardless of whether the plaintiffs won or lost. See In re
Workers' Compensation Refund, 46 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 1995); see also infra sources cited
notes 113-14.
11 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (noting that First Amendment
freedoms, including the right to petition, are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society" and demand exacting protection). For a discussion of the standards and
forms of protections of First Amendment rights relative to that of other rights, see infra Part
IV.C.
12 Traditionally, courts have evaluated and upheld tort reform efforts under equal
protection and due process. See Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978) (upholding
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Defining the right of court access under the Petition Clause, however, is not
an easy task. The historical record offers little insight into the mere existence of a
right to petition courts, let alone the proper contours of that purported right.
Likewise, the Supreme Court, though it recognizes such a right, has barely begun
to define the right. "Proper" definition of the meaning and extent of the right of
court access under the Petition Clause will take years of debate and thought. In
this Article, I hope to foster that debate by reviewing the existing state of the
record and by making my own proposal as to the existence and meaning of the
right of court access under the Petition Clause.
I initially examine whether a Petition Clause right of access exists at all in
any form. I start, in Part I, with the Court's existing court access doctrine and the
under equal protection and due process challenges a statute that required pre-filing screening of
medical malpractice claims and barred complaint demands of specific dollar amounts); Barrett
v. Baird, 908 P.2d 689 (Nev. 1995) (holding that medical malpractice screening statute did not
violate equal protection, due process, or separation of powers).
Only a very few courts have considered the impact of the Petition Clause on efforts to
curb alleged litigation abuse. A California court considered whether the First Amendment right
to petition invalidated the California "vexatious litigant" statute under which a litigant with a
specified history of frivolous litigation could be limited in his ability to file future suits. It
upheld the statute. See Wolfgram v. Wells Fargo Bank, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694, 704 (Cal. App.
1997) ('"[B]aseless litigation is not immunized by the First Amendment right to petition.'")
(quoting Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983)). A New York
court similarly upheld its rule allowing sanctions for "frivolous" litigation conduct, including
civil filings made for an "improper purpose." Gordon v. Marrone, 616 N.Y.S.2d 98, 102 (App.
Div. 1994) ("[W]e reject the petitioner's contention that an award of sanctions ... here
impermissibly infringes upon his First Amendment right of access to the courts."). In addition,
a few commentators have begun to question whether the Petition Clause limits or invalidates
rules of procedure, such as Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which set
standards for the filing of civil complaints in federal court. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11; infra note
436; see also Gary Myers, Antitrust and First Amendment Implications of Professional Real
Estate Investors, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1199 (1994); Spanbauer, supra note 4; Note, A
Petition Clause Analysis of Suits Against the Government: Implications for Rule 11 Sanctions,
106 HARV. L. REV. 1111 (1993) [hereinafter Note, Suits Against the Government].
Some commentators and courts have addressed whether state constitutional provisions
limit or othervise impact tort reform efforts. Usually the state provision at issue is a clause
found in the majority of state constitutions, variously called a "remedy" or "open court" clause.
See, e.g., Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7,9 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (declaring invalid
a limitations statute for medical malpractice claims as applied to minors, under state
constitution which "grants to the people of Missouri an express constitutional guarantee not
enumerated in our federal Constitution'); Donald B. Brenner, Note, The Right of Access to
Civil Courts Under State Constitutional Law: An Impediment to Modern Reforms, or a
Receptacle of Important Substantive and Procedural Rights?, 13 RuTGERs L.L 399 (1982).
Though the effect and meaning of each such remedy clause is beyond the scope of this article, I
discuss the early development of remedy clauses in connection with the history of the right to
petition and right of court access. See infra Part II.
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practical reality that most courts and observers already recognize a right of court
access under the Petition Clause. In Part II, I assess the validity of this reading of
the Petition Clause and conclude that the history, text, and underlying policies of
the clause reasonably support some form of a right of court access. In Part II, I
take on the more difficult task of defining the right. I propose that the right in its
absolute form is very narrow: it protects a person's right only to file winning
claims within the court's jurisdiction. Finally, in Part IV, I propose how courts
should protect this right. I principally borrow from free speech doctrine and
propose protections that will effectively broaden the right of court access beyond
its narrow absolute form. Finally, in subsequent articles, I will apply the
proposed analysis to selected laws and governmental actions and, in the end, will
conclude that the right of access under the Petition Clause overrides some, but
not many, restrictions on court access.
I. DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT RECOGNITION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OF COURT AccEss
A right of court access in civil cases has a long but unsettled history in this
country. Though the Court repeatedly has stated that court access is fundamental,
it generally has not extended constitutional protection to the right of the average
individual to go to court. The Court's decisions under the Due Process Clause-
the constitutional provision traditionally associated with judicial procedure-
protect court access only in isolated cases. Some persons enjoy a broader right of
access, but this right depends on theories, such as the right to associate, not
applicable to the typical individual. Courts and scholars are increasingly
recognizing the general concept of the right to petition courts, but few have given
the right meaningful scrutiny. Nevertheless, the Petition Clause has the most
potential for protecting a broader right of access for individual civil litigants.
A. Developing Theories of a Right of Court Access
For nearly two hundred years, the Supreme Court did not recognize the
Petition Clause as a basis for a right of access to court. The Court initially
recognized judicial access as a fundamental liberty without citing any particular
clause of the Constitution as the source of the right. In this century, the Court
began to assess court access under a variety of specific constitutional provisions
and theories. The Court started with the Due Process Clause, but in the early
1970s, the Court severely limited any due process right of access for average
citizens. At about the same time-the 1960s and early 1970s-the Court granted
special rights of access to certain groups. The Court used an amalgam of
constitutional theories to give prisoners a relatively broad right of access to court.
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It also applied the freedoms of speech and association to protect associations,
such as the NAACP and labor unions, in their group organization of civil
litigation.
During the middle of its efforts to define the right of judicial access in these
other contexts, the Court suggested yet another potential basis for a right of
access, the Petition Clause. The first hint came in the group litigation cases in the
1960s, but it took an antitrust case to draw the Court's most definitive statement
of the right under the Petition Clause. In 1972, the Court proclaimed in
California Motor Transport v. Trucking Unlimited, that "[t]he right of access to
the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition." 13 Perhaps because
this pronouncement came in an antitrust case, not a usual setting for
constitutional law developments, most observers and courts, including the Court
itself, initially ignored the pronouncement outside the area of antitrust. But its
most recent decisions have endorsed the doctrine in other contexts and have
opened the door for a universal right of court access under the Petition Clause.
1. The Fundamental Nature ofJudicialAccess
From the very inception of this nation, jurists viewed the right of access to
court as "fundamental." First, in Marbury v. Madison,14 the Court in 1803
recognized that a person who has suffered a legally cognizable injury has a right
to obtain a remedy in court:
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives injury. One
of the first duties of government is to afford that protection...
... '[ilt is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right
there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is
invaded.'
... '[lit is a settled and invariable principle in the laws of England, that
every right when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper
redress.'
The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a
government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high
appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal
right 15
13 404 U.S. 508, 612 (1972).
14 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
15 Id at 163. The Court ultimately held that the petitioner, Marbury, had a cognizable
injury but that the Court could not entertain his claim because of Article Mit limitations on the
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In setting out this fundamental right of redress, Chief Justice Marshall relied
upon the writings of the English legal historian, Sir William Blackstone, not the
Petition Clause or any other provision of the Constitution. 16
The Court has continued to refer generally to a right to judicial redress in a
variety of contexts, without citing any constitutional authority. 17 The most
common example is the Court's interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV of the Constitution, which prohibits states from denying
citizens of other states certain basic rights that the states afford their own
citizens. 18 In 1823, Justice Bushrod Washington, sitting as circuit justice, set
forth an oft-quoted statement of these basic rights, which included the right to
file civil suits in court:
We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and
immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the
citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by
the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of
their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental
principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate.
They may, however be all comprehended under the following general heads:
Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to
Court's original jurisdiction. See id. at 173-80.
16 See id. For a discussion of Sir Blackstone's writings on the right to judicial remedy, see
infra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
17 For example, in Ex Parte Young, in which the Court interpreted the Eleventh
Amendment to allow suits for prospective relief against state officers, the Court stated that
persons faced with unconstitutional state laws ought to have a remedy to prevent enforcement
of those laws. See 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908) ('It would be an injury to complainant to harass it
with a multiplicity of suits or litigation generally in an endeavor to enforce penalties under an
unconstitutional enactment, and to prevent it ought to be within the jurisdiction of a court of
equity."). Similarly, the Court has emphasized that the federal courts, with only minor
exceptions, "must entertain" suits within their jurisdiction. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678,
681-82 (1946). It also has held that the right to resort to federal court is a "fundamental" right
upon which states may not infringe. See Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529, 532-33
(1922) (declaring unconstitutional a statute that compelled a foreign corporation to waive "its
constitutional right to resort to the federal courts" and apparently, without discussion, basing
that "constitutional right' upon Article IPI).
18 The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Constitution is in essence a
"comity" provision that provides: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. The Fourteenth
Amendment also has a "privileges and immunities" provision: "No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Court has narrowly interpreted this Fourteenth Amendment
clause to apply only to rights of national citizenship. See In re Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36 (1872); see also infra note 22.
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acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness
and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly
prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one state to
pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture,
professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas
corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the
state .... 19
Thereafter, the Supreme Court repeatedly recognized that access to court was a
fundamental liberty within the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause.20
That access to court is protected by the Article IV Privileges and Immunities
Clause means only that a state may not grant judicial access to its own citizens
while denying it to non-citizens. It does not mean that it is a constitutional
guarantee for all citizens.2 1 And it certainly does not mean that the right is based
in the First Amendment Petition Clause.22 But, like Marbury v. Madison, the
19 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (emphasis added) (holding
that New Jersey may reserve oyster fishing rights exclusively for its own citizens).
20 See Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 252 (1898) ("[Tjhe privileges and immunities,
which the citizens of the same state would be entitled to under like circumstances... includes
the right to institute actions.'); Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 113-14 (1890) ('The
intention of [the Privileges and Immunities Clause] was to confer on citizens of the several
States a general citizenship... and this includes the right to institute actions."); Ward v.
Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1870) ("[T]he [Privileges and Immunities] [C]lause
plainly and unmistakably secures and protects the right of a citizen... to maintain action in the
courts of the State.').
21 The "fundamental" rights and benefits protected under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause are not limited to those that are independently protected by other constitutional
provisions:
The modem Court's reference to determining whether a right is sufficiently
"fundamental" to be protected by the clause should not be confused with a determination
of whether an activity constitutes a fundamental right so as to require strict judicial
scrutiny under the due process and equal protection clauses. For example, the regulation
of conditions of employment is not considered a limitation of a fundamental right for due
process and equal protection analysis, but the ability to engage in a private sector activity
or employment is a fundamental right protected by the privileges and immunities clause.
All rights directly protected by the Constitution, such as First Amendment rights,
or other constitutional rights that the Court has found to be fundamental for the purposes
of due process and equal protection analysis, constitute privileges and immntities of
citizenship.
Now~AK & ROTUNDA, supra note 4, § 9.6, at 330-31.
22 In Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867), the Court hinted that the right of
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privileges and immunities cases reflect the importance of the right to go to court.
The Court, for example, in a privileges and immunities case explained that
access to courts is essential to orderly government:
The right to sue and defend in the courts is the alternative of force. In an
organized society it is the right conservative of all other rights, and lies at the
foundation of orderly government It is one of the highest and most essential
privileges of citizenship, and must be allowed by each State to the citizens of all
access to court was tied to the right to petition. The Court invalidated a Nevada state tax on out-
of-state passenger service on grounds now called the "right to travel.' See NowAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 4, §§ 8.10, 14.38. In doing so, the Court used terms remarkably close to
the Petition Clause and specifically mentioned the right of access to court:
The people of these United States constitute one nation. They have a government in
which all of them are deeply interested. This government has necessarily a capital
established by law, where its principal operations are conducted. Here sits its
legislature.... Here resides the President .... Here is the seat of the supreme judicial
power of the nation, to which all its citizens have a right to resort to claim justice at its
hands ...
... [The citizen] has the right to come to the seat of government to assert any claim
he may have upon that government, or to transact any business he may have with it. To
seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions. He has a
right to free access to its sea-ports, through which all the operations of foreign trade and
commerce are conducted, to the sub-treasuries, the land offices, the revenue offices, and
the courts ofjustice in the several States, and this right is in its nature independent of the
will of any State over whose soil he must pass in the exercise of it.
Crandall, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 43-44 (emphasis added). The Court five years later in the
Slaughter-House Cases, quoted this second paragraph, including its reference to the courts of
the states, as an example of the few rights of national citizenship guaranteed by the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79.
Interestingly, the Court separately listed the right to petition as another right of national
citizenship. See id. This separation of the right to petition the national government and of
access to state courts does not necessarily mean that the Petition Clause has no application to
courts. At that time, the federal right of petition, whatever its meaning, did not guard against
infringement by state governments. In fact, one aspect of the Slaughter-House Cases, now
overruled, was rejection of the argument that any part of the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated the Bill of Rights. See id. at 80-81 (construing the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as extending only procedural protections); see also United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875) (stating that the right of petition "like other amendments
proposed and adopted at the same time, was not intended to limit the powers of the State
govemments in respect to their own citizens, but to operate upon the National government
alone"). It was not until 1937 that the Court expressly protected the right to petition against
state interference, through incorporation of the right to petition into the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause. See DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353,364-65 (1937).
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other States to the precise extent that it is allowed to its own citizens.23
Thus, although the Court in these cases had not yet expressly declared that the
right of access derives from the Petition Clause, it put the right on the same plane
as other core freedoms.
2. A Limited Due Process Right of Court Access
The first line of cases in which the Court considered whether a specific
guarantee of the Constitution protects court access was under due process. These
cases, however, functioned more as a rejection, rather than an affirmation, of the
right of access. Initially, neither the litigants nor the Court termed the issue as
one of court access, but the cases nevertheless challenged preconditions to filing
civil suits. An early example is the 1924 case of Jones v. Union Guano Co.,24
which was a challenge to a North Carolina statute that required for all product
suits against fertilizer manufacturers that the plaintiff, before filing his complaint
first obtain a chemical analysis of the fertilizer. The trial court dismissed the
plaintiff's claim because he had no chemical analysis (even though he presented
other evidence that the fertilizer was inferior) and the plaintiff claimed that the
statute violated due process. The Court disagreed, finding that the restriction was
a "reasonable" precondition to filing suit.25
Twenty-five years later, the Court again applied a reasonableness test to
reject a due process challenge to a restriction on filing suit. In Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,26 the plaintiff challenged the requirement that
he post security as a precondition to bringing a shareholder derivative action. In
an opinion by Justice Jackson, the Court held that the security requirement was
reasonable and did not violate due process:
23 Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907).
24 264 U.S. 171 (1924).
25 The Court explained the reasonableness of the statute:
The act does not deprive purchasers of any right or cause of action. On the contrary,
it gives additional rights and remedies [the statute overrode a common law limit on
damages in fertilizer suits] .... The requirement imposed is reasonable and seems well
calculated to safeguard against uncertainty, conjecture and mistake. ...
The Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent a State from prescribing a reasonable
and appropriate condition precedent to the bringing of a suit of a specified kind or class so
long as the basis of distinction is real, and the condition imposed has reasonable relation
to a legitimate object.
Id. at 180-81.
26 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
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A state may set the terms on which it will permit litigations in its courts. No type
of litigation is more susceptible of regulation than that of a fiduciary nature. And
it cannot seriously be said that a state makes such unreasonable use of its power
as to violate the Constitution when it provides liability and security for payment
of reasonable expenses if a litigation of this character is adjudged to be
unsustainable. It is urged that such a requirement will foreclose resort by most
stockholders to the only available judicial remedy for the protection of their
rights. Of course, to require security for the payment of any kind of costs, or the
necessity for bearing any kind of expense of litigation, has a deterring effect But
we deal with power, not wisdom; and we think notwithstanding this tendency, it
is within the power of a state to close its courts to this type of litigation if the
condition of reasonable security is not met.2 7
The defining cases for access to court under due process came in the early
1970s as challenges to court filing fees. The first was the 1971 case of Boddie v.
Connecticut,28 in which indigent petitioners protested the Connecticut filing fee
for divorce actions. The Court noted that due process is usually a protection for
defendants, not a means by which plaintiffs can gain access to court, because
plaintiffs, unlike defendants, may resort to other means:
[Due process] litigation has [ ] typically involved rights of defendants-not, as
here, persons seeking access to the judicial process in the first instance. This is
because our society has been so structured that resort to the courts is not usually
the only available, legitimate means of resolving private disputes. Indeed,
private structuring of individual relationships and repair of their breach is largely
encouraged in American life, subject only to the caveat that the formal judicial
process, if resorted to, is paramount Thus, this Court has seldom been asked to
view access to the courts as an element of due process. The legitimacy of the
State's monopoly over techniques of final dispute settlement, even where some
are denied access to its use, stands unimpaired where recognized, effective
alternatives for the adjustment of differences remain. But the successful
invocation of this governmental power by plaintiffs has often created serious
problems for defendants' rights. For at that point, the judicial proceeding
becomes the only effective means of resolving the dispute at hand and denial of
a defendant's full access to that process raises grave problems for its
2 7 Id. at 552 (emphasis added). One year later, Justice Jackson, in Mullane v. Central
Hanover Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950), wrote a seminal due process opinion that again
established a reasonableness test for the question at hand-the required method of providing
parties with notice of proceedings. See id. at 314 ("An elementary and fundamental
requirement of due process ... is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections.").
28 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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legitimacy.29
The Court nevertheless held that in narrow circumstances due process requires
states to open their courts to plaintiffs.3 0 Boddie presented these circumstances.
The filing fee in Boddie violated due process because marriage is a fundamental
right,3 1 divorce is one of the few examples of a dispute that the parties cannot
otherwise reconcile, and the petitioners were indigent.32
The narrowness of the due process right of access to courts became apparent
in two 1973 cases. First, in United States v. Kras,33 the Court refused to extend
Boddie to filing fees for bankruptcy. The Court emphasized that the due process
29 Id at 375-76.
30 The Court emphasized the narrow application of its holding:
In concluding that the Due Process Clause... requires that these appellants be
afforded an opportunity to go into court to obtain a divorce, we wish to re-emphasize that
we go no further than necessary to dispose of the case before us, a case where the bona
fides of both appellants' indigency and desire for divorce are here beyond dispute. We do
not decide that access for all individuals to the courts is a right that is, in all circumstances,
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause... so that its exercise may not be placed beyond
the reach of any individual, for, as we have already noted, in the case before us this right is
the exclusive precondition to the adjustment of a fundamental human relationship. The
requirement that these appellants resort to the judicial process is entirely a state-created
matter. Thus we hold only that a State may not, consistent with the... Due Process
Clause... pre-empt the right to dissolve this legal relationship without affording all
citizens access to the means it has prescribed for doing so.
1d at 382-83.
31 "[M]arriage involves interests of basic importance in our society." Id. at 376. Justice
Black in his dissent argued that this was the only basis on which to distinguish Cohen, which
upheld a security requirement for a shareholder derivative action, see supra notes 26-27, and
that this "fundamental interest' test was too vague. See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 392-93 (Black, J.,
dissenting). The majority tried to distinguish Cohen on the basis that Cohen looked at a statute
on its face, whereas the Boddie petitioners had established that they were in fact indigent and
barred from court for failure to pay the fee. Justice Black noted that Cohen recognized that the
security requirement may in fact foreclose resort to the courts by most shareholders but
nevertheless held that the state had the power to close its courts to such litigation if the
condition was not met. See id at 392.
32 The Court noted that the filing fee would not be improper for non-indigents and that
the question of what process is due depends on the circumstances of each person: "The State's
obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment are not simply generalized ones; rather, the State
owes to each individual that process which, in light of the values of a free society, can be
characterized as due." Boddie, 401 U.S. at 380. The Court referred by analogy to Mullane, 339
U.S. at 306, where it had held that notice by publication is proper for some but not all
defendants. See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 380.
33 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
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right recognized in Boddie applied only to fundamental rights and only where
judicial access is the exclusive means of resolving the issue:
The denial of access to the judicial forum in Boddie touched directly... on the
marital relationship and on the associational interests that surround the
establishment and dissolution of that relationship.... The Boddie appellants'
inability to dissolve their marriages seriously impaired their freedom to pursue
other protected associational activities. Kras' alleged interest in the elimination
of his debt burden, and in obtaining his desired new start in life, although
important and so recognized by the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act, does not
rise to the same constitutional level ....
Nor is the Government's control over the establishment enforcement, or
dissolution of debts nearly so exclusive as Connecticut's control over the
marriage relationship in Boddie.... The utter exclusiveness of court access and
court remedy.., was a potent factor in Boddie....
However unrealistic the remedy may be in a particular situation, a debtor, in
theory, and often in actuality, may adjust his debts by negotiated agreement with
his creditors. 34
Similarly, in Ortwein v. Schwab,35 the Court refused to invalidate a filing fee for
judicial appeals from adverse administrative welfare determinations: the interest
at stake, increased welfare payments, "like that in Kras, has far less
constitutional significance than the interest of the Boddie appellants,' 36 and the
welfare appellants already had administrative hearings, a form of dispute
resolution.37 In essence then, under the Court's holdings, due process rarely
requires that a plaintiff be given access to court.
In these due process cases, the Court did not meaningfully address the
Petition Clause. The reason for this oversight is difficult to discern. After all, the
Court issued its Petition Clause edict in California Motor Transport in 1972, in
the interim between Boddie and Kras, and litigants and scholars at the time were
actively challenging the narrowness of the due process holdings.38 The answer
341d. at444-45.
35 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curium).
36 Id. at 659.
37 See id.
3 8 In 1973, for example, Professor Frank Michelman published the first of his thoughtful
two-part series that criticized the Court's filing fee cases, but he did not rely upon the Petition
Clause. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to
Protect One's Rights-Part , 6 DuKE L.J. 1153 (1973). A student note in the same year,
directly analyzed filing fees under the Petition Clause as "a more comprehensive and workable
theory of access," but the note garnered little attention. See Note, A First Amendment Right of
Access to the Courts for Indigents, 82 YALE L.J. 1055, 1055 (1973) [hereinafter Note, First
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apparently is that some litigants tried to advance the Petition Clause as an
alternative protection but they could not convince the courts that the Petition
Clause right of court access was a right distinct from that under due process. 39
Even the Supreme Court in Ortwein summarily dismissed a Petition Clause
argument by equating the challenge to that under due process.40 But, as will be
seen, a due process analysis is not what the Court applied only one year earlier in
California Motor Transport.4' Nevertheless, at least for a time, the Petition
Clause lay dormant as anything other than an antitrust doctrine.
3. A Broader Right of Court Access for Prisoners
Ironically, while the Court was narrowly defining the due process right of
court access for average citizens, it was broadly interpreting the right of prisoners
to gain access to court to file civil actions. The first of the prisoner cases
challenged interference by state prison officials with the ability of prisoners to
file habeas petitions (civil actions) in federal court. In the 1941 decision of Ex
Parte Hull,42 the Court, without citing a specific constitutional provision,
invalidated a prison regulation under which prison officials pre-screened habeas
petitions and barred the filing of those that officials deemed "not properly
drawn."'43 In 1961, the Court held that a state may not charge a filing fee to an
Amendment Right ofAccess].
3 9 For example, the trial court in Boddie tied the Petition Clause argument to due process:
"It is claimed that the State of Connecticut is denying the plaintiffs the equal protection of the
laws by barring them from seeking a divorce because of their indigency, and is denying them
due process of law by infringing their right to 'petition the Govemment for a redress of
grievances,' U.S. Const. Am. 1." Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968, 970 (D. Conn.
1968) (emphasis added).
40 See Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 660 n.5 ("Appellants also claim a violation of their First
Amendment right to petition for redress. Our discussion of the Due Process Clause, however,
demonstrates that appellants' rights under the First Amendment have been fully satisfied.").
41 See California Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972). See
generally infra notes 85-95 and accompanying text In California Motor Transport, the Court
did not look to whether the underlying suit involved fundamental rights or whether the courts
were the only means of redress. The litigation challenged competing truckers' applications for
operating licenses. See 404 U.S. at 509. Whether these challenges could have been resolved
outside of court is uncertain, but operating licenses are no more fimdamental than the debts in
Kras and welfare rights in Ortwein. Therefore, the Court could have decided California Motor
Transport on this fundamental interest ground alone, if access to court were a due process
question. It did not. Instead, it looked to see if the challenges were "sham." See id. at 511-13.
42 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
43 Michigan prison officials intercepted Hull's habeas petition because it was not properly
drawn. See id. at 548-49. The Court invalidated this procedure: "[w]hether a petition for writ of
habeas corpus addressed to a federal court is properly drawn and what allegations it must
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indigent prisoner who wishes to file a habeas petition.44 Likewise, in 1969, the
Court in Johnson v. Avery45 invalidated a prison regulation that forbade inmates
from helping each other prepare habeas petitions.
In none of the three decisions did the Court cite a specific constitutional
provision, except by implication in its reference to "the fundamental importance
of the writ of habeas corpus in our constitutional scheme." 46 When the Court
eventually addressed prisoner civil cases not involving habeas petitions, it cited
the Due Process Clause. In Procunier v. Martinez,47 the Court expressly relied
on due process to invalidate a prison ban on law student or paralegal interviews
with prisoners. 48 In Wolff v. McDonnell,49 the Court extended Avery to civil
rights actions,50 declaring that Avery was based on due process, not the Habeas
contain are questions for that court alone to determine." Id. at 549.
44 See Smiih v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
45 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
4 6 Id. at 485. Habeas petitions are separately protected in the Constitution. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ('The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it").
47 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
48 The Court explained the due process foundation for a prisoner's right of access to
court:
The constitutional guarantee of due process of law has as a corollary the requirement that
prisoners be afforded access to the courts in order to challenge unlawful convictions and
to seek redress for violations of their constitutional rights. This means that inmates must
have a reasonable opportunity to seek and receive the assistance of attorneys. Regulations
and practices that unjustifiably obstruct the availability of professional representation or
other aspects of the right to access to the courts are invalid.
Id. at 419 (citing Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941)). The Court agreed that the ban imposed a
"substantial burden on the right of access to the courts" but also noted that "this conclusion
does not end the inquiry." Id. at 420. Rather, the Court must conduct a balancing test: "[t]he
extent to which [the right of access] is burdened by a particular regulation or practice must be
weighed against the legitimate interest of penal administration and the proper regard that judges
should give to the expertise and discretionary authority of correctional officials." Id. The
regulation failed this balancing test because the ban was absolute and the state did not show
that a less restrictive regulation would unduly burden the administrative task of screening
visitors. See id.
49 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
50 In Wolff, the Nebraska prison appointed one legal adviser to inmates and forbade
inmates from assisting each other on legal matters. See id. at 544 n.4. Avery left open the option
of states providing legal advisors in lieu of inmate assistance. See 393 U.S. at 490; supra note
45. The issues in Wolffwere whether a single adviser was adequate and whether adequacy
must be judged on the adviser's ability to counsel prisoners on habeas petitions alone or both
habeas and civil rights actions. See 418 U.S. at 577.
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Clause.51
These cases arguably are consistent with the Court's other due process cases,
such as Boddie. Each prisoner was seeking to challenge either his confinement or
the conditions of his confinement-seemingly fundamental rights. In addition,
the courts are arguably the only means by which a prisoner can pursue these
fundamental rights.52 What is different about the prisoner cases is that the barrier
to access in some prisoner cases is not as direct as in the case of filing fees. In
Avery, for example, the invalid restriction was a prison ban on affirmative
assistance, by other inmates, in the preparation of habeas claims, whereas in
Boddie, the Court actually barred the divorce petition when the indigent
petitioner could not pay the filing fee.
The Court soon carried this prisoner doctrine even farther. In 1977, in
Bounds v. Smith,53 the Court required prisons not only to refrain from banning
assistance to prisoners in civil cases but also to affirmatively provide assistance
at the state's expense, in the form of law libraries or legal advisers.54 The Bounds
51 See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 579. The Wolff Court applied a distinction similar to that in
Boddie and Kras by holding that civil rights actions are equally as fundamental as habeas
petitions. See id. Though Wolffwas decided in 1974, three years after Boddie and one year after
Kras, the WolffCourt did not cite either case. Instead, the Court explained:
First, the demarcation line between civil rights actions and habeas petitions is not
always clear. The Court has already recognized instances where the same constitutional
rights might be redressed under either form of relief. Second, while it is true that only in
habeas actions may relief be granted which will shorten the term of confinement, it is
more pertinent that both actions serve to protect basic constitutional rights. The right of
access to the courts, upon which Avery was premised, is founded in the Due Process
Clause and assures that no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary
allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights. It is futile to
contend that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 has less importance in our constitutional scheme
than does the Great Writ The recognition by this Court that prisoners have certain
constitutional rights which can be protected by civil rights actions would be diluted if
inmates, often "totally or functionally illiterate," were unable to articulate their complaints
to the courts.
Wolff 418 U.S. at 579 (citations omitted).
52 Access to courts is not literally required for civil rights challenges to the conditions of a
prisoner's confinement. The prisoner could seek to informally persuade prison authorities to
cure the defects. This may be a futile effort, but arguably not any more so than the bankruptcy
proceedings in Kras, -where the Court held that the mere possibility of outside relief was
sufficient. See supra notes 33-34.
53 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
54 The Court ordered the state to affirmatively provide law libraries or other legal
assistance to prisoners, presumably without regard to the nature of the underlying litigation for
which the prisoners would use the facilities. The Court declared "that the fundamental
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expansion of prisoner access does not necessarily open the door for like
challenges by average citizens. 55 The Court in effect created an independent
"access to court" doctrine for prisoners. This special rule for prisoners has some
policy justifications. A prisoner has unique circumstances: he is in special need
of judicial relief yet he is confined away from normal avenues of case
preparation and settlement.56
Even with these constraints, some applications of the prisoner access
doctrine-those dictating affirmative assistance-have uncertain constitutional
footing, at least in the view of some members of the Court. For example, in
Bounds, Justice Rehnquist dissented and claimed the majority had created the
constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the
preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate prison
law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." Id at 828.
55 Indeed, the Court has since tried to narrow the expansive reach of Bounds even in
prisoner cases. In Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), where prisoners challenged the
adequacy of the prison law library, the Court denied relief and declared that "Bounds did not
create an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance...." Id. at 351. The
Court went on to note:
It must be acknowledged that several statements in Bounds went beyond the right of
access recognized in the earlier cases on which it relied, which was a right to bring to
court a grievance that the inmate wished to present These statements appear to suggest
that the State must enable the prisoner to discover grievances, and to litigate effectively
once in court. These elaborations upon the right of access to the courts have no antecedent
in our pre-Bounds cases, and we now disclaim them. To demand the conferral of such
sophisticated legal capabilities upon a mostly uneducated and indeed largely illiterate
prison population is effectively to demand permanent provision of counsel, which we do
not believe the Constitution requires.
In other words, Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform
themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative
actions to slip-and-fall claims. The tools it requires to be provided are those that the
inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to
challenge the conditions of their confinement.
Id. at 354-55 (citations omitted).
5 6 In his dissent in Bounds, Justice Rehnquist explained what he believed to be the basis
ofAvery, Procunier, and Wolff.
[Those cases] depend on the principle that the State, having already incarcerated the
convict and thereby virtually eliminated his contact with people outside the prison walls,
may not further limit contacts which would otherwise be permitted simply because such
contacts would aid the incarcerated prisoner in preparation of a petition seeking judicial
relief from the conditions or terms of his confinement
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 838-39 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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right "out of whole cloth."'57 The Court continues to debate the proper
constitutional grounding of the prisoner access doctrine.58 Interestingly, the
Court, in this debate, has virtually ignored the Petition Clause,59 even though it
57 Justice Rehnquist stated:
[The Court] proceeds [] to enunciate a 'Tundamental constitutional right of access to the
courts," which is found nowhere in the Constitution.... [T]he "fundamental
constitutional right of access to the courts" which the Court announces today is created
virtually out of whole cloth with little or no reference to the Constitution from which it is
supposed to be derived.
430 U.S. at 839-40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted); see also id. at
833-34 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The Court leaves us unenlightened as to the source of the
'right of access to the courts' .... "). Bounds arguably extended court access doctrine by
blending the due process cases addressing initial access, such as Boddie, and equal protection
cases addressing criminal appeals. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (requiring
states to affirmatively provide counsel on appeals as of right); Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252
(1959) (same as for filing fees on discretionary review of conviction); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956) (forbidding, on appeal, a state from requiring an indigent criminal defendant to
pay for transcripts on due process and equal protection grounds). The criminal appeal cases
have been challenged as having no constitutional footing. For example, in Ross v. Moffitt, 417
U.S. 600 (1974), the Court (per Justice Rehnquist) refused to extend Douglas to discretionary
appeals, and questioned its constitutional basis:
The precise rationale for the Griffin and Douglas lines of cases has never been
explicitly stated, some support being derived from the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and some from the Due Process Clause of that Amendment.
Neither Clause by itself provides an entirely satisfactory basis for the result reached, each
depending on a different inquiry which emphasizes different factors. "Due process"
emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the State, regardless
of how other individuals in the same situation may be treated. "Equal protection," on the
other hand, emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between classes of individuals
whose situations are arguably indistinguishable.
Id. at 608-09 (footnote omitted).
58 See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 519 U.S. 102, 129-44 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(protesting the Court's holding that Mississippi must waive transcript fees for indigents on
appeals from parental right terminations and arguing that the Court was blending equal
protection and due process doctrine to protect rights that neither clause alone would protect).
5 9 Justice Stevens apparently was the only member of the Court to mention the Petition
Clause in the prisoner cases. He did so in his dissent from Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at 404-14,
in which he opposed any attempt to limit Bounds and suggested the First Amendment Petition
Clause as a possible basis for a broad right of access:
Within the residuum of liberty retained by prisoners are freedoms identified in the
First Amendment to the Constitution: freedom to worship according to the dictates of
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decided California Motor Transport during the height of the prisoner case
development 60
4. Court Access for Group Litigation
A fourth area in which the Court recognized a right of court access was in
cases in which the state sought to restrict associations in assisting their members
in litigation. In these cases, the Court primarily addressed infringement of other
First Amendment rights, namely those of association and political expression,
but obliquely referred to both the right of court access and the right to petition.
This is the first line of cases in which the Court connected the right to petition
with litigation.
The seminal case was NAACP v. Button.61 In this 1963 case, the NAACP
had actively encouraged black citizens of Virginia to retain NAACP lawyers and
fight segregation in Virginia schools. The Commonwealth of Virginia contended
that this activity violated its statute against solicitation of legal business. The
Court held that the NAACP activities were protected exercises of association and
political expression.62 Though the Court expressly based its ultimate holding on
the rights of association and expression, the Court also discussed the right to
petition and suggested that it protected litigation:
[A]bstract discussion is not the only species of communication which the
Constitution protects; the First Amendment also protects vigorous advocacy,
certainly of lawful ends, against governmental intrusion. In the context of
NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences;
it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment by all
government federal, state and local, for the members of the Negro community
in this country. It is thus a form of political expression. Groups which find
themselves unable to achieve their objectives through the ballot frequently turn
their conscience, freedom to communicate with the outside world, and the freedom to
petition their government for a redress of grievances. While the exercise of these freedoms
may of course be regulated and constrained by their custodians, they may not be
obliterated either actively or passively. Indeed, our cases make it clear that the States must
take certain affirmative steps to protect some of the essential aspects of liberty that might
not otherwise survive in the controlled prison environment.
Id. at 404-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
60 The Court decided California Motor Transport in 1972, five years before Bounds, and,
in California Motor Transport, the Court ironically relied upon two prisoner cases, Hull and
Avery, see discussion supra notes 42-43, 45-46, for its court access pronouncement. See
discussion infra notes 85-95.
61 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
62 See id. at 428-29.
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to the courts .... And under the conditions of modem government, litigation
may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for
redress of grievances.63
The next year, the Court extended Button to the personal injury context in
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia.64 There, the union advised its
injured members to consult with union-approved lawyers before settling claims
for work-related injuries, primarily claims under the Federal Employer's
Liability Act.65 Virginia enjoined the union from continuing this advisory
service, charging that the service constituted unlawful solicitation and practice of
law. The Court overturned the injunction, based primarily on the union's right of
association, but also on the right to petition and its corresponding right of access
to court: "The State can no more keep these workers from using their cooperative
plan to advise one another than it could use more direct means to bar them from
resorting to the courts to vindicate their legal rights. The right to petition the
courts cannot be so handicapped."66
Justices Clark and Harlan dissented in Railroad Trainmen and argued that
the protection recognized in Button applied only to political litigation, not to
private personal injury cases.67 This is not an unreasonable interpretation of
63 Id. at 429-30 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Court further explained the
relationship between litigation and more traditional views of First Amendment freedoms:
We need not, in order to find constitutional protection for the kind of cooperative,
organizational activity disclosed by this record, whereby Negroes seek through lawful
means to achieve legitimate political ends, subsume such activity under a narrow, literal
conception of freedom of speech, petition or assembly ...
The NAACP is not a conventional political party, but the litigation it assists, while
serving to vindicate the legal rights of the members of the American Negro community, at
the same time and perhaps more importantly, makes possible the distinctive contribution
of a minority group to the ideas and beliefs of our society. For such a group, association
for litigation may be the most effective form of political association.
Id. at 430-31.
64 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
65 See id. at 1-5.
66 Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
67 The dissent argued:
[In Button] the vital fact was that the claimed privilege was a "form of political
expression" to secure, through court action, constitutionally protected civil rights.
Personal injury litigation is not a form of political expression, but rather a procedure for
the settlement of damages claims. No guaranteed civil right is involved.
Id. at 10 (Clark, L, dissenting).
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Button, which repeatedly had referred to the political nature of the NAACP
litigation.68 But the Court twenty years before, in Thomas v. Collins,69 already
had held that the First Amendment rights of speech, association, and petition are
not limited to "great" or political issues. The Thomas Court declared that rights
of free speech, assembly, and petition apply even if their exercise is for solely
private purposes:
This conjunction of liberties is not peculiar to religious activity and institutions
alone. The First Amendment gives freedom of mind the same security as
freedom of conscience.... Great secular causes, with small ones, are guarded.
The grievancefor redress of which the right ofpetition was insured, and with the
right ofassembly, are not solely religious or political ones. And the rights of free
speech and a free press are not confined to any field of human interest 70
If Thomas and Railroad Trainmen left any doubt that the First Amendment
protected more than just political litigation by associations, the Court soon put
the question to rest when it twice reaffirmed application of the right to union
organization of personal injury litigation, in UMW of America, District 12 v.
Illinois State Bar Association,71 and in United Transportation Union v. State Bar
68 See supra note 63 and accompanying text; see also Button, 371 U.S. at 443 ("Resort to
the courts to seek vindication of constitutional rights is a different matter from the oppressive,
malicious, or avaricious use of the legal process for purely private gain").
69 323 U.S. 516 (1945). In Thomas, the Court overturned the conviction of a national CIO
representative who violated a Texas law requiting him to register as a labor organizer before
giving a labor speech.
70 Id. at 531 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
71 389 U.S. 217 (1967). The Court protected the UMW's hiring of lawyers to assist its
members in FELA claims, and, in doing so, the Court again cited the tight to petition: "[w]e
hold that the freedom of speech, assembly, and petition guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments gives [the union] the right to hire attorneys on a salary basis to assist its members
in the assertion of their legal rights." Id. at 221-22 (footnote omitted). The Court, quoting
Thomas, rejected the contention that the implicated rights do not apply to personal injury
litigation:
We think that both the Button and Trainmen cases are controlling here. The litigation
in question is, of course, not bound up with political matters of acute social moment, as in
Button, but the First Amendment does not protect speech and assembly only to the extent
it can be characterized as political. "Great secular causes, with small ones, are guarded.
The grievances for redress of which the right of petition was insured, and with it the right
of assembly, are not solely religious or political ones."... And of course in Trainmen,
where the litigation in question was, as here, solely designed to compensate the victims of
industrial accidents, we rejected the contention made in dissent, that the principles
announced in Button were applicable only to litigation for political purposes.
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ofMichigan.72
Thus, in these group litigation cases, unlike the due process and prisoner
cases, the Court did not ignore the right to petition. To the contrary, the Court
affirmatively cited the Petition Clause to further support its holdings. The only
limitation was that the cases involved organized activity. Because the cases
involved associational rights, some commentators, and even the Court,
questioned their application to individual cases where other First Amendment
freedoms were not at stake.73 It took an antitrust case for the Court to more
Id. at 223 (citations omitted).
72 401 U.S. 576 (1971). The union recommended counsel to its members in FELA
actions and required all such counsel to limit his or her fees to 25% of all recovery. See id. at
577. The Court overturned a Michigan injunction of this union activity:
The common thread running through our decisions in NAACP v. Button, Trainmen, and
United Mine Workers, is that collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to
the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment. However,
that right would be a hollow promise if courts could deny associations of workers or
others the means of enabling their members to meet the costs of legal
representation .... The injunction... cannot stand....
Id. at 585-86.
73 Indeed, the failure of the Court to discuss or apply the union litigation cases in the near
contemporaneous due process cases prompted some lower courts to assume that the Petition
Clause did not independently support a right of access to court. For example, the Oregon
Supreme Court in Ortwein v. Schwab, 498 P.2d 757 (Or. 1972), dismissed a First Amendment
petition argument on the ground that other filing fee cases such as Boddie had not mentioned or
analyzed this basis:
Petitioners' first amendment contention is grounded upon that part of the
amendment prohibiting the right "to petition the Government for redress of grievances."
This phrase of the First Amendment emerged into popularity in Mr. Justice Black's
majority opinions in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia er rel. Virginia State
Bar and United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Assn. These
decisions held that the rights of workers to associate for the selection of legal counsel was
a right protected by the First Amendment, including the right to petition clause.
Based upon the issues in those decisions, later decisions concerning the right of
access to the courts without paying filing fees, which do not mention such clause, and our
understanding of the historical background of that clause, we are of the opinion that the
First Amendment is not relevant to our present inquiry.
Id. at 758-59 (en banc) (citations omitted); see also Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation
Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 335 (1985) (noting a "conceptual difficulty" in applying the union
litigation cases to an individual claim because "the First Amendment interest at stake was
primarily the right to associate collectively" rather than an individual's interest in prosecuting
his own claim to his best advantage); Spanbauer, supra note 4, at 43-49 (reading Button and its
progeny as requiring the presence of another First Amendment freedom, whether political
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directly state the right of court access under the Petition Clause as separate from
and independent of other First Amendment freedoms.
5. An Individual Right of Court Access Under the Petition Clause
In 1972, the Court launched a new doctrine of court access in California
Motor Transport. The pronouncement initially garnered little attention in the
field of constitutional litigation. Indeed, because the Court in California Motor
Transport was applying an antitrust doctrine, the Noerr-Pennington immunity,
some courts and commentators questioned if its discussion of court access was a
constitutional precept or merely an application of antitrust law. However, in
1983, the Court applied California Motor Transport in a labor case, Bill
Johnson's Restaurants v. NLRB,74 and opened the door for more widespread
recognition of a right of access under the Petition Clause. The Court is not
retreating from its position. In 1993, the Court returned to the question of court
access under Noerr-Pennington and extended broad, though not absolute, First
Amendment protection to court access in civil suits.
Court access under the Petition Clause began with the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine. Noerr-Pennington is a rule of statutory construction that has
constitutional dimensions. The starting point was the 1961 case of Eastern
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,75 which was an
antitrust dispute between truckers and railroads. The truckers complained that the
railroads had acted with "the sole motivation" to "injure the truckers and
eventually to destroy them as competitors" in persuading the governor of
Pennsylvania to veto a bill that would have benefited truckers.76 The Court, in an
opinion by Justice Black, held that the complaint did not state a cause of action
under the antitrust laws because the only alleged harm came from lobbying
efforts. It reached this result by reading the Sherman Act more narrowly than its
literal terms.77 Though the Court cited more than one policy basis for its
speech or associational activity, before the Court will protect access to court). But see Robert
H. Birkby & Walter F. Murphy, Interest Group Conflict in the Judicial Arena: The First
Amendment and Group Access to Courts, 42 TEX. L. REv. 1018, 1043 (1964) (citing Terral v.
Burke, 257 U.S. 529 (1922), and noting that Button "may be only a logical extension of earlier
decisions holding access to the courts to be constitutionally protected right of individuals'). I
further discuss the distinction between a collective and individual right of access infra Part
II.A.
74 459 U.S. 942 (1982).
75 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
7 6 See id. at 129.
77 Under its literal terms, the Sherman Act would outlaw lobbying efforts if done
collectively in restraint of trade or to monopolize trade. Section 1 states that "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
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narrowing of the Act,78 Justice Black explained that the Sherman Act could not
apply to lobbying activity because "such a construction... would raise important
constitutional questions. The right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by
the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent
to invade these freedoms."79 Thus, though Noerr is a principle of statutory
construction, it is one made necessary by the First Amendment.80
The Court, however, has stated some key definitional elements of this
petitioning immunity. First, in Noerr, the Court explained that the immunity was
not absolute:
There may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed
toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is
actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business
relationships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be
justified. But this certainly is not the case here.81
Yet, the Noerr Court also explained that the anti-competitive intent of the
railroads was irrelevant so long as their lobbying efforts were aimed at obtaining
governmental action.82 Likewise, the Court four years later, in United Mine
among the several States... is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Section 2 declares
that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States... shall be deemed guilty of a felony." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
78 The Court noted that the legislative history of the Act did not suggest any intent to
legislate political, as opposed to business, activity. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137. This has been
termed the "essential dissimilarity" rationale for Noerr-Pennington; in other words, the activity
that the Sherman Act was meant to regulate is essentially different from political activity. See,
e.g., McGowan & Lemley, supra note 4. This rationale grew out of the "Parker doctrine'
under which "the Court was unanimous in the conclusion that the language and legislative
history of the Sherman Act would not warrant the invalidation of a state regulatory program as
an unlawful restraint upon trade." Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137-38 (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341,352 (1943)).
7 9 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138.
807Tat the Court based its decision on statutory construction rather than constitutional
grounds is made clear in its footnote:
The answer [defendant's pleading] ... also interposed a number of other defenses,
including the contention that the activities complained of were constitutionally protected
under the First Amendment.... Because of the view we take of the proper construction
of the Sherman Act, we find it unnecessary to consider any of these other defenses.
Id. at 132 n.6.
81 Id. at 144 (emphasis added).
82 Te Court explained that motive was irrelevant under the Petition Clause so long as the
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Workers v. Pennington,83 emphasized that Noerr immunity applies even though
the defendant had the specific intent to eliminate his competitor through his
lobbying efforts.84 Thus, the right is broad, in the sense that bad motive does not
compromise the right, but narrow in that the petition must not be a sham.
In 1972, the Court issued its decision in California Motor Transport v.
Trucking Unlimited85 and expanded the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to apply to
adjudication. There, truckers in California complained that defendants, a
competing group of truckers, had consistently interfered with their administrative
and judicial efforts to acquire, transfer, or register operating rights. The alleged
interference primarily took the form of what the Court described as a "pattern of
baseless, repetitive claims."86 The Ninth Circuit held that Noerr-Pennington was
not applicable because the activity was not traditional lobbying but instead
adjudicatory efforts before courts and administrative agencies.87 Justice Douglas,
writing for the Court in California Motor Transport, disagreed:
The same philosophy governs the approach of citizens or groups of them to
petition itself seeks governmental action:
The right of the people to inform their representatives in government of their desires with
respect to the passage or enforcement of laws cannot properly be made to depend upon
their intent in doing so. It is neither unusual nor illegal for people to seek action on laws in
the hope that they may bring about an advantage to themselves and a disadvantage to their
competitors.... Indeed, it is quite probably people with just such a hope of personal
advantage who provide much of the information upon which governments must act A
construction of the Sherman Act that would disqualify people from taking a public
position on matters in which they are financially interested would thus deprive the
government of a valuable source of information and, at the same time, deprive the people
of their right to petition in the very instances in which that right may be of the most
importance to them. We ... hold that, at least insofar as the railroads' campaign was
directed toward obtaining governmental action, its legality was not at all affected by any
anti-competitive purpose it may have had.
Id at 139-40.
83 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
84 Small coal mine operators charged that the UMW and large coal companies had
collectively lobbied the Secretary of Labor and the TVA for regulations and practices that
would drive the small operators out of business. See id. at 659-61. The Court held that these
efforts could not constitute a violation of the antitrust laws: "Joint efforts to influence public
officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition." Id. at
670.
85 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
86 Id. at 510.
87 See Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transp. Co., 432 F.2d 755, 758-59 (9th
Cir. 1970).
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administrative agencies (which are both creatures of the legislature, and arms of
the executive) and to courts, the third branch of the Government Certainly, the
right to petition extends to all departments of the Government The right of
access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right ofpetition.88
Justice Douglas did not cite, as support for this "new" constitutional precept,
the union litigation cases, such as Button and Railroad Trainmen.89 This is
surprising given the contemporaneous timing of the two lines of cases and the
fact that the union cases expressly tied the right of petition to civil litigation. The
only limitation of the union cases was that they involved group adjudication and
thus implicated the right of assembly, but California Motor Transport also
alleged concerted "group" litigation efforts by the highway carriers.
Nevertheless, Justice Douglas did not rely on this ground. To the contrary, he
noted that the right of court access under the Petition Clause applies to "citizens
or groups of them." 90 Instead, Justice Douglas cited two prisoner cases-Hull
and Avery-as his only support (other than Noerr and Pennington) for the court
access principle.91 This is an ironic choice given that Hull and Avery themselves
cited no independent constitutional basis--other than the Habeas Clause-and
were part of the prisoner line of cases in which the Court never relied upon the
Petition Clause.92
Another irony of the California Motor Transport decision is that the Court
found that the litigation at issue was not protected by Noerr-Pennington
petitioning immunity. The filings were unprotected, not because they were
adjudicative, but rather because they were sham. The Court offered a variety of
explanations as to why the challenged litigation was sham.93 One was that the
88 California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 510 (emphasis added).
89 Justice Douglas cited Button, but he did not do so to support the assertion that the right
to petition encompasses access to court. Instead, he used Button to explain the Noerr "sham"
exception. "First Amendment rights may not be used as the means or the pretext for achieving
'substantive evils' which the legislature has the power to control.'Id at 515 (quoting NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963)). Justice Stewart in his concurrence cited Button. He
stated-in arguing for a more narrow definition of sham litigation-there is "no
difference... between trying to influence executive and legislative bodies and trying to
influence administrative and judicial bodies." Id at 517 (Stewart, J., concurring).
90 Id. at 510 (emphasis added).
91 See id; see also discussion supra notes 42-46.
92 See discussion supra Part I.A.3.
93 For example, the Court made the following seemingly contradictory statement about
sham litigation:
Petitioners, of course, have the right of access to the agencies and courts to be heard
on applications sought by competitive highway carriers. That right, as indicated, is part of
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filings were baseless.94 The defendants allegedly filed their court papers "with or
without probable cause and regardless of the merits of the cases. '95
The principle that the Petition Clause protects a right of court access in civil
cases did not immediately take hold. This hesitation may have resulted from
confusion about the Court's varied definitions of sham litigation. 96 In addition,
some courts and observers questioned whether the principle was an independent
constitutional doctrine at all. Perhaps the best example is Judge Posner's opinion
in Grip-Pak Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc.,97 in which he opined that
California Motor Transport was not a matter of constitutional law, but instead an
"antitrust principle:"
The holding [in Noerr] was presented as an interpretation of the Sherman Act
rather than of the First Amendment, but one strongly influenced by the First
the right of petition protected by the First Amendment. Yet that does not necessarily give
them immunity from the antitrust laws.
It is well settled that First Amendment rights are not immunized from regulation
when they are used as an integral part of conduct which violates a valid statute.
California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 513-14. In addition, the Court suggested that the sham
exception was broader-and therefore provided less First Amendment protection-for
adjudicative proceedings than for executive or legislative lobbying. See id. at 512-13 ("The
political campaign operated by the railroads in Noerr to obtain legislation crippling truckers
employed deception and misrepresentation and unethical tactics.... Misrepresentations,
condoned in the political arena, are not immunized when used in the adjudicatory process.").
94 The Court explained:
[A] pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may emerge which leads the factfinder to
conclude that the administrative and judicial processes have been abused. That may be a
difficult line to discern and draw. But once it is drawn, the case is established that abuse of
those processes produced an illegal result, viz., effectively barring respondents from
access to the agencies and courts.
Id. at 513.
95 Id. at 512.
96 See Balmer, supra note 4, at 47 (discussing the confusion and "perplexity" of
California Motor Transport's sham exception, particularly its use of court access doctrine to
describe the acts of both plaintiffs and defendants); William R. Jacobs, The Quagmire
Thickens: A Post-California Motor View of the Antitrust and Constitutional Ramifications of
Petitioning the Government, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 281, 301 (1973) ("The California Motor
decision, by its loose language, created or let fester more problems than it solved.").
97 694 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1982). In Grip-Pak, a maker of "six-pack" plastic rings for
beverage cans sued a competitor for theft of trade secrets and related claims. The competitor
then claimed in federal court that the first suit was an antitrust violation. Judge Posner, writing
for the court, held that the factual and legal merit of the first suit did not by itself render the suit
immune from antitrust liability. See id. at 473.
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Amendment ... Although [the Court in California Motor Transport] said that
"the right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition,"
this statement was used as the fulcrum to lever the petitioners out of range of the
First Amendment by characterizing the alleged conspiracy as one to prevent the
respondents from exercising their legal rights to obtain and transfer operating
rights....
It takes a rather free-wheeling imagination to extrapolate from the
California Motor Transport opinion a principle that if applied across the board
would... make the tort of abuse of process invalid under the First
Amendment;98 and we decline to do so-noting, also, that the Court used the
language of abuse of process to describe the kind of litigation activity that the
First Amendment does not protect But it is a separate question whether, as a
matter of antitrust principle, the Sherman Act should be interpreted to forbid
using litigation to suppress competition. 99
Judge Posner recognized that the First Amendment protects some litigation, but,
despite Thomas and Railroad Trainmen, limited the protection to political cases,
such as Button.10 0
One year after Grip-Pak, the Supreme Court applied California Motor
98 Judge Posner used the tort of abuse of process-and what he considered to be the
universal view of the tort as constitutional-as a "fulcrum" (to use his term) to narrowly
interpret California Motor Transport:.
If all nonmalicious litigation were immunized from government regulation by the
First Amendment, the tort of abuse of process would be unconstitutional-something that,
so far as we know, no one believes. The difference between abuse of process and
malicious prosecution is that the former does not require proving that the lawsuit was
brought without probable cause. If abuse of process is not constitutionally protected, no
more should litigation that has an improper anticompetitive purpose be protected, even
though the plaintiff has a colorable claim.
Id. at 471 (citations omitted). This fulcrum (analogy to abuse of process) may not be as strong
today as in 1982. A few courts have held the First Amendment Petition Clause does in fact
limit certain extreme applications of the tort of abuse of process, such as that suggested by
Judge Posner. See supra note 9.
99 Grip-Pak, 694 F.2d at 471-72 (citations omitted).
100 Judge Posner stated:
[W]e do not believe that the extent of protection is invariant to the nature of the lawsuit-
that the efforts of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People to use
constitutional litigation to break down official segregation are entitled to no more
protection than the efforts of Illinois Tool Works to collect damages for an alleged theft of
trade secrets-or, if Grip-Pak is right, to drive a competitor out of business.
Id at 471 (citations omitted).
1999]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
Transport in a labor case and belied both the notion that California Motor
Transport was merely an antitrust principle and also that it protects only political
litigation. In Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB,' 0o an employer sued
picketing employees for alleged defamatory statements in the employees' leaflet.
The NLRB enjoined the defamation suit as an unfair labor practice, finding that
the employer filed it in retaliation against the workers' picketing. A unanimous
Court overturned the injunction.1 02 The Court was not blind to the fact that
employers and others can abuse litigation. Indeed, the Court discussed how an
employer could subvert the process and use a suit "as a powerful instrument of
coercion or retaliation." 10 3 Despite the great risk of abuse, however, the Court
found that "weighty countervailing considerations," including both the First
Amendment right of access to the courts and the states' interest in providing
remedies and protecting its citizens from injury, argued against allowing the
NLRB to enjoin the state suit.104
Though Bill Johnson's Restaurants was an exercise in statutory construction,
the construction, like Noerr-Pennington, was dictated at least in part by the
Petition Clause.105 Indeed, the Court repeatedly used strong First Amendment
101 461 U.S. 731 (1983). Bill Johnson'sRestaurants is discussed in more detail infra Part
mH.C.
102 Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court. See id. at 732. Justice Brennan filed the
only separate opinion, a concurring opinion. See id. at 750 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also
discussion infra notes 104-05.
103 BillJohnson's Restaurants, 461 U.S. at 740. The Court acknowledged that the burden
of such a retaliatory lawsuit is particularly high when filed by a powerful employer, against
hourly employees, such as the waitresses picketing Bill Johnson's Restaurants:
[B]y suing an employee who files charges with the Board or engages in other protected
activities, an employer can place its employees on notice that anyone who engages in such
conduct is subjecting himself to the possibility of a burdensome lawsuit. Regardless of
how unmeritorious the employer's suit is, the employee will most likely have to retain
counsel and incur substantial legal expenses to defend against it. Furthermore,... the
chilling effect of a state lawsuit upon an employee's willingness to engage in protected
activity is multiplied where the complaint seeks damages in addition to injunctive relief.
Where, as here, such a suit is filed against hourly-wage waitresses or other individuals
who lack the backing of a union, the need to allow the Board to intervene and provide a
remedy is at its greatest.
Id. at 740-41 (citations omitted).
104 See id. at 741.
105 The Court left open the possibility that it was merely construing the labor laws: it
noted both that it must be "sensitive to these First Amendment values in construing the NLRA
in the present context ' and that it was reluctant "to infer a congressional intent to ignore the
substantial state interest 'in protecting the health and well-being of its citizens."' Id. at 741-42
(quoting Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 302-03 (1977)). Justice Brennan's concurring
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language both in initially construing the labor laws10 6 and in defining what
"baseless" suits might fall outside the protection of its holding.10 7 This
recognition of the right of court access under the Petition Clause is important for
a number of reasons. First, the Court applied the Petition Clause doctrine outside
of antitrust Second, the Court did so in a private suit by one plaintiff. Unlike the
group litigation cases and California Motor Transport, Bill Johnson's
Restaurants did not involve collective efforts to litigate and could not rest on the
right of assembly.10 8 Nor was it a political suit such as Button. It raised simple
defamation claims. Thus, Bill Johnson's Restaurants opened the door to a
universal right of court access for individuals.
The Court has since reaffirmed that the Petition Clause independently
protects access to court. The first two affirmations of this right were dicta. First,
opinion likewise noted that the Court's responsibility was to interpret the labor laws but that the
interpretation had "constitutional resonances." Id. at 751 (Brennan, J., concurring).
106 For example, the Court ultimately held:
Considering the First Amendment right of access to the courts and the state
interests... we conclude that the Board's interpretation of the [NLRA] is untenable. The
filing and prosecution of a well-founded lawsuit may not be enjoined as an unfair labor
practice, even if it would not have been commenced but for the plaintiff's desire to
retaliate against the defendant for exercising rights protected by the Act.
Id at 742-43. The Court further noted:
In California Motor Transport v. Trucking Unlimited, we recognized that the right of
access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition .... "The right of
access to a court is too important to be called an unfair labor practice solely on the ground
that what is sought in court is to enjoin employees from exercising a protected right."
Id. at 741 (citations omitted) (quoting Peddie Bldgs., 203 N.L.RtB. 265,272 (1973)). Likewise,
Justice Brennan agreed that the Court had "recognized a ight under the First Amendment to
seek redress of grievances in state courts." Id. at 752 (Brennan, J., concurring).
107 "Just as false statements are not immunized by the First Amendment right to freedom
of speech, baseless litigation is not immunized by the First Amendment right to petition." Id. at
743 (citations omitted). For further discussion of the Court's standards for determining whether
suits are protected by the Petition Clause, see infra Part III.C.
108 The Court did not discuss the distinction between group or individual litigation.
Indeed, it did not cite any of the group litigation cases, such as Button, but instead cited only
California Motor Transport for the right of access to court under the Petition Clause. See Bill
Johnson's Restaurant, 461 U.S. at 741. California Motor Transport, on the other hand, stated
(in dictum) that the right extended to both "citizens or groups of them." California Motor
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1971). For further discussion of
whether the right to petition courts is a collective or individual right, see infra Part HIlA.
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in Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 10 9 the Court in dictum, stated that "[t]he First Amendment
right protected in Bill Johnson's Restaurants is plainly a 'right of access to the
courts... for redress of alleged wrongs."'"1 0 Second, in McDonald v. Smith, 111
the Court broadly stated, also in dictum, that the Petition Clause protects civil
court filings: "[F]iling a complaint in court is a form of petitioning activity."1 12
The Court's more significant pronouncement came in another antitrust case,
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.113
In this 1993 decision, the Court resolved a split in the circuits as to the definition
of sham litigation and granted broader Noerr-Pennington protection than had
been extended by some lower courts. 114 Unlike in California Motor Transport,
109 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
110 Id. at 897. In Sure-Tan, the Court narrowly interpreted the right of petition to apply
only to requests for remedy of legally cognizable wrongs. See id. The NLRB had found that the
employer had engaged in an unfair labor practice by reporting its employees to the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS), in retaliation for their efforts to unionize. See id. at 886-88.
The Court found that the employer's communications with the INS were not protected
petitioning activity because they "did not invoke the INS administrative process in order to
seek the redress of any wrongs committed against them." Id. at 897. This may be a proper
interpretation of the right to file adjudicatory petitions, but to the extent that the petition sought
merely to inform the executive, this may be an unduly narrow reading of the right to petition
the Executive Branch. See infra Part III.C.
111 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
112 Id. at 484 (citing Bill Johnson's Restaurants, 461 U.S. at 743, and California Motor
Transport, 404 U.S. at 513). McDonald did not involve litigation but instead defined the
proper test for allegedly defamatory statements made in an executive petition. For an extended
discussion of McDonald, see infra notes 313, 398-400.
113 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
114 The Court accepted certiorari in the case in order to resolve the confusion that
followed California Motor Transport. See id. at 56-57. For a discussion of this confusion, see
supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text. One recurring issue was whether an otherwise
meritorious lawsuit is sham simply because the plaintiff did not file the suit to win but instead
to hurt the defendant. See Professional Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 57 ('We left
unresolved in [California Motor Transport] the question presented by this case-whether
litigation may be sham merely because a subjective expectation of success does not motivate
the litigant. We now answer this question in the negative... ."). The Court suggested that this
confusion may have arisen from the tw6 meanings of the word "genuine" which it used in its
prior definitions of sham, and that "genuine has both objective and subjective connotations."
Id. at 61. The Court held that "sham" litigation must have both elements (both objectively
unreasonable and also improper motive), thus rejecting definitions that relied solely on a
subjective test:
[IT]he District court had no occasion to inquire whether Columbia was indifferent to the
outcome on the merits of the copyright suit, whether any damages for infringement would
be too low to justify Columbia's investment in the suit, or whether Columbia had decided
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the Court in Professional Real Estate Investors stated a fairly straight-forward
standard: all objectively reasonable civil suits are immune from antitrust
liability.115 In extending this protection, Justice Thomas, writing for the Court,
again used First Amendment language and relied in part upon Bill Johnson's
Restaurants, noting that the protection for civil filings was not just an antitrust
principle but also one that applied "in other contexts."'1 16 This was the Court's
last significant pronouncement concerning the right of court access under the
Petition Clause.
B. Current Status of the Right of Court Access Under the Petition
Clause
Though the Court recognized the right of court access under the Petition
Clause almost thirty years ago, the existence of a right to petition courts
undoubtedly continues to surprise some observers. The failure of the doctrine to
immediately garner attention is difficult to explain. The demise of due process as
a viable avenue for court access seemingly should have prompted repeated
reliance on the Petition Clause as an alternative basis for the right, but it
surprisingly did not do so. Even Bill Johnson's Restaurants, which was a
significant advancement of the right, went relatively unnoticed. Instead,
Professional Real Estate Investors, another antitrust case, seems to have been the
catalyst for more wide-scale recognition of the right. To be sure, some lower
courts and commentators had earlier concluded that "petitioning immunity"
protected court access outside of the area of antitrust.1 17 But in the six years
to sue primarily for the benefit of collateral injuries inflicted through the use of legal
process. Such matters concern Columbia's economic motivations in bringing suit, which
were rendered irrelevant by the objective legal reasonableness of the litigation.
Id at 65-66 (citation omitted).
115See Professional Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 57 ('We... hold that an
objectively reasonable effort to litigate cannot be sham regardless of subjective intent"). The
Professional Real Estate Investors definition of protected litigation is discussed in more detail
infra Part llI.C.
1 16 Id. at 59 ("Whether applying Noerr as an antitrust doctrine or invoking it in other
contexts, we have repeatedly reaffirmed that evidence of anticompetitive intent or purpose
alone cannot transform otherwise legitimate activity into a sham.").
117 See Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 705-06 (9th Cir. 1992)
(noting that the First Amendment right of petition is one of three sources of the right of court
access); McGuire Oil Co. v. Mapco, Inc., 958 F.2d 1552, 1562 (11th Cir. 1992) (applying
Noerr-Pennington to immunize a civil filing from liability under state unfair trade practices
statute because "the Noerr-Pennington doctrine rests in large part on the general First
Amendment guarantees of freedom to petition and freedom of association"); Hoeber v. Local
30, United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers, Damp and Waterproof Workers Ass'n, AFL-
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since Professional Real Estate Investors, there has been a relative flood of
recognition by both courts1 18 and scholars.1 19 The probable explanation is that
CIO, 939 F.2d 118, 126 (3d Cir. 1991) ('The filing of a lawsuit carries significant
constitutional protections, implicating the First Amendment right to petition the government
for redress of grievances, and the right of access to courts."); Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967,
971-72 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting three constitutional sources of the right of court access-
privileges and immunities, due process, and the right to petition); Acevedo v. Surles, 778 F.
Supp. 179, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (' The right of access to the courts is guaranteed by the First
Amendment right to petition the government for the redress of grievances."); Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. v. Bear Stems & Co., 791 P.2d 587, 596 (Cal. 1990) (en banc) (holding that the
tort of malicious interference with contract cannot derive from filing of a civil suit and noting
that the court previously had "been guided by the constitutional right to petition for relief of
grievances in interpreting the reach of the tort of malicious prosecution"); Protect Our
Mountain Env't, Inc. v. District Court for County of Jefferson, 677 P.2d 1361, 1365 (Col.
1984) (en banc) ("[he right to petition the government for redress of grievances necessarily
includes the right of access to the courts. Were it otherwise, the right to petition would have
little significance in the constitutional scheme of things.); King v. Levin, 540 N.E.2d 492 (fI1.
App. 1989) (applying California Motor Transport and its First Amendment immunity to limit
tort of interference with economic advantage); see also Balmer, supra note 4, at 56 ('CThe
antitrust immunity extended to good faith litigation by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is based
on the first amendment's protection of the right of petition and the freedom of association.");
Fischel, supra note 4, at 98 (arguing that Noerr-Pennington is a constitutional doctrine and that
"the Court's extension of the right to petition to adjudicatory bodies in California Motor
Transport was clearly correct'); David Goldberger, First Amendment Constraints on the
Award of Attorney's Fees Against Civil Rights Defendant-Intervenors: The Dilemma of the
Innocent Volunteer, 47 OHIo ST. L.J. 603 (1986) (analyzing fee awards under the First
Amendment right to petition but relying principally on group litigation cases such as Button);
Jacobs, supra note 96, at 293 n.52 (1973) ("It may seem surprising to equate the right of
petition with resort to the judiciary, but the right had its origins in appeals to Parliament sitting
as a court to redress private grievances.") (citations omitted); Spanbauer, supra note 4, at 43
("Given both the historical development of petitioning and the tripartite system of govemment
established by the Constitution, the First Amendment Petition Clause should be read to
encompass a substantive right of access to the courts."); Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Conundrum,
26 GA. L. REV. 901, 934 (1992) ("[T]he Supreme Court has long held that the First
Amendment right to petition prohibits punishing persons who pursue legitimate litigation for
an apparently improper purpose."); Waldman, supra note 4, at 968 (noting that "[t]he right to
obtain a remedy and to access the courts for assistance has its genesis in the First Amendment"
but relying principally on group litigation cases such as Button); Note, First Amendment Right
ofAccess, supra note 38, at 1059 ("In a tripartite system of government, any meaningful right
to petition must extend to the judiciary."); Note, Suits Against the Government, supra note 12
(arguing that suits against the government are protected under the Petition Clause).
118 See, e.g., Monsky v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 1997) ("It is 'well
established that all persons enjoy a constitutional right of access to the courts, although the
source of this right has been variously located in the First Amendment right to petition for
redress, the Privileges and Immunities Clause... and the Due Process Clauses....");
Proportion Air, Inc. v. Buzmatics, Inc., 1995 WL 360549 (Fed. Cir. June 14, 1995) (relying on
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Professional Real Estate Investors standard, vacating judgment for defendant on counterclaims
for tortious interference and abuse of process, and remanding for district court to make specific
finding of whether the main claim was objectively baseless); Whelan v. Abell, 48 F.3d 1247,
1254-55 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("As Noerr-Pennington rests on the conclusion that the filing of
claims in court or before administrative agencies is part of the protected right to petition, it is
hard to see any reason why, as an abstract matter, the common law torts of malicious
prosecution and abuse of process might not in some of their applications be found to violate the
First Amendment."); San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424, 434 (3d Cir. 1994) (filing of
'lawsuits... implicate[s] the petition clause, rather than the free speech clause, of the first
amendment"); Lyon v. Vande Krol, 940 F. Supp. 1433, 1437 (S.D. Iowa 1996) (recognizing a
fundamental right of court access under the right to petition); Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Amoco Corp.,
926 F. Supp. 948, 955-56 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (applying Noerr-Pennington to state claims
attacking the filing of a patent suit: "The majority of courts who have considered the issue have
concluded that the immunity is constitutional and rooted in the First Amendment right to
petition"); Armuchee Alliance v. King, 922 F. Supp. 1541, 1549 (N.D. Ga. 1996) ('lt is well-
established that 'the right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to
petition the Government for redress of grievances."'); Scioto County Reg'l Water Dist. No. 1
v. Scioto Water, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 692, 701-02 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (holding that the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine is "grounded on the First Amendment principle that an individual or entity
has the right to pursue legitimate efforts to influence government decision-making and to
approach the courts in order to obtain redress of grievances" and "applies whether those efforts
are challenged under federal antitrust law or under state law"); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v.
American Fundware, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1516, 1522 (D. Col. 1993) (surveying the "numerous"
cases "in which the Noerr-Pennington doctrine has been applied to non-antitrust claims" and
stating that the doctrine "is fundamentally based on First Amendment principles"); Kellar v.
Von Holtum, 568 N.W.2d 186, 192-93 (Minn. App. 1997) (noting that Noerr-Pennington
applied outside antitrust and was an additional ground for rejecting the torts of abuse of process
and malicious prosecution); DeVaney v. Thriftway Mktg. Corp., 953 P.2d 277, 284-85 (N.M.
1997) (recognizing right of court access under the Petition Clause and narrowly construing tort
of misuse of process); RRR Farms, Ltd. v. American Horse Protection Ass'n, Inc., 957 S.W.2d
121, 129 (Tex. App. 1997) (surveying the cases and recognizing that Noerr-Pennington is
"fundamentally based on First Amendment principles" and "bars litigation arising from injuries
received as a consequence of First Amendment petitioning activity, regardless of the
underlying cause of action'); see also supra notes 9-10.
119 See, e.g., Aaron R. Gary, First Amendment Petition Clause Immunity From Tort
Suits: In Search of a Consistent Doctrinal Framework, 33 IDAHO L. REv. 67, 88 (1996)
(concluding that Noerr-Pennington is a constitutional doctrine that applies to civil litigation in
other contexts); Lawson & Seidman, supra note 4, at manuscript pp. 19-20 (recognizing a
right to petition federal courts); Myers, supra note 4, at 1240 (noting that "Noerr, California
Motor Transport, and Professional Real Estate Investors establishes that the First Amendment
right to petition constrains the types of litigation activities that can be penalized under the
Sherman Act" and that "[t]here is no reason to believe, however, that these principles are
limited to antitrust cases"); Charles C. Hsieh, Note, Professional Real Estate: The Line Between
Patent and Antitrust, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 173, 185 (1993) (recognizing that the right to
petition covers right of access to courts but noting a "doctrinal gap" in Court precedent as to the
extent of that protection). But see David Franklin, Comment, Civil Rights vs. Civil Liberties?
The Legality of State Court Lawsuits Under the Fair Housing Act, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1607
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Professional Real Estate Investors for the first time provided a clear standard for
Noerr's judicial petitioning immunity-objectively reasonable suits.
Unfortunately, few commentators or courts have accompanied this new
recognition with meaningful analysis. In the first place, there is a dearth of
analysis concerning whether the Petition Clause appropriately applies to courts at
all. Even the Supreme Court has not given any historical, textual, or policy basis
for this application. It has discussed the history of the right to petition generally
in other contexts, 120 but it has not explained how, if at all, this history justifies
application of the right to court access. Professor Pfander provides the most
thorough analysis of the historical and textual basis for extending the right to
petition to the courts, and he makes a compelling case.121 However, his analysis
is directed to the question of sovereign immunity and litigation against the
government as a party defendant, not the broader issue of whether the right to
petition includes a right of court access for all civil litigation. 122
Second, observers tend to overlook that a right of court access under the
Petition Clause may have unique meaning and effect. Many lower courts simply
describe the right to petition as an additional ground for court access, apparently
one without any independent significance from other court access doctrines.1 23
(1996) (arguing that civil suits are and should be within the definition of illegal activity under
the Fair Housing Act and that Noerr-Pennington is not a constitutional doctrine though civil
suits can have some First Amendment elements, such as in Button); Thies Kolln, Comment,
Rule 11 and the Policing ofAccess to the Courts After Professional Real Estate Investors, 61 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1037, 1064-67 (1994). Kolln notes that Noerr and Professional Real Estate
Investors have two possible rationales- the Petition Clause and the "proper functioning of
govemment' rationales-and preferring the latter because it has lesser repercussions:
[G]iven the Court's emphasis on the proper-functioning-of-government rationale for
Noerr over the First Amendment issues, it seems improbable that Professional Real
Estate Investors was meant to be a revision of an entire aspect of First Amendment
jurisprudence ... If it extends the right-to-petition analysis of Noerr, then Professional
Real Estate Investors effectively mandates an objective test of intent for all sanctioning
mechanisms that police access to the courts-not only Rule 11, but common law torts
such as malicious prosecution and abuse of process as well.
Id.
120 Perhaps the most extensive analysis of the Petition Clause came in McDonald, but
some scholars have criticized McDonald as inaccurate. See supra note 4; infra notes 328, 397.
121 See Pfander, supra note 4.
122 Nevertheless, Professor Pfander's work provides the best starting point for a broader
historical analysis of the right of court access under the Petition Clause, and is discussed in
more detail infra Part II.B.
12 3 See Monsky v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting three
constitutional sources of the right of court access-privileges and immunities, due process, and
the right to petition-and not distinguishing the rights in its analysis); Los Angeles County Bar
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Ironically, this comes at both ends of the spectrum. Courts equate the right of
access under the Petition Clause with either the narrow right under due
process 124 or, at the other extreme, with the broad right of prisoners. 125 But, as
the court access cases of the 1970s demonstrate, these two doctrines differ
widely in their level of protection, and the Petition Clause right of access may
have unique dimensions as well.
Even the authorities that recognize the Petition Clause right of court access
as an independent freedom fail to give it sufficient attention. Instead, these
authorities tend to merely import one test or definition, developed in a particular
context, and apply it to all court petition cases without first considering whether
it is the proper standard. Many courts, for example, apply the Professional Real
Estate Investors antitrust definition of sham litigation-the objectively
reasonable claim test-to determine whether a court rule or other law improperly
infringes on the right to petition the courts. 126 This definition may be appropriate
in some cases, but as discussed in Part Il of this Article, it is not the standard
that the Court applied in Bill Johnson's Restaurants.12 7 Most authorities
overlook this difference and the possibility that Bill Johnson's Restaurants, and
its "win-lose" distinction, may instead be the proper constitutional test.
Moreover, the difference between Bill Johnson's Restaurants and
Professional Real Estate Investors merely addresses one aspect of defining the
Petition Clause right of court access-the requisite merit of the underlying
action. A number of other questions remain as to proper contours of the right
Ass'n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 705 (9th Cir. 1992) (same); Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 971-
72 (5th Cir. 1983) (same).
124 See Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985)
(dismissing summarily a Petition Clause challenge to a limitation on the amount that veterans
may pay lawyers in benefit proceedings before the Veterans Administration and suggesting
that the First Amendment challenge asked the same question as that under due process,
whether the process allowed claimant to make a meaningful presentation); Barrett v. Baird, 908
P.2d 689, 696-98 (Nev. 1995) (holding that the right of court access challenge to imposition of
attomey fees is a due process issue and subject to "the lowest level of judicial scrutiny-the
'rational basis test."').
125 See Simond v. Dickhart, 804 F.2d 182 (1st Cir. 1986) (recognizing a prisoner's right
of access to court under due process, privileges and immunities, and the right to petition and
holding that this singular "right" is violated where prison officials withhold legal materials).
This distinction may become even more important as prisoners attack the Prison Litigation
Reform Act's (PLRA) limitation on a prisoner's ability to proceed informa pauperis. Compare
Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1997) (upholding the "three strikes" provision of the
PLRA against a challenge that it was an unconstitutional infringement on the prisoner's right of
access to courts), with Lyon v. Vande Krol, 940 F. Supp. 1433 (S.D. Iowa 1996) (holding that
the "three strikes" provision of the PLRA violated equal protection).
126 See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 117-18.
127 For a detailed discussion of these different standards, see infra Part ln.C.
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itself. One is whether the right to petition courts extends beyond the mere filing
of the complaint. Some courts have applied the right to various stages of
litigation, such as motions and appeals, without first considering whether the
right extends beyond initial access.128 Likewise, whether the right to petition
courts is a collective or individual right is still a source of some uncertainty. 29
Finally, courts and commentators have not adequately analyzed how to
protect the right (even assuming it is properly defined). 130 This is surprising
given the varied degree of protection the Court gives other constitutional rights,
especially First Amendment freedoms. A single test or rule does not strike the
proper balance in all speech cases, and there is little reason to believe that it will
in judicial petition cases.131 For example, under the prior restraint rule, a
128 See Quinon v. FBI, 86 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (applying Petition Clause
protection of court access to a motion to recuse); Hirshfeld v. Spanakos, 909 F. Supp. 180
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (applying Professional Real Estate Investors' sham test to determine if
defendant's motion to stay district court's order on appeal was a violation of plaintiff's right of
access to court). But see Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 706 (9th Cir.
1992) (noting that the right of court access is only "the right to pass through the courthouse
doors and present one's claim for judicial determination"); cf. Fowler V. Harper & Edwin D.
Etherington, Lobbyists Before The Court, 101 U. PENN. L. REv. 1172 (1953) (criticizing
Supreme Court's limitation on amicus curiae briefs as infringing upon the right to "lobby" the
govemment). As I explain more fully in Part I.B, I contend that the right of court access under
the Petition Clause is one of filing an initial claim only and that it does not protect substantive
rights or subsequent procedure.
129 See supra note 73. 1 discuss this issue in infra Part IA.
130 A notable exception among the judicial treatment of the right is the Third Circuit's
discussion in San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424 (3d Cir. 1994). There, the court
considered whether a state's alleged retaliatory discharge of a university professor who had
filed grievances and lawsuits against the university violated that employee's right to petition.
The court considered at length the Supreme Court's petition cases and free speech cases and
their policies and declined to apply the political speech test that applies to a government's
retaliatory firing of an employee for his speech. See id. at 434-43. A few academic
commentators have applied, with varying degrees of success, speech doctrine to court petition
cases. See Natalie Abrams, The Sham Exception to the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine: A
Commercial Speech Interpretation, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 573 (1983) (discussing the commercial
speech doctrine); Robert P. Faulkner, The Foundation ofNoerr-Pennington and the Burden of
Proving Sham Petitioning: The Historical Constitutional Argument in Favor of a "Clear and
Convincing" Standard, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 681 (1994) (arguing for application of New York
Times clear and convincing burden to sham issue in antitrust cases); McGowan & Lernley,
supra note 4, at 374-97 (analyzing right to petition and court access under "public fora!' and
"chilling effece' speech doctrines); Joseph S. Faber, Note, City of Long Beach v. Bozek: An
Absolute Right to Sue the Government?, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1258 (1983) (proposing that a
heightened New York Times speech standard apply to right to petition court access analysis to
protect citizen suits against the government).
131 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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regulation that might pass scrutiny as a penalty after the underlying litigation is
finished may fail if it is applied to prevent filing of the suit in the first place.
Seemingly, as in the case of free speech, a prior restraint on exercise of the right
to petition demands stricter scrutiny than a subsequent punishment.132 Yet,
despite the example of speech cases, courts, for the most part, have not
recognized distinctions such as this in court access challenges under the Petition
Clause. 133
This lack of analysis can cause more than mere confusion. Without more
meaningful thought, the right of court access under the Petition Clause could
become either so weak that it is meaningless or so ill-defined that it cuts too wide
a swath. To be sure, the right of access to court under the Petition Clause is a
"new" constitutional precept, at least in the eyes of most observers.
Constitutional analysis takes years of refinement. The Court is still developing
the myriad of speech tests. No single case or article, including this one, can fully
explore and define a constitutional right. But we must begin to give the right
serious consideration. In the remaining sections of this Article, I offer a starting
point for further thought and debate concerning the right of court access under
the Petition Clause.
II. THE HIsToRicAL, TEXTUAL, AND PoLIcY BASES FOR A RIGHT OF CouRT
ACCESS UNDER THE PETMON CLAUSE
A basic question seemingly overlooked by the Court in recognizing a right
of court access under the Petition Clause is whether there is any historical,
textual, or policy support for this conclusion. The average observer might say no.
To the extent that anyone-even a lawyer-would consider the "right to
petition" at all, he likely would envision a petition to his local zoning board or
letters to legislators urging passage or defeat of pending legislation, not a civil
complaint in a court of law. Unfortunately, there is a paucity of information to
tell us whether the drafters of the First Amendment actually intended the Petition
Clause to encompass civil court filings.
We can at least say that the history, text, and policies of the Clause are not
inconsistent with an application of the right to petition to the courts. In other
words, a plausible argument can be made that the Petition Clause does protect, at
least to some degree, a person's right to file a civil lawsuit. First, the right to
132 For a discussion of the prior restraint rule, see infra Part IV.C.
133 For example, in Wolfgram v. Wells Fargo Bank, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694, 704 (Cal. App.
1997), the court applied Bill Johnson's Restaurants---baseless litigation is not immunized by
the First Amendment right to petition"--to uphold a "vexatious litiganf' statute without fully
considering whether the injunction portion of the statute needed stricter scrutiny under the free
speech "prior restraint' rule. See discussion supra note 12.
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petition historically protected requests for some form of individual redress, even
if by the legislature. Second, the actual text of the clause extends the right to
petition the "government" and is not limited to a particular branch. Finally, the
policies served by petitioning-citizen participation in government and
opportunity for peaceful resolution of grievances-apply to the courts as well as
to the other branches of government.
A. The History of the Right to Petition
Until the First Amendment most written Anglo-American statements
concerning a right to petition were made in the context of the legislature, or, in
England, of both the Parliament and the King. They did not mention the "courts."
But this is not to say that the historical right to petition did not protect the right to
ask for redress of individual civil disputes. Both in England and in the colonies,
there was no separation of powers as we conceive of that doctrine today, and
petitions to the legislatures were often judicial in nature. The English Parliament
and colonial legislative assemblies performed judicial roles and resolved
individual grievances that today would constitute civil actions.134
1. The English Right to Petition
Most historians and constitutional scholars tie the right to petition to the
Magna Carta, which in 1215 gave English barons the right to petition the King-
if the King or his ministers violated other provisions of the Magna Carta.135
134 See generally Lawson & Seidman, supra note 4, at manuscript pp. 17-18. They note:
[l]he right to petition antedated modem notions of separation of powers; early English
governments... did not have clear demarcations between legislative, executive, and
judicial powers. They certainly did not recognize the kind of demarcations reflected in the
American Constitution. The same was largely true of colonial goverment... Petitions
sent to governmental bodies thus often sought what today we would regard as judicial
relief.
Id. at manuscript p. 18.
135 Chapter 61 of the original 1215 Magna Carta allowed the barons to present grievances
to the King:
Since, moreover, we have granted all the aforesaid things for God, for the reform of our
realm and the better settling of the quarrel which has arisen between us and our barons,
and since we wish these things to be enjoyed fully and undisturbed, we give them and
grant the following security: namely, that the barons shall choose any twenty-five barons
of the realm they wish, who with all their might are to observe, maintain and cause to be
observed the peace and liberties which we have granted and confirmed to them by this our
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Though the initial petitions were representative, by an appointed group of barons
to the King, they evolved into direct petitions by individual subjects to the King,
or his council, and to Parliament as it developed.136 The nature of the petitions
also evolved. Petitions no longer were just complaints about the King. By the
fourteenth century, petitions had become both general-asking for relief that
would resemble modem day legislation-and individual-asking for relief of a
present charter, so that if we or our justiciar or our bailiffs or any of our servants offend
against anyone in any way, or transgress any of the articles of peace or security, and the
offence is indicated to four of the aforesaid twenty-five barons, those four barons shall
come to us or our justiciar, if we are out of the kingdom, and shall bring it to our notice
and ask that we have it redressed without delay.
1215 MAGNA CARTA, ch. 61, translated and reprinted in J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 333-35
(1965) (emphasis added). Some historians note that petitioning preceded the Magna Carta and
that the Magna Carta was itself a response to a petition to King John. See Lawson & Seidman,
supra note 4, at manuscript p. 7 (noting that "Magna Carta in 1215 was the result of one [ ]
episode in which King John had no choice but to accede to the petition of the powerful
barons"); Mark, supra note 4, at 2163-64 ('The practice of petitioning the King for redress
long antedated Magna Carta;" "Magna Carta is, however, hailed as the progenitor of English
constitutional liberty because it came to provide a formal check on royal authority that could be
exercised by other segments of English society.... ). For a discussion of the history of
petitioning in England, see Lawson & Seidman, supra note 4; Mark, supra note 4; Pfander,
supra note 4; Smith, supra note 4, at 1154-70; Spanbauer, supra note 3, at 22-27; Don L.
Smith, The Right to Petition for Redress of Grievances: Constitutional Development and
Interpretations 10-45 (1971) (unpublished dissertation in Government, Texas Tech University)
(on file with the Ohio State Law Journal).
136 Professor Spanbauer explains this development:
Over time [the representative petitioning of the barons as provided for in the Magna
Carta] became the customary practice, and various segments of society, including knights
and burgesses, were also granted audiences by the crown as the royal government's
financial needs increased. Like those of the barons, the petitions these representatives
presented on behalf of individuals and their communities were granted in exchange for
commitments to make payments to the crown.
This process ultimately led to the development of Parliament, whose advice and
consent was often sought by the royal government before it took action of any magnitude.
The king's council-which consisted of judges for the common law courts, officers,
lawyers, and jurists--comprised the core of Parliament, and the king received the
petitions through his ouncil .... [S]ome individuals appeared to personally present their
petitions. As a result, the demarcation between representative petitioning and individual
petitioning was blurred in Parliament's history.
Spanbauer, supra note 4, at 23; see also NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 4, § 16.53 (noting
that "as Commons became more important than the House of Lords, petitions for redress of
grievances began to be directed to it, instead of the Crown").
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judicial nature on private matters. 137 Although judicial courts already existed,
litigants petitioned the entity that they thought would give the desired relief.138
When early Parliaments received "judicial" petitions, Parliament often referred
the petitions back to the common law courts, but it also sent some to the King's
chancellor or acted upon the petitions directly.' 39
137 See generally 10 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 696 (3d ed. 1938)
(describing types of judicial and legislative petitions in fourteenth and fifteenth centuries).
Some historians believe that the individualized or judicial petitions predominated and that early
Parliaments functioned primarily as does a modem court:
Parliament, up to the time of the Tudors, was hardly thought of primarily or principally as
a legislature: it was still in reality 'The High Court of Parliament" That court then
retained the varied functions of the old Curia, as Parliament now does, but the judicial
functions bulked larger in men's minds than the legislative.
CHARLES HOWARD MclLwAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREMACY 109
(1979); see also JAMES S. HART, JUSTICE UPON PEnTION: THE HOUSE OF LORDS AND THE
REFORMATION OF JUSTICE 1621-1675, at 5 (1991) ("Parliament... had begun life as a
court .... The business of Parliaments became the business of rendering decisions in private
disputes between party and party.") (emphasis added).
13 8 See BRYCE LYON, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND
425-26 (1960). Lyon noted:
[The King's small council] was the core and essence of parliament; it drafted most of the
statutes, gave counsel, directed administration, and above all, dispensed justice.... [A]s
the High Court of Parliament, a court above all other courts, the small council resolved
difficult or doubtful judgments, provided remedies for new legal actions, and dispensed
equity, that is, justice, when for some reason it could not be secured in any other royal or
public court
Id.; see also NICHOLAS UNDERHILL, THE LORD CHANCELLOR 78 (1978) ('The reign of Edward
I [1272-1307] shows an enormous increase in the volume of petitions addressed to the king
and his council by suitors who saw better prospects of success with them than in the courts");
Mark, supra note 4, at 2166 ('The petitions did not recognize fine a priori distinctions in
categories of judicial, legislative, or executive authority, nor did they recognize a deep
theoretical gulf between public and private grievances.").
139 Professor Spanbauer credited this judicial petitioning practice as the origin of the
chancery courts:
The practice of petitioning also included quasi-judicial functions. When petitions were
presented to the council, the council would examine the petitioners and refer them to the
appropriate common law court. As the fourteenth century progressed, the council began
referring the growing number of petitions requesting individual relief to the king's chief
advisor, the lord chancellor, who was also a leading member of the council. The
chancellor would make a recommendation to the council, and the council would dispose
of these petitions. By the fifteenth century, the chancellor, subject to the king's approval,
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The "right' of individual English subjects to present any form of petition-
whether "legislative" or 'judicial"--was not sacrosanct. Petitioning activity was
sometimes punished.140 Nevertheless, scholars characterize the right to petition
possessed the authority to unilaterally refer and dispose of petitions. Sometimes
petitioners were summoned by the chancellor to appear and testify under oath. From this
process, an important branch of the judiciary emerged: The Court of Chancery.
Spanbauer, supra note 4, at 23-24 (footnotes omitted); see also K. Smellie, Right ofPetition, in
12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 98 (1985) ("From the right of petition have
developed.., the equity jurisdiction of the chancellor," if the petitions "could be satisfied in
the ordinary courts of law they were referred to the appropriate court;" "[i]f they asked relief
which known writ could give ... their petition was considered by the king in Council, in which
was concentrated for the time all of the powers of state."). See generally MCILwAIN, supra note
137, at 198-212 (describing the practice of and procedures for referral or handling of'Judicial"
petitions in Parliament); UNDERImLL, supra note 138 (describing origin of courts of chancery).
140 The English government, as Holdsworth explains, attempted from time to time to curb
some petitioning activity, including the so-called "tumultuous" petitions in the mid-17th
century:
Petitions multiplied during the years in which the Long Parliament sat. It was alleged by
Clarendon that some of them did not represent the views of their signatories; and it is
certain that the numbers who attended to present them, gave opportunities for that mob
violence which often interfered seriously with freedom of Parliamentary debate .... In
1647 there was such an outbreak of tumultuous petitions that Parliament made an
ordinance, "that it should be treason to gather and solicit the subscriptions of hands to
petitions." But this ordinance so offended all parties that Parliament was compelled within
two days to revoke it ... [In 1661] it then enacted that no petition to the King or
Parliament for the alteration of matters established in church or state was to be signed by
more than twenty persons, unless the petitions were approved by three or more justices of
the peace .... No petition was to be presented to the King or Parliament by more than ten
persons.
10 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 137, at 697; see also Lawson & Seidman, supra note 4, at
manuscript p. 8 ("In early times, petitioners did not enjoy any immunity from prosecution or
persecution for their petitioning activity."). One of the more infamous petition prosecutions
was the trial of the Seven Bishops. In 1688, King James II ordered the clergy of the Church of
England to read a declaration from their pulpits. Seven bishops filed a petition in which they
stated that the declaration was illegal and asked the King to excuse them from this declaration.
The King responded by arresting the seven Bishops and trying them for seditious libel. The
counsel for the bishops argued that it was not a crime to petition the King and that "to make it a
libel, it must be false, it must be malicious, and it must tend to sedition." Trial of the Seven
Bishops for Publishing a Libel (1688), reprinted in 5 THE FOuNDERS' CONSTITTioN, 193
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987). The jury acquitted the bishops. Many
commentators attribute this trial as the impetus for inclusion of a clause protecting the right of
petition in the English Bill of Rights in 1689. See infra notes 142-43; see also Schnapper,
supra note 4, at 312; Smith, supra note 4, at 1160.
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as part of the "fabric" of English constitutional law. 141 Petitioning was important
enough that it was one of the few individual rights exacted of William and Mary
in the 1689 Bill of Rights.' 42 The new English Bill of Rights guaranteed "that it
is the right of the subjects to petition the king, and all commitments and the
prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal" and "that for redress of all
grievances.., parliaments ought to be held frequently."'143
Whether this right to petition included a right to go to court is a difficult
matter to discern. One theory is that any right to petition the King included
access to courts.144 To be sure, England by 1689 had an elaborate court system,
including law courts and chancery courts, 145 but these courts did not constitute a
141 See Mark, supra note 4, at 2169. Professor Mark noted:
Petitioning came to be regarded as part of the Constitution, that fabric of political
customs which defined English rights. That is, by its use, petition came to be such a clear
part of English political life that, certainly by the seventeenth century, monarchial
challenge to a petition could be, and was, defended on the basis that petitioning was an
ancient right
Id. (footnotes omitted); cf. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 4, at manuscript p. 3 ("The most
important such proposition is that the First Amendment's Petitions Clause did not create the
right .... That right existed... as a background principle of republican governance.").
142 The 1689 Bill of Rights preserved few individual rights to the people. In addition to
the right to petition, the Bill of Rights included some individual rights that recently had been
subject to abuse, such as a prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual
punishment, but it principally addressed the rights of Parliament vis-a-vis the sovereign. See
IRVING BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING 164-66 (1965). Indeed,
Thomas Paine criticized the Bill of Rights as ignoring the people and throwing them a bone in
the form of the right to petition: "'The act, called the Bill of Rights... what is it but a bargain,
which parts of the government made with each other to divide powers, profits, and
privileges? ... and with respect to the nation, it said, for your share you shall have the right of
petitioning."' Id. at 165 (quoting THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN).
143 BILL OF RIGHTS (1689), reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BML OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 43 (1971). The English Bill of Rights followed the "glorious
revolution of 1688" and the ouster of James II in December 1688. William and Mary
consented to the Bill of Rights in 1689, as a condition of their accession to the throne after
James II fled England. See id. at 40-41.
144 Cf Pfander, supra note 4, at 956 ("Petition Clauses traditionally reflected the structure
of government or the locus of sovereignty: Blackstone's right to petition Parliament and the
King reflected his conception of the two-branch structure of government."); Spanbauer, supra
note 4, at 24 ("Due to the intermingling of the executive, legislative, and judicial functions of
governments, petitioning possessed a very broad meaning for the British citizenry....").
145 In 1768, Blackstone explained that England had a number of private and public
courts:
EThere are] several species and distinctions of courts of justice, which are acknowledged
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separate branch of government. English government had only two branches:
Parliament and the King. The King retained supreme authority over the
courts. 14 6 Hence, any right to petition the King theoretically could include
petitions to his courts.
This argument may be too simple. Historical accounts suggest that
Englishmen viewed the right to go to court as a right distinct from their right to
petition. By 1685, litigants sought judicial relief directly from courts far more
often than indirectly through petitions to the King himself or to Parliament. 147 In
1765, the English legal historian, Sir William Blackstone, wrote to explain five
"subordinate" rights that protected all other rights of Englishmen. 148 Two of
and used in this kingdom. And these are either such as are of public and general
jurisdiction throughout the whole realm, or such as are only of a private and special
jurisdiction in some particular parts of it. Of the former there are four sorts; the universally
established courts of common law and equity, the ecclesiastical courts; the courts military;
and courts maritime.
3 WILIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *30.
14 6 Blackstone likewise explains that the King had authority over the courts ofjustice:
A court is defined to be a place wherein justice is judicially administred. And, as by
our excellent constitution the sole executive power of the laws is vested in the person of
the king, it will follow that all courts of justice, which are the medium by which he
administers the laws, are derived from the power of the crown. For whether created by act
of parliament, letters patent, or prescription, (the only methods of erecting a new court of
judicature) the kings consent in the two former is expressly, and in the latter impliedly,
given. In all these courts the king is supposed in contemplation of law to be always
present; but as that is in fact impossible, he is there represented by his judges, whose
power is only an emanation of the royal prerogative.
3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 145, at *23-24 (footnotes omitted).
147 Holdsworth explains that as courts, including courts of chancery, became more
established, the number ofjudicial petitions to King or Parliament decreased:
The most important function of the King's Council in Parliament in Edward I's reign
[1272-1307] was the receiving and answering of petitions. Some of these petitions asked
for a remedy which could be given by the courts of common law, others asked for a
remedy which the courts of common law were unable to give, others asked for a change
in or an addition to the law. The first two classes of petitions ceased in course of time to
be addressed to the King in Parliament, and came to be addressed to the appropriate
courts. Petitioners for these remedies took their cases direct to the common law courts, to
the court of Chancery, or, till 1640, to the Council or Star Chamber.
10 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 137, at 696.
14 8 Blackstone explains the nature of these five subordinate rights:
In the three preceding articles we have taken a short view of the principal absolute
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these five rights were the right of access to court and the right to petition, which
Blackstone described as separate rights:
A third subordinate right of every Englishman is that of applying to the
courts ofjustice for redress of injuries. Since the law is in England the supreme
arbiter of every man's life, liberty, and property, courts of justice must at all
times be open to the subject, and the law be duly administred therein....
If there should happen any uncommon injury, or infringement of the rights
beforementioned, which the ordinary course of law is too defective to reach,
there still remains a fourth subordinate right appertaining to every individual,
namely, the right of petitioning the king, or either house of parliament for the
redress of grievances. 149
But even under Blackstone's view, the right to petition protected access to
courts, albeit indirectly through the right to obtain judicial relief from Parliament
As Blackstone noted, petitions to Parliament or the King ensured relief where the
courts could not act. Before and after the English Civil War, Parliament acted as
a court and asserted both original and appellate jurisdiction over suits that today
would resemble private civil suits.150 Under this theory, the English Bill of
rights which appertain to every Englishman. But in vain would these rights be declared,
ascertained, and protected by the dead letter of the laws, if the constitution had provided
no other method to secure their actual enjoyment It has therefore established certain other
auxiliary subordinate rights of the subject, which serve principally as barriers to protect
and maintain inviolate the three great and primary rights, of personal security, personal
liberty, and private property.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 145, at *136. In addition to the rights to court access and to
petition, as quoted infra note 150, the remaining subordinate rights were "[tihe constitution,
powers, and privileges of parliament" "[t]he limitation of the king's prerogative," and the right
of the subjects "of having arms for their defense, suitable to their condition and degree, and
such as are allowed by the law" 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 145, at *136-37, *139.
149 Id. at *137-39.
150 For example, throughout most of the seventeenth century, the House of Lords
reasserted itself as a court and regularly acted in a judicial role. James S. Hart provides an
excellent history of the judicial work of the House of Lords in his book. See HART, supra note
137. His introduction gives an overview of this judicial work:
The petitioners represented all ranks of English society and all geographic areas of
the country. Their complaints reflected a broad range of problems from relatively
mundane disputes over real property, debt, inheritance, wages, contracts and a variety of
domestic matters, to more exceptional (and politically charged) appeals against unjust
imprisonments, arbitrary taxation, judicial malfeasance, excommunication, deprivation of
ecclesiastical livings and loss of public office. Some were brought originally as cases of
first instance. Others requested review of proceedings and decrees in inferior courts. The
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Rights did not need to independently preserve the right of access to courts. To
the extent that avenue to the courts was closed or abridged,151 the people still
could bring their judicial claims by petition to Parliament, which met to redress
"all grievances." Accordingly, the English model of the right to petition arguably
included some form of right to seek judicial redress, whether viewed as a petition
to the King, and therefore his courts, or as a form of back-up relief by
Parliament
2. The Right to Petition in Colonial and Revolutionary America
The experience in colonial America was similar to that in England. In fact,
many of the original colonial charters granted the colonists the same rights as
those of English subjects, thus enabling them to petition Parliament or the
King.152 Petitioning was important to colonial Americans. Their petitions to
England were one of the few means by which colonists could attempt to be heard
because they had no direct representation in Parliament.
The importance of the petition was reflected by the repeated references to
petitions in the American fight for independence. In 1765, the Stamp Act
Congress declared "[t]hat it is the right of the British subjects in these colonies,
to petition the King or either House of Parliament." 153 The First Continental
Congress again asserted in 1774 that colonists "have a right peaceably to
assemble, consider of their grievances, and petition the King; and that all
prosecutions, prohibitory proclamations, and commitments for the same, are
illegal."'154 Indeed, the failure of the petitioning process to achieve meaningful
relief was a factor spurring revolution. When the colonists declared their
independence, they complained in the Declaration of Independence that the King
only thing they seemingly had in common were insoluble legal problems which required
extraordinary remedy.
Id. at 3.
151 Blackstone noted that Parliament, but only Parliament, could alter the "third
subordinate right' of applying to court: "Not only the substantial part, or judicial decisions, of
the law, but also the formal part, or methods of proceeding, cannot be altered but by
parliament; for if once those outworks were demolished, there would be no inlet to all manner
of innovation in the body of the law itself." 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 145, at *137-38.
152 See generally Smith, supra note 135, at 47-57 (describing the colonial charters and
their general grants of the "liberties of an Englishman").
153 DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND GREVANCES, ART. 13 (1765), reprinted in 1
SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 198.
1 5 4 DECLARATION AND RESOLVES OF THE FIRST CONSTITUlmONAL CONGRESS (1774),
reprinted in I SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 217.
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had answered their previous petitions "only by repeated Injury."'155
American colonists did not just petition the distant government in England.
They also petitioned their local governmental bodies. A few colonies expressly
granted the right to petition the colonial government.' 56 The 1641 Massachusetts
Bay Colony Body of Liberties guaranteed a very broad right of petition that
expressly encompassed the right to file complaints in local courts:
Every man, whether Inhabitant or Sorreiner, free or not free, shall have libertie
to come to any publique Court, Councel or Towne meeting, and either by speech
or writeing, to move any lawfull, seasonable and materiall question, or to present
any necessary motion, complaint, petition, Bill or information, whereof that
meeting hath proper cognizance, so it be done in convenient time, due order and,
respective manner.
157
Even without an express grant, most colonists viewed the right to petition their
local governmental bodies as a fundamental "common law" right.158
When the new states prepared their individual declaration of rights or state
constitutions (under the Articles of Confederation, before the Constitution), they
continued to preserve the right to petition. Seven states included in their
constitutions a statement of the right to petition.159 Interestingly, these states did
155 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 21 (U.S. 1776) ("In every stage of these
Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble Terms: Our repeated Petitions
have been answered only by repeated Injury.").
156 See, e.g., THE MASSACHusETrS BODY OF LmERTES (1641), reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ,
supra note 143, at 73.
157 Id. (spelling as appears in the original). Some commentators have characterized the
Body of Liberties as one of the "most important [forerunners] of the federal Bill of Rights." Id.
at 69.
158 "The right of petition was regarded in the eighteenth century both in England and in
America as a natural right which despotism itself could hardly stoop to withhold. It was a
common law tradition in the colonies." Smellie, supra note 139, at 100.
159 In order of enactment, the seven states were Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
North Carolina, Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. See PENNSYLVANIA
DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS art. XVI (1776), reprinted in I ScHwARTZ, supra note 143, at
266 ('Chat the people have a right to assemble together, to consult for their common good, to
instruct their representatives, and to apply to the legislature for redress of grievances, by
address, petition, or remonstrance.'); DELAWARE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 9 (1776),
reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 277 ('That every man hath a right to petition the
Legislature for the redress of grievances in a peaceable and orderly manner."); MARYLAND
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XI (1776), reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 281
('That every man hath a right to petition the Legislature, for the redress of grievances, in a
peaceable and orderly manner."); NORTH CAROLINA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XVIII
(1776), reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 287 ('That the people have a right to
assemble together, to consult for their common good, to instruct their Representatives, and to
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not express the right to petition as broadly as it had been stated in England.
Englishmen had the right to petition both branches of government, Parliament,
and the King. Yet the new American states preserved the right, if at all, only as to
the legislature. Though we may never know the actual intent behind this
legislative limitation on the right to petition, the drafters of the early state
constitutions, like their English contemporaries, probably viewed the rights of
petition and judicial relief as closely linked.
First, as in England, the legislative bodies in many colonies heard and
resolved private disputes of a judicial nature. 160 The Massachusetts provincial
legislature regularly acted as a court of equity.161 The Connecticut General
apply to the Legislature, for redress of grievances."); VERMONT DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art.
XVIII (1777), reprinted in I SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 324 ('"hat the people have a right
to assemble together, to consult for their common good--to instruct their representatives, and
to apply to the legislature for redress of grievances, by address, petition or remonstrance.');
MASSACHUSETS DECLARATION OF RGHTS art. XIX (1780), reprinted in I SCHVARTZ, supra
note 143, at 343 ("The people have a right, in an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble to
consult upon the common good; give instructions to their representatives; and to request of the
legislative body, by the way of addresses, petitions, or remonstrances, redress of the wrongs
done them, and of the grievances they suffer."); NEW HAMPNsHE BILL OF RIGHTS art. XXXII
(1783), reprinted in I SCHVARTz, supra note 143, at 378-79 ('The people have a right in an
orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble and consult upon the common good, give
instructions to their representatives; and to request of the legislative body, by way of petition or
remonstrance, redress of the wrongs done them, and of the grievances they suffer."). The
Georgia, New Jersey, New York, and South Carolina constitutions did not contain any
guarantee of the right to petition. Nor did the Virginia or Connecticut Statement of Rights.
Rhode Island did not enact any new constitution or statement of rights, but merely continued its
charter. See generally 1 SCMVARTz, supra note 143, at 231-375 (reprinting the Georgia, New
Jersey, New York, and South Carolina constitutions and the Virginia and Connecticut
Declarations of Rights).
160 Whether all colonies had similar experiences is unknown. Most historians cite the
same colonies-Maryland, Virginia, and the New England colonies-as examples of
legislatures acting in judicial roles. See, e.g., MARY PATrERSON CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY
PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN COLONIEs 29 (1971). Clarke noted:
[lI]t is seen that in New England and the Chesapeake region, and on very rare
occasions elsewhere, the assembly considered itself a criminal court and actually judged
crimes and misdemeanors and inflicted penalties. In the same two regions, New England
and the old southern colonies of Virginia and Maryland, the assembly also had civil
jurisdiction.
Id.
161 An early note of the Harvard Law Review reports a sampling of 16 legislative equity
cases in the Massachusetts General Assembly from 1708-1720. See Judicial Action by the
Provincial Legislature of Massachusetts, 15 HARV. L. REV. 208 (1902). An example is the
petition of Eleazar Walker in which he asked for relief in equity against Joseph Tisdale for
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Assembly usually acted on more individual causes than on legislation. 162
Virginia and Maryland had similar experiences. 163 In his seminal work, The
Creation of the American Republic, Gordon Wood explained the judicial role of
the colonial legislature:
[The assemblies in the eighteenth century [] saw themselves, perhaps even
more so than the House of Commons, as a kind of medieval court making
private judgments as well as public law. Because the courts themselves were so
involved in governmental and administrative duties, it was inevitable that the
line between what was political and what was judicatory would be blurred. Both
the county sessions courts in Massachusetts and county courts in Virginia before
and after the Revolution remained crucially important governing bodies,
assessing taxes, directing expenditures on local projects, issuing licenses, and in
general monitoring the counties over which they presided. Although there is
some evidence that by the mid-eighteenth century the distinction between
Tisdale's failure to return property to Walker. Walker had given the property to Tisdale as
security for a debt. Walker claimed that he paid. The legislature ordered the case for hearing for
the next session of the General Assembly. See id. at 214; see also id. at 208 n.l. The editor of
this note observed:
In these records... the provincial legislature will often be found acting in ajudicial
capacity, sometimes trying causes in equity, sometimes granting equity powers to some
court of the common law for a particular temporary purpose, and constantly granting
appeals, new trial and other relief fromjudgments, on equitable grounds.
Id.
162 "In 1770, Connecticut's General Assembly promulgated only fifteen laws on its own
initiative, while acting on over 150 causes, in law and equity, brought by petitioners."
Higginson, supra note 4, at 146. For example, in 1770, the General Assembly entertained a
petition from David Christie against George Nichols and Daniel Benedict, which charged that
they had "in an undue manner by artful and oppressive means" gotten a deed from Christie.
After appointing a committee to investigate, the General Assembly declared "null and void"
both the deed and the note given by Nichols to Christie. See THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE
COLONY OF CONNECTICUT, MAY 1768-MAY 1772, at 320-21 (Charles J. Hoardley ed., 1885).
16 3 See CLARKE, supra note 160, at 30. Clarke notes:
Virginia and Maryland, in their early years, furnish illustrations of civil suits .... In
Virginia, the session of 1661 considered several disputes, mostly over the ownership of
land. In fact this session, during which no laws were passed, seems to have been given up
entirely to judicial procedure of one sort and another.
Id.; see also RAYMOND C. BAILEY, POPULAR INFLUENCE UPON PUBLIC POLICY: PErTONING IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY VIRGINIA 166 (1979) (describing the "origin and development of the
right of petition, the procedure used in the presentation and consideration of petitions, and the
impact of petitions upon the political process").
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legislative and judicial functions was beginning to harden, the assemblies
continued to exercise what we would call essentially judicial responsibilities,
largely, it appears, because of the political nature of the court system, the fear of
royally controlled judges, the dislike of gubernatorial chancery jurisdiction, and
the scarcity of trained judges. The assemblies constantly heard private petitions,
which often were only the complaints of one individual or group against
another, and made final judgments on these complaints. They continually tried
cases in equity .... 164
Thus, many early Americans would have viewed the right to petition the
legislature as including the right to present private disputes for resolution by the
legislature.165
Second, five of the seven states that expressly preserved the right to petition
also included a "remedy clause."1 6 6 Though the meaning of these remedy
16 4 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 154-
55(1969).
165 Moreover, Professor Mark argues that the statement in state constitutions of the right
to petition only in terms of the legislature was not a limitation on the traditional broader right of
petition and "did not mean that the petitioning of other branches of state governments was
barred or left unprotected." Mark, supra note 4, at 2200.
166 Again, in order of enactment, the first states were Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. See PENNSYLVANIA DECLARATIONS OF RIGHTS, § 26
(1776), reprinted in 1 SCHVARTZ, supra note 143, at 271 ("Courts of session, common pleas,
and orphans courts shall be held quarterly in each city and county; and the legislature shall
have power to establish all such other courts as they may judge for the good of the inhabitants
of the state. All courts shall be open, and justice shall be impartially administered without
corruption or unnecessary delay: All their officers shall be paid an adequate but moderate
compensation for their services: And if any officer shall take greater or other fees than the law
allows him, either directly or indirectly, it shall ever after disqualify him from holding any
office in this state."); DELAWARE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 12 (1776), reprinted in I
SCH ARTZ, supra note 143, at 277-78 ("That every freeman for every injury done him in his
goods, lands or person, by any other person, ought to have remedy by the course of the law of
the land and ought to have justice and right for the injury done to him freely without sale, fully
without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to the law of the land."); MARYLAND
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XVII (1776), reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 281
("That every freeman, for any injury done him in his person or property, ought to have remedy,
by the course of the law of the land, and ought to have justice and right freely without sale,
fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to the law of the land.");
MASSACHUSETTS DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XI (1780), reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra
note 143, at 342 ("Every subject of the Commonwealth ought to find a certain remedy, by
having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person,
property, or character. He ought to obtain right and justice freely, and without being obliged to
purchase it; completely, and without any denial; promptly, and without delay; conformably to
the laws."); NEWHAMPSHIREBILLOFRIGHTS art. XIV (1783), reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra
note 143, at 377 ("Every subject of this state is entitled to a certain remedy, by having recourse
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clauses are the subject of modem judicial and scholarly debate, most
commentators agree that a remedy clause at least protects some form of court
access. 167 Thus, the early state constitutions closely tracked Blackstone's
statement, eleven years earlier in 1765, of the rights to judicial relief and to
petition.' 68 The primary difference was the states' omission of the right to
to the laws, for all injuries he may receive in his person, property or character, to obtain right
and justice freely, without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and without any denial;
promptly, and without delay, conformably to the laws."). North Carolina, which had a petition
clause, limited its remedy clause to men in confinement. See NORTH CAROLINA DECLARATION
OF RIGHTS art. XIII (1776), reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 287 ("That every
freeman, restrained of his liberty, is entitled to a remedy..."). Vermont had a petition clause
but no form of remedy clause. See VERMONT DECLARATIONS OF RIGHTS (1777), reprinted in 1
SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 319-24. Connecticut, Georgia, New Jersey, New York, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, and Virginia had neither. See generally 1 SCHVARTZ, supra note 143,
at 231-375 (reprinting respective documents).
167 See infra note 206. Most states now have a form of "remedy" clause, but they word
and interpret them differently, prompting considerable debate and confusion as to their
meaning. See John H. Bauman, Remedies Provisions in State Constitutions and the Proper
Role of State Courts, 26 WAKE FOREsT L. REv. 237, 237 n.2 (1991) (noting that "[t]hese
provisions are variously called 'open courts,' 'access to courts,' 'remedy guarantee,' or just
'remedies' provisions" and that the names "reflect, in part, differences in the wording of the
provisions" and "different emphasis by the various state courts"); see also Hans A. Linde,
Without "Due Process," 49 OR. L. REV. 125, 138 (1970) (arguing that the Oregon clause is
"not a due process clause" because of its omission of the "law of the land" language). One
debate centers on whether the clause limits the legislature's ability to alter remedies. Compare
Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: The Orins of the Open Courts Clause of
State Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REv. 1279 (1995), with David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy,
65 TEMP. L. REv. 1197 (1992). A consensus exists that the clause at least protects "the right to
seek judicial redress for injuries or to protect right and interests recognized elsewhere in the
law." William C. Koch, Jr., Reopening Tennessee's Open Courts Clause: A Historical
Reconsideration ofArticle I, Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution, 27 U. MEMPHIS L. REV.
333, 437 (1997); see also Bauman, supra, at 284 (concluding that such a clause requires that
the courts "be open and accessible and forbids the imposition of arbitrary barriers before a
litigant may bring suit").
168 See supra note 149. The state constitutional "remedy clauses" and Blackstone's
statement of the third subordinate right "of applying to the courts of justice for redress of
injuries" have a common origin: Sir Edward Coke's interpretation of § 29 of the 1225 version
of the Magna Carta. Indeed, Blackstone in describing the right to petition and the right to
judicial remedy, quotes Sir Coke's interpretation of the Magna Carta:
The emphatical words of magna carta, spoken in the person of the king, who in judgment
of law (says Sir Edward Coke) is ever present and repeating them in all his courts, are
these; "nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut differemus rectum veljustitam: and therefore
every subject," continues the same learned author, "for injury done to him in bonis, in
terris vel persona, by any other subject, be he ecclesiastical or temporal without any
exception, may take his remedy by the courts of the law, and have justice and right for the
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petition the executive. Judicial relief retained its importance. Thus, the purpose
of the new limitation on the right to petition likely was not to change the nature
of the petition right which, as Blackstone had noted, included the ability to ask
for relief of a judicial nature, but instead to limit the power of the executive.
Third, the link between the right to petition the legislature and the right to
relief of a judicial nature persisted even though some states declared a separation
of powers between the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. 169 To be sure,
a reader today understandably could look at the paper structure of the early state
constitutions-petition rights expressed only as to the legislature, remedy
clauses, and, most importantly, declarations of separation of powers 17 0-and
injury done to him, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without
delay."
I BLACKSTONE, supra note 145, at "137-38; see also SIR EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART
OF THE INsTrrulrEs OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 55-56 (1642). Though legal historians object to
Coke's interpretation as reflecting his own time rather than that of the early thirteenth century,
most agree that Coke had a profound impact on American political thinkers in the eighteenth
century. For a discussion of this debate and Coke's influence on the remedy clauses of early
state constitutions, see generally Hoffman, supra note 167.
169 Not all states declared a separation of powers. Only three states-Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and Maryland-had all three constitutional provisions: the right to petition, a
remedy clause, and a separation of powers clause. Compare supra note 159 (petition), with
supra note 166 (remedy), and infra note 170 (separation of powers).
170 six states expressly declared separation of powers in their state constitutions. See
VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. V (1776), reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at
235 ('That the Legislative and Executive powers of the State should be separate and distinct
from the Judicative."); MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. VI (1776), reprinted in 1
SCHwARTZ, supra note 143, at 281 ('That the legislative, executive and judicial powers of
government, ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other."); NORTH CAROLINA
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. IV (1776), reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 286
("That the legislative, executive and supreme judicial powers of govemment, ought to be
forever separate and distinct from each other."); GEORGIA CONSTTTIloN art. I (1777),
reprinted in 1 SCHVARTZ, supra note 143, at 292 ('The legislative, executive, and judiciary
departments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly
belonging to the other."); MASSACHUSETTS DECLARATION OF RIGHTs art. XXX (1780),
reprinted in I SCHwARTZ, supra note 143, at 344 ("In the govemment of this Commonwealth,
the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of
them: The executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them:
The judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the
end it may be a govemment of laws and not of men.'); NEW HAMPsHIRE BILL OF RIGHTS art.
XXXVII (1783), reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 379 ("In the govemment of this
state, the three essential powers thereof, to wit, the legislative, executive and judicial, ought to
be kept as separate from and independent of each other, as the nature of a free government will
admit, or as is consistent with that chain of connection that binds the whole fabric of the
constitution in one indissoluble bond of union and amity.").
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conclude that the revolution signaled an end to any form of petition right that
also encompassed the right to present individual grievances for government
resolution. However, this view overlooks the nascent status of the doctrine of
separation of powers in early post-revolutionary America.
The state legislatures did not necessarily violate the principle of separation
of powers-as the people then conceived it-when it acted as a court. Early state
separation of powers proclamations primarily acted to separate and weaken the
executive, not the legislature.171 The state legislature, as the body of the people,
was supreme. People felt they had a natural right to ask this representative body
for whatever relief they desired. The state legislatures continued to oblige their
constituents by acting in a judicial role, despite constitutional "separation of
powers." Indeed, in the Federalist Papers, James Madison complained that in
Virginia, his home state and the first to expressly provide for separation of
powers in its constitution, 172 the legislature "in many instances, decided rights
which should have been left to judiciary controversy" and that the intrusion was
"becoming habitual and familiar."'173 It took the post-revolutionary experience
of the continued-and in some cases heightened-encroachment of legislatures
171 See infra note 173.
172 Virginia's 1776 statement of separation of powers is credited with being the "first
such statement in an organic instrument." 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 233.
173 THE FEDERALST NO. 48, at 62 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis in original) (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGNIA, 195
(Lester DeKoster ed., 1976)). Madison concluded that Virginia's declaration of separation of
powers was insufficient: "a mere demarcation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the
several departments, is not a sufficient guard against those encroachments which lead to a
tyrannical concentration of all the powers of govemment in the same hands." Id. Gordon Wood
offers an explanation of the meaning of the Virginia separation of powers clause:
This endorsement of legislative supremacy and encroachment into traditionally executive
and judicial functions, despite the emphatic declarations, as in the Virginia
Constitution... has understandably led historians to believe that the Americans in their
1776 constitutions meant by separation of powers nothing more than a prohibition of
plural officeholding....
Yet separation of powers had a more precise significance for Americans than simply
an abolition of plural officeholding-a significance that flowed from their conception of
the way eighteenth-century politics worked. What particularly troubled the colonists was
the means by which the governors had used their power to influence and control the other
parts of the constitution....
When the American[s] in 1776 spoke of keeping the several parts of the government
separate and distinct they were primarily thinking of insulating the judiciary and
particularly the legislature from executive manipulation.
WOOD, supra note 164, at 156-57.
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on judicial functions to prompt political thinkers to further reconsider judicial
decisionmaking by the legislature.174
In sum, in post-revolutionary America, a petition to the legislature was
viewed as a fundamental right and served as a means of securing redress of
private grievances. The "right to petition" thus protected the right to present
individual petitions that today would constitute a civil action in court. It protected
this right even despite the presence of remedy clauses and even despite the fact
that the right to petition extended only to the legislature.
B. The Drafting and Text of the Petition Clause
The drafting history of the Petition Clause suggests an evolution in thinking
about the right to petition. This evolution corresponds to the transformation from
the early state model of government by legislature to the new federal model of
government by three separate branches. The drafters of the Bill of Rights
174 Gordon Wood explains:
[]n 1776 it was only the beginning of an independence for thejudiciary.... [M]ost of the
early constitution-makers had little sense that judicial independence meant independence
from the people.... The Revolutionaries had no intention of curtailing legislative
interference in the court structure and in judicial functions, and in fact they meant to
increase it... The expanded meaning of separation of powers, as Jefferson and other
Americans later came to express it, along with a new conception ofjudicial independence,
had to await the experience of the years ahead.
The department of government which benefited most from this new, enlarged
definition of separation of powers was the judiciary. At the time of Independence, with
the constitution-makers absorbed in the problems of curtailing gubernatorial authority and
establishing legislative supremacy the judiciary had been virtually ignored or considered
to be but an adjunct of feared magisterial power. Only the experience of the following
years gave the judicial department the position of respect and independence as one of "the
three capital powers of Government" that is so characteristic of later American
constitutionalism. Once the reaction to legislative supremacy had set in, once legislative
interference in judicial matters had intensified as never before in the eighteenth century, a
new appreciation of the role of the judiciary in American politics could begin to emerge.
"When the assembly leave the great business of the state, and take up private business, or
interfere in disputes between contending private business, or interfere in disputes between
contending parties," men now increasingly argued, "they are very liable to fall into
mistakes, make wrong decisions, and so lose that respect which is due to them, as the
Legislature of the State."... Out of just this kind of experience a growing recourse to
judicial settlement was bred and nurtured.
WOOD, supra note 164, at 161, 453-54. But see Erwin C. Surrency, The Courts in the
American Colonies, in 11 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY 259 (1967) ("[B]efore
the end of the seventeenth century, the legislative bodies had, in general, given up any claim to
judicial power, except in the New England colonies.").
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replaced the right to petition the legislature, which was the supreme power in the
states, with the right to petition the whole "government"-which possessed all of
the powers of the federal government. Though these changes to the text of the
clause may appear minor in other contexts, they are, as Professor Pfander has
convincingly argued,175 significant to defining the right to petition to include
access to courts.
James Madison drafted the initial version of the Bill of Rights, including the
first draft of the Petition Clause. He had a number of ideas and proposals from
which to develop his list of rights, including the state constitutions and proposals
for a Bill of Rights developed while the states debated and ratified the
Constitution. Madison relied principally on the proposal from the ratification
convention of his own Virginia, which proposed twenty amendments to the
Constitution, including both petition and remedy clauses.176 When Madison
17 5 See Pfander, supra note 4, at 954--62.
176 See VIRGINIA RATFYI~G CONVENTION (1788), reprinted in 2 SCMVARTZ, supra note
143, at 765. Madison was a member of the Virginia ratifying convention that proposed twenty
amendments to the Constitution. Virginia's proposals for a remedy clause and right of petition
were:
12th. That every freeman ought to find a certain remedy, by recourse to the laws, for
all injuries and wrongs he may receive in his person, property, or character. He ought to
obtain right and justice freely, without sale, completely and without denial, promptly and
without delay, and that all establishments or regulations contravening these rights are
oppressive and unjust.
15th. That the people have a right peaceably to assemble together to consult for the
common good, or to instruct their representatives; and that every freeman has a right to
petition or apply to the legislature for redress of grievances.
Id. at 841-42. Virginia was one of only two states that proposed both a petition and remedy
clause during the ratification process, yet Virginia had neither clause in its own state
Declaration of Rights drafted in 1776. See VIRGNIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (1776),
reprinted in I SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 234.
North Carolina submitted an identical proposal to that of Virginia. See 2 SCMVARTZ,
supra note 143, at 966-67. New York proposed a petition clause only. See id. at 913 ("[T]he
People have a right peaceably to assemble together to consult for their common good, or to
instruct their Representatives; and that every person has a right to Petition or apply to the
Legislature for redress of Grievances. That the Freedom of the Press ought not to be
violated .... ."). Rhode Island reportedly proposed a remedy clause after Congress had begun
the amendment process. See Koch, supra note 167, at 373 ("That every freeman ought to
obtain right and justice, freely and without sale, completely and without denial, promptly and
without delay; and that all establishments or regulations contravening these rights are
oppressive and unjust.") (quoting "Section XII of Rhode Island's recommended bill of
rights"). Both Massachusetts and Maryland considered adding a right to petition the federal
legislature, but the ratifying conventions did not formally endorse the proposals. See
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submitted his draft of the Bill of Rights to the First Congress on June 8, 1789,
one of his proposed rights was the right to petition: 177 "The people shall not be
restrained from peaceably assembling and consulting for their common good;
nor from applying to the Legislature by petitions, or remonstrances, for redress
of their grievances."'178
Had Madison's proposal made it intact into the Constitution, one reasonably
could conclude that the Bill of Rights did not protect access to the new federal
courts. Madison's right of petition was legislative only. 17 9 This is not surprising
because at that time states expressed the right to petition in terms of the
legislature only.' 80 Yet, the new Constitution had a clearer separation of powers
than the states. To be sure, the concept of separation of powers today is far more
developed than it was in 1789, but even then, the concept had evolved beyond
that practiced in the early state governments under the Articles of
MASSACHUSETT5 RATIFYING CONVENTION (1788), reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143,
at 675, 681; MARYLAND RATIFYING CONVENTION (1788), reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra
note 143, at 735-36. A remedy clause is not recorded among their proposals. See id.
Pennsylvania's defeated proposal was widely circulated but did not contain either a right to
petition or a remedy clause. See PENNSYLVANIA CONVENTION DEBATES (1787), 2 SC-VARTZ,
supra note 143, at 658. Massachusetts, South Carolina, and New Hampshire proposed
amendments but not a petition or remedy clause. See SouTH CAROLINA RATIFYING
CONVENTION (1788), reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 739-57; NEW HAMPSHIRE
RATIFYING CONVENTION (1788), reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 758-61;
MASSACHUSETTS RATIFYING CONVENTION (1788), reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143,
at 677-78. Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, Connecticut, and Maryland ratified
the Federal Constitution without formally proposing a bill of rights. See generally 2
SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 627-979.
177 Madison proposed that the amendments that are now called the Bill of Rights be
incorporated in Article I of the Constitution, dealing with the legislative branch of the federal
government. See 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 1026. On the motion of Representative
Sherman, an opponent of adding a Bill of Rights, the House of Representatives decided to add
the amendments at the end of the Constitution, as a supplement. See id. at 1050-51, 1121-25.
178 Id. at 1026.
179 In addition, Madison chose to depart from the Virginia proposal and add the more
common phrasing of the right, which included the word "remonstrances." Most statements of
the right to petition in state constitutions included the term "remonstrances.' See supra note
159. Professor Pfander views the choice of the term "remonstrance" as indicating a legislative
view of the right to petition because the term was "frequently used to describe an address to a
legislative body." Pfander, supra note 4, at 58.
180 Nine of the thirteen original states-Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Virginia--stated a right
to petition either in their state declaration of rights or constitutions or in their proposed
amendments to the Federal Constitution, or both. Compare supra note 159, with supra note
176.
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Confederation. 181 More importantly, we know that Madison personally opposed
legislatures acting as courts, as demonstrated both by his Federalist Paper that
complained of the Virginia legislature encroaching on judicial power182 and by
his proposed amendment to the Constitution that affirmatively stated that the
federal legislature shall not exercise the powers of the judiciary.183 Therefore,
Madison, when drafting his proposed right to petition, seemingly would not have
viewed the right to petition the federal legislature as a right to obtain judicial
relief or as a right to petition the federal courts.184
181 See WOOD, supra note 164, at 549 ("By 1787 the doctrine of separation of powers, as
the various debates over reforming the state constitutions revealed, had become something far
more important than what it had been in 1776, becoming in fact for many Americans an
'essential precaution in favor of liberty."'). For a discussion of the concept of "separation of
powers" in the early years of the new nation as being a balance of power rather than a "wall" of
separation, see Wythe Holt, Separation of Powers?: Relations Between the Judiciary and the
Other Branches of the Federal Government Before 1803, in NErITER SEPARATE NOR EQUAL:
CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE AND JUDICItL BRANCHES IN THE 1970S (Donald R. Kennon
ed., forthcoming University of Virginia Press) (copy on file with its author).
182 Madison's condemnation of the Virginia legislature acting in a judicial capacity in
The Federalist No. 48, see supra note 173, was just one of several in which he discussed the
importance of a true separation of powers. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 49; THE FEDERALIST
NO. 51.
183 Madison proposed a new Article VII of the Constitution that would have stated:
The powers delegated by this constitution are appropriated to the departments to
which they are respectively distributed: so that the legislative department shall never
exercise the powers vested in the executive or judicial, nor the executive exercise the
powers vested in the legislature or judicial, nor the judicial exercise the powers vested in
the legislative or executive departments.
House Debates (May-June 1789), reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 1028.
184 Madison also did not include or propose a remedy clause, even though such a clause
appeared in Virginia's proposal as well as in some state constitutions. One could speculate as to
his reasons, but the omission may simply reflect Madison's attitude about the amendments that
he was proposing. Madison originally was unenthusiastic about adding a Bill of Rights but
eventually decided to endorse and draft the amendments. See Letter from Madison to Jefferson
(Oct. 17, 1788), reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 614 (stating the reasons for his
indifference); Letter from Madison to George Eve (April 25, 1788), reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ,
supra note 143, at 984 (stating the reason for his endorsement of amendments to add a Bill of
Rights). When he drafted the proposed amendments, Madison took a minimalist approach and
aimed for a consensus. See Madison Address and Debate in Congress (June 8, 1789), reprinted
in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 1025 (stating that in the case of amendments "it is
necessary to proceed with caution" and that he "shall not propose a single alteration but is
likely to meet the concurrence required by the constitution"). One Representative reported that,
when the Select Committee worked on Madison's draft, see discussion infra notes 185-88, it
took a similar approach. See House Debate (Aug. 15, 1789), reprinted in 11 DOCUMENTARY
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But Madison's draft was just a proposal. A "Select Committee" of the House
of Representatives soon adjusted Madison's draft amendments and proposed
what ultimately became the House version of the right to petition:185 "The
freedom of speech, and of the press, and the right of the people to assemble, and
consult for their common good, and to apply to the government for redress of
grievances, shall not be infringed."' 86 The Committee thus departed from the
state legislative models of the right to petition and restated the right as the right
to "apply to the government." No record tells us why the Committee made this
change. 187 The change apparently was initiated by Representative Sherman, 188
though Professor Pfander believes that Madison had an active role in the
language change and that he did so in order to secure a right to present claims
against the federal government in the federal courts.1 89
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-1791, at 1274 (Statement of Rep. Vining)
("IThe committee conceived some of [the States' proposed amendments] superfluous or
dangerous, and found many of them so contradictory that it was impossible to make any thing
of them.") [Hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. For a discussion of the possible reasons that
the Senate may have rejected a proposal to add a remedy clause, see infra notes 204-07.
185The House appointed a Select Committee on July 21, 1789, and the Committee
reported back to the House one week later, on July 28, 1789. See 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143,
at 1050. The Committee members were Representatives Vining, Madison, Baldwin, Sherman,
Burke, Clymer, Benson, Gilman, Goodhue, Boudinot, and Gale. See House of Representatives
Journal (June-Aug. 1789), reprinted in 2 SCf-VAR1-, supra note 143, at 1054.
186 House of Representatives Journal (Aug. 1789), reprinted in 2 SCVARTZ, supra note
143, at 1122.
187 No records exist of the Select Committee's deliberations. See Pfander, supra note 4, at
962.
188 Representative Sherman, a member of the Select Committee, prepared an intermediate
draft of the Petition Clause, apparently based on Madison's draft. Sherman's draft stated: "The
people have certain natural rights which are retained by them when they enter into society.
Such are the rights... of applying to Government by petition or remonstrances for redress of
grievances." HELEN E. VERT Er AL., CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, THE DOCUMENTARY
RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 266-68 (1991).
189 See Pfander, supra note 4, at 961-62. Professor Pfander relies in part on an
intervening event-between Madison's original draft and the Committee draft-the debate on
June 29, 1789, concerning the new treasury bill, in which Madison questioned the tenure and
power of the comptroller to determine claims against the government. See id. Madison
proposed that Congress have more control over the comptroller but also proposed that because
the comptroller would be so "thoroughly dependent" it would be "necessary to secure his
impartiality" and that "this might be effected by giving any person who conceived himself
aggrieved, a right to petition the supreme court for redress." 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 184, at 1080-81 (emphasis added). Professor Pfander argues that though Madison
withdrew this proposal the next day on June 30, 1789, Madison was influenced by the idea
later, in July, when he worked on the Select Committee to draft the Bill of Rights and that
Madison worked to secure a right to redress of claims against the government by restating the
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One could reasonably read the new language as extending the right to
petition to include all three branches of the federal government. The term itself
does not suggest any limitation to the legislature. A contemporary dictionary,
Samuel Johnson's, A Dictionary of the English Language, defines "government"
as the "[florm of a community with respect to the disposition of the supreme
authority." 190 Under this definition, the early post-revolutionary state legislatures
might have constituted "the government" because the legislatures were supreme,
but under the new Constitution, no single branch had "supreme authority."
Power was more evenly distributed among the three branches, which together
formed "the government."191
Moreover, the text of the Constitution and of drafts of other amendments
suggests that the term "government" means all three branches. Then and now,
the text of the Constitution rarely refers broadly to "the government" but instead
distinguishes between the specific branches of government.' 92 This distinction
right to petition to apply to the entire government. See Pfander, supra note 4, at 962; see also
DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSrITUTIoN 231
(1990) (reporting that little is known about the workings of the Committee and assuming that
"Madison played a major role in the drafting process").
190 SAMuEL JOHNSON, A DICrIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 1784).
191 The term "the government" could have an even broader meaning. The term as used in
the Petition Clause could include all governments, including state governments. To be sure, at
the time of the First Congress, the First Amendment reference to "Congress shall make no law"
limited action by the federal, not state, government. In other words, until the Court interpreted
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate the Bill of Rights and
apply their restrictions to the states, the prohibition against restricting the right to petition
applied only to the federal government. See supra note 22. Use of the term "the government"
in the Petition Clause instead goes to the activity that the federal government may not restrict.
Under this view, the Petition Clause, as originally enacted would bar the federal government
from abridging the right to petition any government (including state governments), not just the
right to petition the new federal government. Though no records suggest that this was the intent
of the First Congress, it is not an implausible view given the breadth of other First Amendment
freedoms. Speech, for example, is seemingly protected from interference by Congress
regardless of whether the speech addresses issues of national, as opposed to local, relevance.
192 Professor Pfander notes that the term "government" appears only three times in the
original Constitution: in the grant to Congress of power over the District for the "seat of the
Government," in the guarantee to the states of a "Republican form of Government" Pfander,
supra note 4, at 956-57, n.210 (1997). He views as most significant the reference to "the
government" in the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I:
The familiar language of the Necessary and Proper Clause literally authorizes
Congress to create a "government" of laws, by passing laws to effectuate its own "power"
and the "powers" otherwise vested by the Constitution in the "Government of the United
States." Such a reference to the "powers" of the "Government," in turn, reminds us that
the first three Articles of the Constitution vest "power" in three distinct branches of
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apparently was in the minds of the members of the Select Committee. The
Committee adopted Madison's proposed separation of powers amendment and
therein made careful distinctions in its choice of terms for "the government" as
opposed to its individual branches:
The powers delegated by the Constitution to the government of the United
States, shall be exercised as therein appropriated; so that the legislature shall
never exercise the powers vested in the executive or judicial; nor the executive
the powers vested in the legislative or judicial; nor the judicial the powers vested
in the legislative or executive. 193
The proceedings of the entire House offer only minimal additional insight.
The House adopted both the petition and separation of powers amendments with
little comment. In approving the Petition Clause, the House debated only
whether to delete the right of assembly and whether to add a right to instruct
representatives. 194 This debate gives some insight as to other aspects of the
meaning of the Petition Clause,195 but it does not tell future generations whether
the drafters viewed the right to petition as encompassing the courts. The limited
House debate on separation of powers again does not tell us much, but it does
suggest an evolving concept of separation of powers. 196 Under this emerging
government Article I vests "legislative Powers" in Congress; Article II vests the
"executive Power" in a President; and Article III vests "the judicial Power" in the federal
judiciary. If Article I, Section 8 describes a "government" of "powers vested" in three
distinct branches, then the Petition Clause promises the individual a right to invoke the
"powers" of government by way of a petition for redress of grievances. By its terms, then,
the clause affirms the right to invoke the 'Judicial power" of the government by petition
for redress.
Id. at 957.
193 House of Representatives Journal (Aug. 1789), reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note
143, at 1123.
194 Some representatives thought that the right of assembly was obvious, given the other
rights, and therefore appeared "trifling." House Debates (Aug. 15, 1789), reprinted in 2
SC-VARTZ, supra note 142, at 1089-91; see also infra notes 243-47. In addition, some wanted
to resurrect the right to instruct representatives that appeared in many state constitutions and in
state proposals for a Federal Bill of Rights. See House Debates (July-Aug. 1789), reprinted in
2 SCH-VARTT, supra note 143, at 1091-1105; see also discussion infra notes 197, 270-77.
195 Academic commentators, for example, have analyzed whether the debate on the duty
to instruct indicates that the House believed that the right to petition included a duty by the
government to formally respond to petitions. See discussion infra Part Ill.B. In addition, the
debate on the right to assemble gives some insight as to whether the right to petition is an
individual right or only a collective right. See discussion infra Part h1.A.
196 The House conducted only limited debate on the separation of powers amendment.
The record of the House debate on August 18, 1789, reports the following comments:
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view, the new federal legislature could not act in a judicial capacity, thus at least
creating the need for a broader statement of the right to petition if the drafters
wanted to include within it the right to request relief of a judicial nature.
Even fewer records reflect the intent of the Senate in adopting the Petition
Clause. Existing records report only the actual results--those measures that the
Senate adopted and rejected-not the substance of the Senate debate.197 A few
of these decisions have some relevance, albeit minimal, to the right to petition
courts. First, the Senate made slight modifications to the Petition Clause-
reviving the "petition" language to replace the "apply" language of the House
version-but kept the right to "petition the government for a redress of
grievances." 198 Retention of the broader term "the government" suggests that the
Senate agreed with an expansive view of the right to petition. Although the
change to the word "petition" (from "apply") is not particularly meaningful as to
the question of its application to courts, the term is at least consistent with a
judicial view of the right. The term "petition" had long connoted both legislative
and judicial requests.199 A variety of pleading systems over the years have
Mr. Sherman conceived this amendment [separation of powers] to be altogether
unnecessary, inasmuch as the constitution assigned the business of each branch of the
Government to a separate department.
Mr. Madison supposed the people would be gratified with the amendment, as it was
admitted that the powers ought to be separate and distinct; it might also tend to an
explanation of some doubts that might arise respecting the construction of the
constitution.
Mr. Livermore, thinking the clause subversive of the constitution, was opposed to it,
and hoped it might be disagreed to.
House Debates (Aug. 18, 1789), reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 1117; see also
House Debates (Aug. 13, 1789), reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 1073 (statement
of Mr. Sherman) ("[Tjhe last amendment but one provides that the three branches of
Government shall exercise its own rights. This is well secured already....').
197 Senate sessions were closed until 1794. See 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 1145.
198 Senate Journal (Aug.-Sept. 1789), reprinted in 2 SCHVARTZ, supra note 143, at 1149
(emphasis added). The Senate rejected the proposal to add to the Petition Clause a right to
instruct representatives. The Senate Journal reports that "[it] was moved to insert, after the
words 'common good,' the words 'to instruct their representatives' and that "[o]n this
question... it was decided as [two yeas and fourteen nays]." Id. at 1148.
199 Indeed, bills in the chancery courts in England began as petitions to Parliament or the
King, see supra note 139, and were commonly called petitions even when initiated in the
courts of chancery. See MCILWAIN, supra note 137, at 211 ("The words 'petition' and 'bill' are
used interchangeably in the Chancery down to the Tudor times, and the same is true in
Parliament as well as in the ordinary speech of the people."). In 1784, Samuel Johnson defined
"petition" as a "request; entreaty; supplication; prayer." See JOHNSON, supra note 190; see also
BLACK'S LAW DIC'IONARY 1145-46 (6fth ed. 1990) ("Petition: ... Formerly, in equity practice
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termed original complaints "petitions." 200 Indeed, it is a fair characterization
even today to call a civil complaint a "petition for redress of grievances."
Second, the Senate rejected the separation of powers amendment proposed
by the House.20 1 The Senate gave no reason for its rejection. The rejection does
not necessarily mean that the Senate believed that Congress could encroach on
the powers that the Constitution gave another branch.2 02 Indeed, the Senate
might have agreed with the view stated by Representative Sherman in the House
that the Constitution already provided for a balance of power and that a separate
amendment was unnecessary. 203 In any event rejection of a separation of powers
provision does not mandate a narrow interpretation of the right to petition.
Indeed, only the converse result would have excluded application of the right to
petition to the courts-Senate adoption of separation of powers amendment and
revision of the right to petition to extend only to Congress.
Finally, the Senate also rejected adding a remedy clause to the Bill of
Rights.20 4 Again, any statement of the Senate's intent is necessarily speculative,
but the Senate may have rejected the clause because it considered a remedy
clause unnecessary. As noted earlier, the meaning and effect of a remedy clause
the original pleading was denominated a petition or bill. Today... the initial pleading is a
complaint.").
200 Today, many court systems use the term "petition" to describe the pleading used to
institute particular types of judicial proceedings (e.g., a divorce action), but perhaps the most
common use of the term "petition" is under the writ system. Most applications for writs,
whether they be writs of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, or other, are termed "petitions."
Thus, parties seeking reviev by the Supreme Court are "petitioners." Black's Law Dictionary
today defines petition as: "A formal written application to a court requesting judicial action of a
certain matter. A recital of facts which give rise to a cause of action." BLACK'S LAW
DICIoNARY, supra note 199, at 1145-46.
201 See 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 1145-46, 1151.
202 Most scholars, and the Supreme Court, interpret the structure of the Constitution, with
a separate article enumerating the power of each branch, as itself establishing separation of
powers or at least a balance of power. See generally Pfander, supra note 4, at 945-47, 958-59.
203 See supra note 196.
204 See Senate Journal (Aug.-Sept. 1789), reprinted in 2 SCMVARTZ, supra note 143, at
1151-52. The Senate Journal records that in September 1789, the "following propositions to
add new articles of amendment were ... decided in the negative," including:
That every freeman ought to find a certain remedy, by recourse to the laws, for all injuries
and wrongs he may receive in his person, property, or character, he ought to obtain right
and justice, freely, without sale; completely, and without denial; promptly, and without
delay; and that all establishments or regulations contravening these rights, are oppressive
and unjust.
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are the subject of modem scholarly debate,20 5 and, depending on the proposed
interpretation, a remedy clause arguably is redundant of a number of provisions
of the Constitution.20 6 Interestingly, the one thing that most commentators agree
that a remedy clause protects is access to courts.207 At the time that the Senate
considered a remedy clause, its proposed Petition Clause already included the
right to petition the whole government. Thus, Senators might have viewed a
remedy clause as redundant of the right to petition courts.
After the Senate completed its consideration, the amendments package-
then consisting of twelve amendments-went to Conference Committee for
reconciliation of differences between the House and Senate versions. The Senate
205 See supra note 167; infra note 206.
206 One scholar argues that the aim of the remedy clause movement was to ensure the
independence of the judiciary and that this was amply accomplished by the separation of
powers in the Constitution. See Hoffman, supra note 167, at 1318 (surveying the history of the
remedy clauses, particularly its prohibition against "sale" ofjustice and arguing that the early
states adopted the clause in response to royal interference with justice "to ensure that justice
would not be compromised as it had been in the past"). In addition, a remedy clause may
protect some form of fair judicial process, which was secured by the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause. Though most commentators view the typical remedy clause as distinct from
due process, the two clauses have a common origin-Chapter 29 of the 1225 Magna Carta-
and the language of at least some of the state remedy clauses, see supra note 168, though not
the version proposed and rejected by the Senate in 1789, contain "law of the land" language
thought to have a due process element. See Hoffman, supra note 167, at 1295, n.104; id. at
1307-16 (setting forth the text of the early state constitutional remedy clauses); id. at 1295
(describing Sir Edward Coke's description of Chapter 29); see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco,
Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1987) (noting that the Texas "open courts" provision might address
Texaco's challenge to allegedly excessive appeal bond "more specifically than the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"). Another asserted protection of a remedy clause is the
right of public access to civil trials. See generally Jack B. Harrison, How Open is Open? The
Development of the Public Access Doctrine Under State Open Court Provisions, 60 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1307 (1992). Public access to court is arguably protected by the First Amendment, but
under the Press Clause, not the Petition Clause. See Hoffman, supra note 167, at 1317.
Compare Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 397-98 (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing
that the First Amendment protects the right of access to the public, because the press is the
agent for the people), with id at 404 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (arguing that the First
Amendment does not guarantee public access to trials). Finally, one author suggests that a
remedy clause protects substantive causes of action and hence would have been inconsistent
with the Constitution, which he contends gave the federal government no (or little) power over
common law. See Linde, supra note 167, at 138 n.38 ("[I]t would have made sense to 'limit'
this [federal] government by a demand that it afford every man 'remedy in due course of law
for injury done him in his person, property or reputation'-matters of common law that were
not among the powers delegated to Congress.").
207 See supra note 167.
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version of the Petition Clause prevailed.20 8 On September 25, 1789, the twelve
amendments passed both houses of Congress.20 9 The states ratified all but the
first two amendments proposed by Congress, which placed the Petition Clause in
the First Amendment.210 The people thus secured in the First Amendment of the
Bill of Rights the right to petition the government for redress of grievances.211
This drafting history provides perhaps the strongest argument in support of a
right to petition the courts. The First Congress, and the states that ratified the
Petition Clause, deliberately departed from existing models of the right to
petition-the right to petition only the legislature. This was a change that
reflected an evolution in government. The new right extends to the entire
government-a government which consists of three independent branches,
including a separate judiciary.
208 During the final stages of drafting, the Senate "tightened" the seventeen House
amendments by combining several related provisions. See 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at
1121-38. On September 9, 1789, the Senate fused the religion, speech, press, assembly, and
petition provisions into a single amendment, the Third Amendment at that time: 'Congress
shall make no law establishing articles of faith, or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free
exercise of religion, or abridging the freedom of speech, or the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and petition to the govemment for redress of grievances."' Senate
Journal (Aug.-Sept. 1789), reprinted in 2 SCIBWARTZ, supra note 143, at 1153. The clause that
had immediately preceded the right to petition, the right to "consult for the common good,"
was now gone. See id. at 1159-66. The Conference Committee made some changes to the
amendment, including deletion of the word "to" before the word "petition." This change was
reversed by the House. See id. For a further discussion of this change, see infra note 241-42.
209 See Senate Debates (Sept. 1789), reprinted in 2 SCHWARTz, supra note 143, at 1166.
2 10 See 2 SCMVARTz, supra note 143, at 1171. The states rejected the first two proposed
amendments, which related to the method for calculating representation and to congressional
pay. See Senate Journal (Sept. 1789), reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 1164.
Whether the states debated the right to petition is unknown. The states' failure to ratify the first
two amendments would suggest at least some debate in ratification, but surprisingly few
records exist of the state ratification process. See 2 SCIVARTZ, supra note 143, at 1171 ("It is
amazing, considering the crucial significance of the Bill of Rights, that we know practically
nothing about what went on in the state legislatures during the ratification process.").
211 Many states, including some of the original thirteen colonies, later expanded their
statements of the right to petition to likewise extend beyond the legislature. See, e.g., N.Y.
CONST. OF 1897 art. 1, § 9(1) ("No law shall be passed abridging the rights of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition the government or any department thereof."); PA. CONST.
OF 1873 art. 1, § 20 ('The citizens have a right in a peaceable manner to assemble together for
their common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of govemment for redress
of grievances or other proper purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance.).
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C. The Common Policies Underlying the Petition Clause and Court
Access
Having determined that the history and text of the Petition Clause suggest
that the clause could encompass a right of access to court, the question remains
whether application to courts makes any sense in light of the purposes and
policies of the Petition Clause. Although little documentary evidence exists as to
the actual purpose intended by those who drafted the Petition Clause, the Court
has summarily stated the aims of the clause, 12 and many commentators have
further developed what they believe to be the interests served by the right to
petition.2 13 These aims support-though perhaps not in equal measure-
212 The Court usually utters a one clause statement of a purpose behind the right to
petition, depending on the type of petition. See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479,483 (1985)
(executive petitions: "an important aspect of self-government'); Bill Johnson's Restaurants,
Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983) (judicial petitions: "compensation for violated rights
and interests, the psychological benefits of vindication [and] public airing of disputed facts")
(quoting Balmer, supra note 4, at 60); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954)
(legislative petitions: '"ull realization of the American ideal of government by elected
representatives"); see also United States v. Cruiksbank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875) ('The very
idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of
grievances.").
213 See Fischel, supra note 4, at 98. Fischel notes:
The right to petition serves two important values. First, it ensures that citizens can
present grievances to their government. The nature of the grievance determines which
governmental agency is petitioned, but the right of the people to present their claims
remains uniformly important. Second, the right to petition helps ensure that the
government is informed.
Id.; see also Anita Hodgkiss, Petitioning and the Empowerment Theory of Practice, 96 YALE
L.J 569, 570 (1987) (arguing that petitioning empowers the people: petitioning embodies "the
values of human self-determination, expression of individual conscience and freedom of
association"); Lawson & Seidman, supra note 4, at Part HI (manuscript pp. 5-18) (describing
the petition as a form of communication between citizens and govemment); Smith, supra note
4, at 1178-80 (listing eight different interests served by petitioning, including informing the
government, remedying government misconduct, measuring public approval, and avoiding
force and revolution); Waldman, supra note 4, at 968 (arguing that judicial petitions serve the
"basic human desire" and "need for relief from injustice"); Comment, On Letting the Laity
Litigate: The Petition Clause and Unauthorized Practice Rules, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1515,
1520-24 (1984) (arguing that preservation of the right to petition is essential to the social
contract between govemment and its citizens and to government legitimation); Note, Suits
Against the Government, supra note 12, at 114-18 (arguing that petitions serve different
interests depending on whether the petition is "general" and asks for change in government
behavior, which serves the interest of governmental accountability, as opposed to 'Judicial,"
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applying the right to petition to the courts as well as to the other branches of
government.
Many of the policies supporting the right to petition are apparent from its
history and the evolving use of petitions. First though the right to petition started
in England as a check on the King's power, petitioning grew to serve broader
functions. 214 It became a means by which all English subjects, not just the
Barons, could inform their government, whether Parliament or King, of their
complaints and needs, whether large or small. It also became a tool of individual
justice. By acting as a back-up to the courts when relief was wanting there,
petitions gave individuals the opportunity, if nothing more, to have a peaceful
solution to their disputes.
The American colonists viewed petitions as important to representative
government. Prior to the revolution, petitioning was the colonists' primary form
of access to British lawmakers. Indeed, the failure of their petitioning to
influence British law likely prompted some states to include in their new
constitutions, as a corollary to the right to petition, the right of the people to
instruct their representatives. 215 The First Congress chose not to bind the federal
government by citizen instructions, but James Madison, in speaking in the House
on this issue, stated a purpose behind petitioning:
[]f we mean [in the proposed right to instruct] nothing more than this, that the
people have a right to express and communicate their sentiments and wishes, we
have provided for it already. The right of freedom of speech is secured; the
liberty of the press is expressly declared to be beyond the reach of this
Government; the people may therefore publicly address their representatives,
may privately advise them, or declare their sentiment by petition to the whole
body; in all these ways they may communicate their will.2 16
which serves the interest of neutral dispute resolution).
214 Professor Mark describes the functions of early English petitions:
From the beginning, petitions were a formal and peaceful way to draw the attention
of the King and his counsellors to grievances. Given the difficulty of communicating with
the government as well as the limited access to the King and his council, petitions were
also the most convenient and the most effective method of calling attention to a grievance.
Petitions, by default, became a mechanism whereby the King and his counsellors were
informed of political complaints, asked to review actions of government officials, and
through which individuals and groups suggested changes in policies.
Mark, supra note 4, at 2165-66.
215 See supra note 159.
216 House Debates (Aug. 15, 1789), reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 1096;
see also discussion infra notes 270-77.
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Thus, at least Madison, and likely most of his contemporaries, understood the
right to petition as part of the system by which the First Amendment would
guard the people's right to "communicate their will" to their government.217
But the right to petition is a right in addition to the right of free speech. It is
different from the general right of free speech in two material respects. First, the
right to petition guarantees the right to speak to a particular body of persons,
those comprising the government. This targeted speech serves values not
achieved by general speech. It gives citizens a better chance at having their
voices heard by the very public servants who are making the decisions in
government. People do not have to wait or hope that their views will be
channeled by the press or others to the government. This not only gives citizens a
sense of participation in government, but it also helps to keep the government
better informed.
Second, the Petition Clause preserves a particular type of speech, the right of
the people to petition the government for redress of grievances. The people are
not limited to merely stating their views but can ask for relief. It does not say that
they will get the relief, only that they have the right to ask for it.218 What does
this serve? It gives the people a chance at a peaceful and lawful alternative to
self-help and force. It gives the people a feeling of justice and order in their
government.
These two general aims--citizen access to, and participation in, government
and a chance for just resolution of disputes-are fulfilled by petitions to all
branches of the government, including the judiciary. It is easy to see how courts
satisfy the second aim of providing an opportunity for peaceful dispute
resolution. That is the function of courts. However, courts also allow the people
to implement the first aim of the Petition Clause. It allows them access to
government to air their views and inform their government.219
2 17 See also Lawson & Seidman, supra note 4, at manuscript pp. 5-6 (noting that
petitions are just one of the many "formal channels of communication" between citizens and
government and that "[i]n view of the myriad forms of direct and indirect communication with
the government that are now available to citizens, the mere right to petition the government
seems quite meager" but that "[i]t did not... seem meager or mere to earlier generations").
218 The Court, however, stated in Bill Johnson's Restaurants that an aim of judicial
petitioning is "vindication" and "compensation." See supra note 212. This undoubtedly is an
over-statement, at least with regard to petitions to the legislature or executive. These petitions
do not necessarily give vindication or compensation. This is an accurate statement with regard
to petitions to courts at least under the Court's narrow application of the right to petition. In Bill
Johnson's Restaurants, the Court suggested that the right extends only to winning claims,
which, by definition, would give vindication and compensation. See discussion infra Part II.C.
2 19 See Fischel, supra note 4, at 98 ("W[The right to petition helps ensure that the
government is informed. Courts, like administrative bodies, legislatures and executive
agencies, are dependent on interested parties for much information.").
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Today, courts, like the other branches of government, make and apply laws
in ways that impact the everyday lives of American citizens. Indeed, as the Court
noted in Button, litigation sometimes is the only practical method to bring about
change. 220 This change need not involve the great social issues of the day. All
civil cases have some potential for broad application, whether it is an
advancement in the common law or a new nuance in interpretation of a statute or
rule.
In sum, despite an understandable reluctance to take as a constitutional
mandate the Supreme Court's statement that access to court is a part of the right
to petition, the history, text, and policies of the Petition Clause support the
Court's conclusion. The critical issues are not the recognition or existence of the
right but instead the form and application of this right of court access. Without
definition of its proper scope or guidance for its protection, the right of access to
court under the Petition Clause runs the risk of sweeping too broadly or
disappearing entirely.
I. THE NARROW SCOPE OF THE RIGHT OF COURT ACCESS UNDER THE
PETITION CLAUSE
That a person has a right of access to court under the Petition Clause does
not necessarily mean that he can file any claim at any time under any conditions.
Courts and scholars do not read other First Amendment freedoms so broadly. For
example, although the Constitution does not expressly delineate the scope of the
Speech Clause, the Supreme Court has held that "there is no constitutional value
in false statements of fact."221 In other words, false speech, though "speech," is
not within the scope of the right. In this section, I offer a similar proposal for
narrowly defining the right to petition courts: the right of court access under the
Petition Clause means only that an individual or group ofpersons has a right to
file claims that are winning and within the court'sjurisdiction.
Defining the extent of the right of court access is the most difficult aspect of
analyzing the right. The literal text and history of the Petition Clause do not give
much guidance. Indeed, as has been seen, it is difficult to ascertain from this
record even the existence of a right to petition courts, in any form, let alone the
precise contours of that right. Nevertheless, history offers some clues, if only by
analogy, in the form of legislative petitioning practice and court procedures.
Moreover, the Court's modem precedent on the right to petition, concerning both
2 20 See supra Part lA.4; see also Protect Our Mountain Env't, Inc. v. District Court for
County of Jefferson, 677 P.2d 1361, 1365 (Col. 1984) (en banc) ("Access to the courts is often
the only method by which a person or group of citizens may seek vindication of federal and
state rights and ensure accountability in the affairs of govemment.").
221 Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
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the right to petition generally and the right to petition courts in particular,
suggests a few key parameters of the right. My proposed definition of the right to
petition courts attempts to fill the gaps left by these sources.
I recognize that any definition of the right of court access under the Petition
Clause will prompt debate. Other First Amendment rights have taken years to
develop both in scholarly journals and in the courts. My proposed definition is an
early entry in the study and debate about the right to petition. But in assessing my
proposal, which admittedly is a narrow view of the right, it is important to note
that I attempt to define what the right is in its absolute form and that in Part IV of
this Article, I add another layer to the proposal. I suggest there how courts should
protect the right of court access under the Petition Clause, which in some
applications, as in speech cases, will have the functional effect of broadening the
narrow right.
A. An Individual and Collective Right of Court Access
An initial question about the nature of the right of court access under the
Petition Clause is whether it applies only to "the people" collectively or also to
an individual person. 22 Indeed, this was an issue of contention in the Court's
early development of the right to litigate. The Court's group litigation cases,
starting with Button, all spoke in terms of the collective right to litigate.223 But
the Court has since stated that the right applies to individuals. First, in California
Motor Transport, the Court (in dictum) stated that the protection of petitioning
activity also "governs the approach of citizens or groups of them to
administrative agencies.., and to courts."'224 Ten years later, the Court applied
the doctrine in Bill Johnson's Restaurants to a suit by an individual plaintiff.225
222 The right of court access seemingly would apply to all persons, not just citizens. The
First Amendment extends the right to petition to "the people." Moreover, the Court has held
that other rights belonging to "persons' extend to aliens as well as citizens. See Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (holding that the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
"are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality"). See generally NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 4, § 14.11. Moreover, the right to petition historically was quite broad
and not limited to enfranchised citizens. See generally Mark, supra note 4, at 2155-87
(describing the use of petitions in England and colonial America by disenfranchised groups of
society).
223 See discussion supra Part I.A.4.
224 California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1971)
(emphasis added). The statement was dictum because the litigation at issue was a collective
effort by several truckers.
225 See discussion supra notes 101-08. Two years later though, in Walters v. National
Association of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985), the Court again questioned
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Likewise, lower courts and commentators have addressed and applied the
Petition Clause without regard to whether the plaintiff acts collectively or
alone.226 Thus, the right as developed by the courts appears to be an individual
application of the right to litigate to individuals. There, individual veterans sought to overturn a
limit on the amount that they could pay their lawyers in proceedings before the Veterans
Administration. See id. at 308. However, the petitioners apparently relied solely upon Railroad
Trainmen and United Mine Workers and did not cite California Motor Transport or Bill
Johnson's Restaurants, and the Court's comments were limited to the application of the former
two cases:
There are numerous conceptual difficulties with extending the cited cases to cover the
situation here; for example, those cases involved the rights of unions and union members
to retain or recommend counsel for proceedings where counsel were allowed to appear,
and the First Amendment interest at stake was primarily the right to associate collectively
for the common good. In contrast, here the asserted First Amendment interest is primarily
the individual interest in best prosecuting a claim, and the limitation challenged applies
across-the-board to individuals and organizations alike.
Id. at 334-35.
226 In Acevedo v. Surles, 778 F. Supp. 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), for example, the court
invalidated a policy of the New York State Office of Mental Health, by which it submitted bills
for past hospitalization and medical expenses to indigent patients who brought suits against the
state. By thus rendering futile any suit against the state, the state hoped to save the cost of
defending the suit in the first place. Patients sued under § 1983 and challenged the policy as
violating their First Amendment right of access to courts. The court agreed and invalidated the
practice. See id. at 184. Though the patients joined in their § 1983 suit, each had individually
sued the state and it was that individual access that the court held that the state had
impermissibly infringed through its billing policy. See id.; see also Scioto County Reg'l Water
Dist. No. 1 v. Scioto Water, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 692 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (applying Noerr-
Pennington to grant summary judgment for single plaintiff on defendants' counterclaims for
tortious interference); Wolfgram v. Wells Fargo Bank, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694 (Cal. App. 1997)
(addressing challenge of individual plaintiff to vexatious litigant statute); Smith, supra note 4,
at 1191 ("[Ihe petition clause of the first amendment protects only the core petitioning
activities-preparing and signing a written petition and transmitting it to the government-
either individually or in concert with others but without the involvement of public meetings").
To be sure, many of the cases recognizing court access involve more than one plaintiff,
but that is not surprising given, first, the liberality of plaintiffjoinder rules today, see, e.g., FED.
R. CIV. P. 20, and, second, the nature of many of the underlying suits that give rise to the
question of court access. The Petition Clause court access doctrine started as an antitrust
principle, and antitrust remains today the most common area in which the issue arises. Most of
the Noerr-Pennington cases involving court access are collective litigation cases, not
necessarily because of the nature of the Petition Clause but more likely because of the nature of
the antitrust laws. Section 1 of the Sherman Act outlaws only concerted activity. See supra note
77. Therefore, for Noerr-Pennington even to arise in § I cases, there must have been group
litigation efforts or else there would be no purported violation of the antitrust laws.
Nevertheless, some suits based on § 2 of the Sherman Act, which outlaws monopolization, or
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right, not dependent on group or associational interests.
But is this a proper reading of the Petition Clause? The phrasing of the First
Amendment places the right to petition in close proximity to the right of
assembly. In fact, they form the same clause: "Congress shall make no
law... abridging...; the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." 227 The term "right"
appears only once, as a preface to both assembly and petition, and this clause is
separated by a semi-colon from the Speech and Religion Clauses. Moreover, the
right refers to the right of "the people" to petition, not that of an individual.
Despite the appeal of these textual arguments, I believe that the courts are correct
in applying the right as an individual as well as a collective right.
First, the history of the right to petition suggests that, in order to petition, one
need not "assemble" first. In England, the right of petitioning evolved by the
f6urteenth century to be both collective and individual.228 The right to petition,
as Blackstone noted in 1765, was one "appertaining to every individuaL"2 29 In
the American colonies both individuals and groups petitioned the assemblies.
Take, for example, the case of Eleazer Walker who petitioned the Massachusetts
General Assembly for relief in equity and asked for the return of his property
from a Joseph Tisdale. 230 Mr. Walker was not part of a group or other assembly.
His was a petition by one individual against another, and such a petition was,
according to Gordon Wood, a common feature of colonial legislative
experience. 231
It was the collective right to petition, not the individual right, that was
uncertain. In 1647, Parliament, supposedly acting out of concem that petitions
did not represent the views of all who signed them and the belief that violence
accompanied large group petitions, declared "that it should be treason to gather
and solicit the subscriptions of hands to petitions."232 That law met with uproar,
related state claims, may involve underlying litigation by a single plaintiff. See Computer
Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. American Fundware, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1516 (D. Col. 1993) (holding that
Noerr-Pennington is a First Amendment doctrine and applying it to bar a state unfair
competition counterclaim against a single plaintiffwhose main claim alleged breach of contract
and misappropriation of trade secrets).
227 U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The full text of the First Amendment is reprinted at supra note
3.
228 For a discussion of English petitioning practice, see supra Part II.A.1.
229 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 145, at *138 (emphasis added).
230 See JudicialAction by the Provincial Legislature ofMassachusetts, supra note 161, at
214.
231 Wood reported that the colonial "assemblies constantly heard private petitions, which
often were only the complaints of one individual or group against another." WOOD, supra note
164, at 154-55.
232 10 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 137, at 697.
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and Parliament quickly revoked it.2 33 But Parliament did succeed in limiting the
number of signatories to twenty persons.234 That limit and another that restricted
the number of persons who can present petitions to "no more than two persons at
a time," survived at least until Blackstone's day.235 Thus, at the time of the
American revolution, the right of persons to assemble to present a petition was
subject to some question. This history would suggest that any association of the
right to assemble with the right to petition was an effort to preserve the right of
collective petitioning, not to limit the individual right to petition.
Moreover, the drafting history of the Petition Clause suggests more of an
effort at economy of language than an intent to make the rights of assembly and
petition dependent upon each other. The starting point was the early state
constitutions. Most early state versions of the rights to assemble and to petition
were longer than the current Petition Clause and separated the two rights by
inserting between them references to other corollary rights such as the right to
consult for the common good and the right to instruct legislators. 236 In addition,
some states expressly stated the right to petition as an individual right. For
example, the proposed bill of rights submitted by the Virginia ratification
convention proposed a clause that stated both the right to assemble and petition
233 See id.
234 See id.
235 In 1765, Blackstone noted:
Care only must be taken, lest, under the pretence of petitioning, the subject be guilty of
any riot or tumult; as happened in the opening of the memorable parliament in 1640: and,
to prevent this, it is provided by the statute 13 Car. II. St 1. c. 5. that no petition to the
king, or either house of parliament, for any alterations in church or state, shall be signed
by above twenty persons, unless the matter thereof be approved by three justices of the
peace or the major part of the grand jury, in the country; and in London by the lord
mayor, aldermen, and common council; nor shall any petition be presented by more than
two persons at a time. But under these regulations, it is declared by the statute 1 W.&M.
St. 2. c. 2. that the subject hath a right to petition; and that all commitments and
prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 145, at *138-39; see also supra note 140.
236 Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire all
stated the rights of assembly and petition in a single clause as the right of the "people" but the
rights were separated by declarations of related rights of consultation for common good and
instructing the legislature. The early state constitutions' petition clauses are reprinted at supra
note 159. North Carolina's Declaration of Rights, for example, stated: "[Tnhe people have a
right to assemble together, to consult for their common good, to instruct their Representatives,
and to apply to the Legislature, for redress of grievances." NORTH CAROLINA DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS art. XVff (1776), reprinted in I SCHWARrZ, supra note 143, at 287.
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but that expressly stated the right to petition one of "every freeman."2 37
Though Madison did not adopt Virginia's wording, his initial draft separated
the right of petition from that of assembly: 'The people shall not be restrained
from peaceably assembling and consulting for their common good; nor from
applying to the legislature by petitions, or remonstrances for redress of their
grievances." 238 The Select Committee, likewise, directly linked the right of
assembly with the right to consult for the common good, and separately stated
the right to petition: "[T]he right of the people peaceably to assemble and consult
for their common good, and to apply to the government for redress of grievances,
shall not be infringed."239 When the Senate "tightened" all of the proposed
amendments, it deleted the reference to "consult for the common good."24 The
rights of petition and assembly now were side by side.
After the Senate approved the amendments package, the Conference
Committee modified the then third proposed amendment (now the First
Amendment), by deleting the term "to" before the word petition so that the final
clause read "the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition.... "241
The House objected and reinserted "to" in the final version of the clause.242 No
records reflect why this change was made and reversed at the eleventh hour, but
the reversal, if it has any relevance at all, suggests an effort to separate assembly
and petition, not to join them.
The debates over the right of assembly further suggest that members of the
First Congress viewed the rights as separate. In fact, the House debated whether
an expression of the right of assembly was necessary at all.243 On August 15,
1789, Representative Sedgwick of Massachusetts moved to strike "assemble
and" from the amendment2 44 He argued that statement of the right to assemble
was unnecessary in light of the fact that the amendment already secured freedom
of speech: "If people freely converse together, they must assemble for that
237 See supra note 176. North Carolina's ratification convention submitted an identical
proposal, even though its state constitution had stated the right as one of "the people."
Compare supra note 159, with supra note 176. The Maryland and Delaware Declarations of
Rights stated the right in terms as one of "every man" and did not preserve any right of
assembly. See supra note 159.
238 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 184, at 10.
239 Id. at 28. The Select Committee separated all of the Tights, including the "freedom of
speech, and ofthe press" merely by commas, not semi-colons. See id.
240 See 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 1145-46; supra notes 198, 208.
241 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 184, at 47-48.
242 See id. at 48.
243 See 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 184, at 1262-63.
244 See id. His proposed version therefore would have read "the right of the people
peaceably to consult for their common good, and to apply to the government...." Id.
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purpose; it is a self-evident unalienable right which the people possess ... "245
Nowhere did he or any other supporter of the motion argue that assembly was
necessarily part of or a limit on the right of petition. Opponents of the motion did
not argue that the right to assemble was an essential limitation on the right to
petition, but instead that the right of assembly was not self-evident and had been
penalized in the past.246 The opponents caried the day, and the motion "lost by a
considerable majority."2 47 This history, though somewhat ambiguous, suggests
that the expression of the right to assemble was an effort to secure the right of
assembly, not to limit an individual's right to petition by himself.
This leaves the phrase "the people" and whether it connotes a collective
rather than individual right. First, the general history of the right to petition, as
discussed above, argues against such an interpretation. Second, the term "the
people," in context of other provisions of the Bill of Rights, does not seem to be
a limitation. To be sure, the Framers chose to state some rights as belonging to an
individual and others as belonging to the people. The Fifth Amendment starts its
litany of procedural protections by stating that "[n]o person shall"248 and the
Sixth Amendment refers to the rights of "the accused" in criminal
proceedings.249 But, the Second Amendment,2 50 the Fourth Amendment, 51 the
Ninth Amendment,252 and the Tenth Amendment253 all refer to the rights of "the
24 5 Id Representative Sedgwick argued that if the amendments included such a self-
evident right as assembly, then the amendments might as well also secure other "trifles" such
as a citizen's "right to wear his hat if he pleased, that he might get up when he pleased, and go
to bed when he thought proper...." Id
246 See id. at 1264. Representative Page argued in response to Representative Sedgwick
"that such rights have been opposed, and a man has been obliged to pull off his bat when he
appeared before the face of authority; people have also been prevented from assembling
together on their lawful occasions" and that "if the people could be deprived of the power of
assembling under any pretext whatsoever, they might be deprived of every other privilege
contained in the clause." Id. Representative Gerry argued that the right to assemble "had been
abused in the year 1786 in Massachusetts" and that "the people ought to be secure in the
peaceable enjoyment of this privilege, and that can only be done by making a declaration to
that effect in the constitution." Id at 1263.
247 Id. at 1264.
248 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
249 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
250 See U.S. CONST. amend. 1I (stating that "the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed").
251 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV ('The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated....").
252 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX ('The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
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people." In fact, in most places in which the Bill of Rights refers to a "right" or
"rights," it states that they belong to "the people."254
No one likely would contend that the Fourth Amendment right "of the
people" to be secure "in their houses" from unreasonable searches and seizures
applies only to communal living situations. A single person living alone is
protected equally along with families and other groups of persons living together.
Though one scholar has recently argued that the Second Amendment's guarantee
of the right "of the people" to bear arms applies only to the "body of the people"
and not individuals, 255 that argument is subject to scholarly debate and depends
on factors unique to the Second Amendment.256 The remaining two
amendments, the Ninth and the Tenth, refer generally to all remaining "rights of
the people" and act to reserve to the people and the states all rights and powers
not enumerated in the Constitution.257 This reference surely includes both
253 See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
254 Only the Sixth and Seventh Amendments contain the term "fight" without also stating
that the right belongs to the people. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating that "the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial"); U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("Mhe right of trial by
jury shall be preserved[.]").
255 David C. Williams, The Unitary Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 822, 822
(1998).
2 56 See id. at 827. Professor Williams argues that "the people" had two meanings in the
eighteenth century: referring "indiscriminately to either individuals or the Body of the People"
and that "[p]lainly, the Fourth Amendment emphasized people as individuals, but in
[Williams's] view the Second Amendment emphasized the people as members of an organic
collectivity, an entity that no longer exists." Id. He does not offer his view on the Petition
Clause, but instead draws on unique wording and history of the Second Amendment to
distinguish it from the Fourth. First, he looks to the "purpose clause" of the Second
Amendment. See id. at 824. The Second Amendment is unique, at least among the
amendments in the Bill of Rights, in that it contains a statement of purpose: "A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State... ." U.S. CONST. amend. II. Professor
Williams argues that "[b]y stressing the importance of the militia, the Framers implicitly
referred to the tradition of civic republicanism, which placed militia service at the center of a
well-ordered polity." Williams, supra, at 825. He also relies upon earlier drafts of the right to
bear arms that specifically referred to the "body of the people." 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 184, at 28 (Select Committee Version of the right to bear arms: "A well-regulated
militia, composed of the body of the people, being the best security of a free State, the right of
the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed .... "). The Petition Clause has no such
purpose clause, and no early draft of the Petition Clause referred to the "body of the people."
For an argument against Professor Williams's interpretation of "the people" phrase of the
Second Amendment, see Eugene Volokh, The Amazing Vanishing Second Amendment, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 831 (1998).
257 See supra notes 252-53.
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collective and individual rights; otherwise, an individual would have no rights
outside of those specifically reserved to individuals in the Constitution.
Accordingly, the mere addition of the term "the people" does not necessarily
preclude application of a right to an individual. Use of the term in the Petition
Clause should not override the history of the right to petition as both a collective
and individual right. The Court's dicta in California Motor Transport was
correct. The right to petition the courts should apply to an individual acting alone
as well as groups of persons filing a civil lawsuit.
B. A Right Only to File Claims
Another fundamental question in defining the Petition Clause right of access
to court is whether the right guarantees anything other than initial access, the
mere act of filing a civil complaint. This is a significant question. If the right to
petition courts is one of access only, it would not guarantee any substantive right
to relief, only the right to ask for it. Moreover, such a narrow right of access
would have minimal impact on procedure. Much of civil procedure, including
appeals, are forms of governmental response. If the right to petition generally
includes no requirement of a response, or requires at most a summary denial,
then the right as applied to the courts would not impact most existing procedural
practices. The Petition Clause, for example, would not govern or limit standards
for filing answers, motions, discovery, or even appeals.
The question of the extent of the government's duty to respond to petitions,
if any, is a subject of current controversy, particularly as to legislative and
judicial petitions.258 The Court has held that the government has no duty to
respond to executive petitions, but many scholars argue that this decision is
contrary to historical practice. 259 Fortunately, for purposes of defining the right
to petition courts, this debate need not be categorically settled. Instead, important
258 A related question also arises from this definitional element-whether the right
requires the government to merely receive the complaint or actively assist in its preparation.
The Court in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), held that the right of court access as
applied to prisoners extended beyond mere filing to include a governmental duty to assist the
prisoner in preparation of his complaint by providing law libraries or legal advisers. See supra
notes 53-58 (discussing Bounds and its extension of a prisoner's right of access to court). The
right to access to court under the Petition Clause seemingly would not include a similar duty.
First, the duty in the prisoner cases derives from the unique conditions of a prisoner in which
he is isolated from all avenues of case preparation. See supra note 56. Second, nothing in the
historical practice surrounding petitioning suggests government assistance in preparation of the
petition. In fact, the record concerning whether the government has any duty to respond to
petitions, as discussed in the text, suggests at most a duty to summarily deny a petition, not to
assist in its preparation.
259 See infra notes 268-69.
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conclusions about the government's duty with regard to judicial petitions can be
drawn from the non-controversial aspects of the historical record and the Court's
precedent. For example, a concensus apparently exists that the Petition Clause
does not require the government to grant redress. Similarly, the record suggests
that to the extent that the Petition Clause requires any form of procedural
response, that response is minimal and is overshadowed by the response required
by due process. Due process affirmatively requires the government to provide
meaningful procedural opportunities in response to judicial petitions, far and
above any required by the First Amendment standing alone.
1. The Government's Duty in Response to Petitions Generally
The Supreme Court holds that the government has no duty in response to
executive petitions. The Court doctrine on this point dates back to at least 1915,
to the case of Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization.260
There, a taxpayer charged that due process required him to be heard before the
government implemented a city-wide tax increase.261 Justice Holmes writing for
the Court explained that due process did not require that this taxpayer or any
other individual have an opportunity to be heard on matters that were of general
concern:
Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is impracticable
that every one should have a direct voice in its adoption. The Constitution does
not require all public acts to be done in town meeting or an assembly of the
whole. General statutes within the state power are passed that affect the person
or property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a
chance to be heard. Their rights are protected in the only way that they can be in
a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make
the rule .... There must be a limit to individual argument in such matters if
government is to go on.2 62
This case was argued and decided on due process grounds, but seventy years
later the Court applied Bi-Metallic to the Petition Clause.
In Minnesota State Board of Community Colleges v. Knight,263 state
employees challenged a statute that required the state employer to meet only
with the designated representative of public employees and did not require it to
260 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
261 See id. at 444. An owner of real estate in Denver sought to enjoin the Denver tax
assessor from obeying an order of the State Board of Equalization to increase by 40% the
valuation of all taxable property in Denver. See id. at 443.
2 62 Id. at 445.
263 465 U.S. 271 (1984).
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meet with individuals. The employees claimed "an entitlement to a government
audience for their views."264 Justice O'Connor writing for the Court held that no
part of the Constitution, including the First Amendment Petition Clause, required
the government to "listen or respond to individuals' communications on public
issues:"
However wise or practicable various levels of public participation in
various kinds of policy decision may be, this Court has never held, and nothing
in the Constitution suggests it should hold, that government must provide for
such participation. In Bi-Metallic the Court rejected due process as a source of
an obligation to listen. Nothing in the First Amendment or in this Court's case
law interpreting it suggests that the rights to speak, associate, and petition require
government policymakers to listen or respond to individuals' communications
on public issues. Indeed, in Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees,2 65 the
Court rejected the suggestion. No other constitutional provision has been
advanced as a source of such a requirement Nor, finally, can the structure of
government established and approved by the Constitution provide the source. It
is inherent in a republican form of government that direct public participation in
government policymaking is limited. ... Disagreement with public policy and
disapproval of officials' responsiveness, as Justice Holmes suggested in Bi-
Metallic is to be registered principally at the polls. 266
The Court based its holding primarily on practical necessity: "Government
makes so many policy decisions affecting so many people that it would likely
grind to a halt were policymaking constrained by constitutional requirements on
whose voices must be heard."267 But its interpretation also has some basis in the
text of the First Amendment. The Petition Clause states that the people have a
right to petition the government for redress of grievances. Though many authors,
including this one, off-handedly refer to the right as the right "of petition," the
right literally is one "to petition," which focuses the right on the actions of the
petitioner, not the government. The clause does not state any obligation on the
2 6 4 Id at 282.
265 Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463 (1979) (per
curiam), was the "converse" of Knight: the government listened only to individual employees
and not to the union. The Court held that this did not violate the speech, assembly, or petition
rights of the First Amendment. See id at 465 ("The public employee surely can associate and
speak freely and petition openly, and he is protected by the First Amendment from retaliation
for doing so. But the First Amendment does not impose any affirmative obligation on the
government to listen, to respond or, in this context, to recognize the association and bargain
with it") (citation omitted).
266 Knight, 465 U.S. at 285 (citation omitted) (relying in part on THE FEDERALLSTNO. 10
(James Madison)).
267 Id.
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part of the government at all, other than stating that Congress may not abridge
the right to petition.
Nevertheless, a number of academic commentators, beginning principally
with a note in the Yale Law Journal by Stephen Higginson,2 68 have argued that
the Court is wrong, that the government does have a duty to respond. They
essentially say that a failure to respond to a petition is itself an abridgment of the
"right to petition. '269 They first argue that the right to petition, without a duty to
respond, is meaningless and merely redundant of speech. This first argument
does not carry the day. To be sure, a duty to respond would strengthen the right
to petition, but a petition, even without any response, has some independent
meaning. A petition targets the petitioner's speech to the government in
particular and maximizes the opportunity to inform the government. The mere
ability to make a request improves a person's chance of getting relief over a
system in which he had no right to request relief.
In addition, the academic commentators advance two historical arguments in
favor of a duty to respond, both focused on legislative petitions. First they find
support in the First Congress's rejection of a right to instruct representatives.
They rely principally upon the content of the debate-comments made in this
debate that also concerned the right to petition-rather than the mere fact that the
House rejected a right to instruct. However, I will pause here and consider the
meaning of the rejection of a right to instruct.
This rejection and comments specifically made about the proposed right to
instruct offer one valuable insight into the right to petition-the right of petition
does not guarantee redress. The House's primary concern in rejecting the right to
instruct was that such a right would bind the representatives to adopt positions
268 See, e.g., Higginson, supra note 4. Higginson states:
In colonial America, the right of citizens to petition their assemblies was an
affirmative remedial right which required governmental hearing and response...
The original design of the First Amendment petition clause-stemming from the
right to petition local assemblies in colonial America, and forgotten today-included a
governmental duty to consider petitioners' grievances.
Id at 142-43.
26 9 See Edmund G. Brown, The Right to Petition: Political or Legal Freedom, 8 UCLA
L. REV. 729, 732-33 (1961); David C. Frederick, John Quincy Adams, Slavery and the
Disappearance of the Right of Petition, 9 LAW & HIST. REV. 113, 114-15 (1991); Higginson,
supra note 4, at 145-149, 155-167; Hodgkiss, supra note 213, at 575; Mark, supra note 4, at
2169; Spanbauer, supra note 4, at 33-34, 49-51; Note, Suits Against the Government, supra
note 12, at 1116-17; Comment, Letting the Laity Litigate, supra note 213, at 1524-28. But see
Lawson & Seidman, supra note 4, at Part III.B. (manuscript pp. 20-23) (arguing that Congress
has no duty to respond to legislative petitions); Smith, supra note 4, at 1190-91 (arguing that
the Petition Clause does not impose any duty to respond).
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that they did not support or to take actions that were unconstitutional.270 Though
the representatives had different views as to whether the duty to instruct would in
fact bind them, few seemed to endorse the concept.271 Moreover, no one voiced
a concern that the right of petition (as opposed the right to instruct) would bind
the representatives. The assumption apparently was that petitions were requests
only, not instructions, and that the government therefore had no duty to grant
petitions. The academic advocates of a duty to respond seemingly agree that the
right to petition does not include any such substantive duty.
Instead, these academic commentators advocate a procedural response. They
argue that the drafters believed that they must at least respond to petitions, even.
if that response was a denial.272 In particular, they cite the comments of
270 See II DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 184, at 1266. For example,
Representative Hartley warned:
I have known within my own time some many inconveniences and real evils arise from
adopting the popular opinions on the moment, that although I respect them as much as
any man, I hope this government vill particularly guard against them, at least that they
will not bind themselves by a constitutional act.
Id.; see also id. at 1267 (Statement of Rep. Clymer). Representative Clymer noted:
If they have a constitutional right to instruct us, it infers that we are bound by those
instructions, and as we ought not to decide constitutional questions by implication, I
presume we shall be called upon to go further, and expressly declare the members of the
legislature bound by the instruction of their constituents; this is a most dangerous
principle, utterly destructive of all ideas of an independent and deliberative body....
Id; see also id. at 1268 (Statement of Rep. Jackson) ("Consider the dangerous tendency of
establishing such a doctrine, it would necessarily drive the house into a number of factions,
there might be different instructions from every state, and the representation from each state
would be a faction to support its own measures."); i. at 1271 (Statement of Rep. Madison)
('Tjhe consequence that instructions are binding on the representative is of a doubtful, if not
of a dangerous nature.").
271 See id. at 1277. Some suggested that the right to instruct would not bind the
representatives. See id. (Statement of Rep. Sumter) ("What [the representatives] shall notice
[the instructions] and obey them as far as is consistent and proper, may be very just; perhaps
they ought to produce them to the house, and let them have as much influence as they deserve;
but nothing further, I believe, is contended for."); see also infra notes 285-86 (statements of
Rep. Gerry). Some representatives argued that many states had such a provision and that failure
to include such a provision in the Bill of Rights would provoke discontent. See, e.g., id. at 1278
(Statement of Rep. Burke) ("[Tjhe constitutions of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and North-
Carolina, all of them recognize, in express terms, the right of the people to give instruction to
their representatives... [the amendments before the House] are not those solid and substantial
amendments which the people expect....).
27 2 See Higginson, supra note 4, at 155 (arguing that during the debates the House
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Representative Gerry, Sherman, and Madison.273 However, these statements are
ambiguous. Representative Gerry, for example, stated that Congress should
never shut its ears to the voice of the people, but he stated it merely as a
"hope."274 Elsewhere, Representative Gerry stated that a representative would
present the petition to the House if "he thinks proper."275 Likewise,
Representative Sherman explained that though an effective representative should
generally inquire into the wishes of the people, whether contained in petitions or
otherwise, the right of the people should go "no further than to petition."276
Similarly, James Madison broadly stated that "the people have a right to express
and communicate their sentiments and wishes" through various means including
"expressly affirmed Congress' duty to receive and consider, although not to be bound by,
citizens' communications") (citing statements of Representatives Gerry, Sherman, and
Madison contained in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 1093-96); Note, Suits Against the
Government, supra note 12, at 1116-17, n.54 (arguing that members of First Congress
believed that they had a duty to inquire into petitions and could 'never shut its ears") (citing 5
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE RoOTs OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1093-94 (1980)); see also
Spanbauer, supra note 4, at 40-41 ("[T]he consensus was that Congress had a duty to consider
petitions, but individual representatives were not bound to act favorably upon or to support the
substance of the petitions presented on behalf of each constituent.") (citing the Senate rejection
and House Debates (Aug. 15, 1789), reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 1146).
273 See, e.g, Higginson, supra note 4, at 155; Note, Suits Against the Government, supra
note 12, at 1116-17, n.54.
274 "1 hope we shall never shut our ears against that information which is to be derived
from the petitions and instructions of our constituents. I hope we shall never presume to think
that all the wisdom of this country is concentred [sic] within the walls of this House." House
Debates (Aug. 15, 1789), reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 1095-96.
275 Id. at 1095. Representative Gerry stated:
[T]he amendment [proposing a right to instruct] does not carry the principle to such an
extent [to bind representatives], it only declares the right of the people to send
instructions; the representative will, if he thinks proper, communicate his instructions to
the House, but how far they shall operate on his conduct, he will judge for himself
Id.
276 Id. at 1094. Representative Sherman noted:
[T]he right of the people to consult for the common good can go no further than to
petition the Legislature, or apply for a redress of grievances. It is the duty of a good
representative to inquire what measures are most likely to promote the general welfare,
and, after he has discovered them, to give them his support Should his instructions,
therefore, coincide with his ideas on any measure, they would be unnecessary; if they
were contrary to the conviction of his own mind, he must be bound by every principle of
justice to disregard them.
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"by petition to the whole body," but he did not say that Congress must
specifically respond to each of these views. 277
The other alleged historical basis for a duty to respond is the actual
petitioning practice in place immediately before and after the Petition Clause
became a part of the Bill of Rights.278 This is the most compelling point. The
history books are full of accounts of the English Parliament279 and the colonial
and early American governments processing and responding to petitions. 280 In
fact, the First Congress-the drafters of the Petition Clause-established rules
for processing citizen petitions.281 Documentary records of the First Congress
277 Id. at 1096.
278 See Spanbauer, supra note 4, at 33-34. See generally Frederick, supra note 269;
Higginson, supra note 4.
279 The extent of the English practice of responding to petitions is somewhat unclear.
David Frederick cites two examples of the duty to respond to petitions in England. First, he
cites Holdsworth's observation "that receiving and answering petitions were the most
important functions of the King's Council in Parliament under Edward I" Frederick, supra
note 269, at 114 (citing 10 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 137, at 696). Indeed, the King apparently
did have a duty to respond under the original 1215 Magna Carta: the barons had a right to
petition the King for redress of the King's breaches of the other provisions of the Magna Carta,
and, if he did not, the barons could seize the King's property until the wrong "has been
redressed." 1215 MAGNA CARTA, ch. 61, reprinted in HOLT, supra note 135, at 339. This
provision did not appear in the 1225 version of the Magna Carta. Frederick also cites a 1669
resolution of the English House of Commons "[t]hat it is an inherent right of every commoner
in England to prepare and present Petitions to the House of Commons in case of grievances,
and the House of Commons to receive the same." Frederick, supra note 269, at 114-15
(emphasis added). However, he notes that "in the next breath, the Commons used unfortunate
language in what appears to be a direct contradiction: 'That it is an undoubted right and
privilege of the commons to judge and determine conceming the nature and matter of such
petitions, how far they are fit or unfit to be received."' Id. at 115 (quoting Resolution of the
House of Commons (1669), reprinted in C. ROBERTSON, SELECTED STATUrES, CASES, AND
DOCUMENTS TO ILLUSTRATE ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 1660-1833, at 27 (4th ed.
rev. 1923)). Moreover, this statutory "resolution" of the duty of Parliament to receive petitions
did not appear in the 1685 English Bill of Rights. See supra notes 138-41; see also 8
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 184, at xv (noting that "the House of Commons was free
to reject any petitions outright, and prevented by tradition from receiving others"). When
Blackstone spoke of the right to petition, he spoke only of the right of the people to petition and
the prohibition against prosecuting persons for such petitioning, not of an affirmative duty to
respond to each petition. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 145, at *138-39.
280 As to petitioning practice in colonial America, see BAILEY, supra note 163, at ch. 2
(surveying the different procedures for processing petitions in 18th century Virginia); CLARKE,
supra note 160, at ch. II & VI (all colonies); Higginson, supra note 4, at 144-55 (providing the
procedure used in colonial Connecticut); see also discussion supra notes 159-64.
281 On April 7, 1789, the House adopted the following procedure for petitions:
Petitions, memorials, and other papers addressed to the House, shall be presented
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show instance after instance of the House affirmatively considering and acting
upon citizen petitions.282 The petitions helped to shape the legislative agenda of
the First Congress.2 83
Yet, some questions remain. First, the practice of the First Congress reflects
custom only with respect to legislative petitions and does not address the practice
as to petitions addressed to the other branches of government. 2 84 Second, the
response of the First Congress to legislative petitions may have depended on the
discretion of individual members.285 Representative Gerry's comments, quoted
above, suggests that at least one member of the First Congress believed that the
response to a constituent's petition depended on the discretion of the member.286
If this were a universal view, then petitions may have gone unanswered. This is a
difficult matter to uncover because the petitions that are reported in official
records are necessarily those that received some sort of response.
Indeed, the practice may have been, as suggested in Knight, just a "wise"
recognition by the First Congress that they should respond to petitions or else
suffer the ill will of the people.287 If this were the view, it arguably reflects a
through the Speaker, or by a member in his place, and shall not be debated or decided on
the day of their being first read, unless where the House shall direct otherwise; but shall lie
on the table to be taken upon in the order they were read.
8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 184, at xvi, 766.
282 See generally id. at 1-462 (surveying histories of petitions presented to the First
Congress); see also Frederick, supra note 269, at 117 (quoting a 1795 letter reporting that
"[t]he principal part of [Congress's] time has been taken up in reading and referring petitions").
283 See 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 184, at xxv. The records note:
The accomplishments of the petitions submitted to the First Congress were considerable.
Their impact on the legislative agenda transcended private claims, in several instances
influencing legislative business of far-reaching significance; for example, the acts relating
to copyrights and patents, federal revenues and their collection, the federal debt, the
location of the capital, the limitation of revenue penalties, and the land office.
Id. See generally id. at 1-462 (surveying actions on petitions presented to the First Congress).
284 See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 4, at Part III (arguing that the duty to respond to
petitions varies with each branch of govemment and requires separate analysis).
285 See 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 184, at xxvi ("Congressmen usually
presented their constituents' petitions, which were either mailed to them or which they carried
with them for their home districts when they returned from recess.').
286 See supra note 276.
287 Lawson and Seidman argue that this is precisely the reason for early Congressional
response to petitions:
It is true that the early Congresses took petitions quite seriously and sought, at least
through committee referrals, to address them all. There may have even been individual
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balancing of interests that may change with time, particularly as the government
grows. 288 Indeed, the House debate on the Petition Clause and proposed right to
instruct suggests some such balancing. For example, some members of the First
Congress expressed concerns about the practical problems of implementing a
right to instruct.289 At the same time, some recognized the political reality of
ignoring petitions. They recognized that if members of Congress did not listen to
the people, they might suffer at the next election.2 90
members of Congress who thought it their legal duty to treat petitions in this fashion. But
this confuses expectations with legal requirements. There are very good reasons why
legislative bodies will make every effort to treat citizen petitions seriously. Petitions are,
or at least were in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, among the best sources of
information for legislatures about citizen concerns, and careful attention to those concerns
may improve the perceived legitimacy of the government, or even stave off revolution.
But that does not mean that such treatment of petitions is a legal requirement. That is
especially true given the Constitution's express provisions for periodic election of
legislative officials.... The right to petition emerged in England largely as a substitute for
such formal mechanisms of representation. The Constitution, however, expressly chooses
electoral representation as the primary means of citizen input and control.
Lawson & Seidman, supra note 4, at manuscript p. 23.
2 88 Norman Smith notes these practical considerations:
Such an extension of the right of petition [to include a duty to respond]... could
exceed the practical limitations of our system of government; with our present capacity
for multiplying documents, the business of government could be halted if each paper
produced in a massive petition campaign is addressed. The government would become
acutely aware of such petitions from a variety of sources and would be no better informed
if required to digest every word of every paper that is presented.
Smith, supra note 4, at 1190-91; cf. Higginson, supra note 4, at 166 (noting that "[t]he original
character of the right to petition may impose an untenable restraint on the autonomy and
agenda setting power of the federal legislature" but arguing that the Court and commentators
should "be honest" and recognize that the duty of response disappeared with the antebellum
Congress not with the Framers).
289 See supra notes 270-71. In addition to the conceptual difficulties associated with
binding a representative, they worried about how Congress would react when the people
disagreed in their instructions and how Congress would collect the instructions from distant
states. See 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 184, at 1275-76 (Statement of Rep.
Sedgwick) ("If instructions are to be of any efficacy, they must speak the sense of the majority
of the people, at least of a state. In a state so large as Massachusetts it will behoove gentlemen
to consider how the sense of the majority of the freemen is to be obtained and
communicated.'; id. at 1271 (Statement of Rep. Smith) ("I conceive [that the right to instruct]
will operate as a partial inconvenience to the more distant states; if every member is to be
bound by instructions how to vote, what are gentlemen from the extremities of the continent to
do?").
2 90 Accountability through the election process was a recurring theme in this debate. For
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This balancing is reflected also in the actual responses that Congress has
given petitions over time. Even in the First Congress, which relied upon petitions
for its legislative agenda, the House sometimes tabled petitions indefinitely or
ordered a petition's withdrawal.291 In 1836, Congress instituted a rule by which
it could not refer, present, or consider abolitionist petitions.292 In 1842, Congress
example, Representative Hartley argued:
According to the principles laid down in the constitution, it is presumable that the
persons elected know the interests and the circumstances of their constituents.... At least
it ought to be supposed that they have the confidence of the people during the period for
which they are elected; and if, by misconduct, they forfeit it, their constituents have the
power of leaving them out at the expiration of that time-thus they are answerable for the
part they have taken in measures that may be contrary to the general wish.
11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 184, at 1265; see also id. at 1277 (Statement of Rep.
Wadsworth) (noting that representatives have ignored instructions in the past and "yet the
representative was not brought to account for it, on the contrary, he was caressed and re-
elected" and warning that if he were to get instructions contrary to his own good judgment, he
"would disobey them and let the consequence be what it would").
291 The editors of the Documentary History of the First Federal Congress report that
"[t]he First Congress never once refused to accept a petition, although on several occasions it
gave a petitioner leave to withdraw a petition it had tabled or otherwise ordered a petition's
withdrawal" and that "[h]aving lain on the table the requisite time, a petition could remain there
indefinitely, to be taken up or not at any time." Id. at xvi-xvii.
292 Most commentators acknowledge that Congressional processing of petitions forever
changed after abolitionists, beginning in the 1830s, inundated Congress with petitions urging it
to end slavery in the District of Columbia. The House eventually passed an 1836 "gag" rule by
which it would immediately "table" and give no consideration to petitions "relating in any
way... to the subject of slavery." 12 CONG. DEB. 4052 (1836) ("Resolved, that all
petitions ... relating in any way, or to any extent whatever, to the subject of slavery, or the
abolition of slavery, shall, without being either printed or referred, be laid upon the table, and
that no further action whatever shall be had thereon.). Southern representatives argued that
Congress had the power "to refuse to receive any petitions:"
The English cases are conclusive authorities. The House of Commons, in numerous
cases... after the Bill of Rights, refused to receive petitions, and resolved, in several
cases, standing orders not to receive certain classes of petitions and the precedents in the
Senate and House of Representatives are as numerous, full, and conclusive to the same
point.
H.R. REP. No. 28-3, at 15 (1844). John Quincy Adams argued that this rule was
unconstitutional, yet he recognized that all that was required was a "referral" to committee,
where the petitions might languish forever. Over Adams's repeated objections, Congress
renewed the rule until 1844, when on Adams's motion the House repealed it and again
received anti-slavery petitions. See generally Frederick supra note 269; Higginson, supra note
4, at 159-65; Smith, supra note 135, at 81-108.
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abandoned its former practice of formally presenting petitions to the House and
began to direct petitions to the House Clerk instead.2 93 This move "was found
necessary, in order to save time."294 Today, the response appears entirely within
the discretion of the individual members to whom the petition is directed. House
Rules provide that members "may" deliver petitions to the Clerk, who shall then
send them for entry in the Congressional Record.295 There is no mechanism by
which petitions are assured review by Congress.
For these reasons, the duty, if any, that the First Amendment imposes on
government to respond to petitions likely is minimal. Indeed, some of the
scholars who argue that the government has a duty to respond, propose that this
extends only to a summary denial.2 96 A duty to respond therefore would not give
2 93 See RuLES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H. Doe. No. 97-271, at 571 (1983)
(Rule XXII, 2) ("At the first organization of the House in 1789 the rules then adopted
provided for the presentation of petitions to the House by the Speaker and Members .... In
1842 it was found necessary, in order to save time, to provide that petitions and memorials
should be filed with the Clerk").
294 Id.
2 95 The Rule further states:
Members having petitions or memorials or bills of a private nature to present may deliver
them to the Clerk... and said petitions... except such as, in the judgment of the Speaker,
are of an obscene or insulting character, shall be entered on the Joumal ... And the Clerk
shall furnish a transcript of such entry to the official reporters of debates for publication in
the Record.
Id. 1. A member at his option may also present a petition to the House, which may refer it to
committee. A committee may receive a petition only by referral by the House. See id.
296 Professor Spanbauer, for example, argues that the duty to respond is limited solely to
a literal response, even ifjust a summary denial:
Historically [ ] the right to petition did include both the right to present a written petition
and the right to receive a response, which, at a minimum, might be summary denial. A
petitioner never possessed the right to a full legislative discussion or debate of a particular
petition, nor to a public forum to present testimony relevant to a petition, nor to an
investigation of a petition, nor to a detailed explanation for the denial or rejection of a
petition. Consistent with the original understanding, a petitioner is entitled to a response,
which might exclude an explanation or simply state that, after consideration, the petition is
denied.
When understood in this limited sense, these minimal presentation and response
requirements will not unduly burden government. The advent of the federal system and
the unforeseen growth of this nation should not destroy either component of the right to
petition. In order to be meaningful, the First Amendment right to petition government for
a redress of grievances must also include minimal governmental consideration.
Spanbauer, supra note 4, at 51. John Quincy Adams also believed that only a minimal response
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petitioners the opportunity to personally appear and present their views. It would
not require the government to hold meaningful discussions concerning the
petition. It would not mandate that the government provide any review or appeal
of its response.
2. The Government's Duty in Response to Judicial Petitions
The debate on the duty to respond has centered on the duty with regard to
legislative or executive petitions. Neither scholars nor the Court has addressed
the issue in the context of courts.297 However, certain principles can be taken
from this debate and used to help define the meaning of the right to petition
courts.
First, no one contends that the mere right to petition guarantees that the
government will grant the petitioner's request. The government is free to deny
the request. Thus, the First Amendment, as applied to judicial petitions, does not
touch upon the substantive right to relief. The government, whether through its
courts, legislature, or executive, may define, alter, even eliminate causes of
action without infringing the right to petition.
Second, the historical debate as to the extent of the procedural response
suggests that the Petition Clause will have a negligible impact on the procedure
of the courts. If Knight applies to judicial petitions, then the Petition Clause does
not impose any duty at all with regard to responsive procedure. If the academic
advocates prevail, there is a duty of minimal response, merely a summary denial
of the complaint. Either way, the duty would not require courts to provide any
form of procedural consideration of complaints. It would not require courts to
give plaintiffs or defendants the opportunity to be heard. It would not require
courts to grant discovery rights or even appeals. At most, courts would simply
have to tell the plaintiff that his complaint is denied.
But are courts different? Do they owe petitioners a more meaningful
response than the other branches of government? Many of the policy reasons for
limiting or rejecting a duty of response by the legislature or executive do not
apply to courts. Unlike Congress and the President, courts, at least federal courts,
are not accountable at the next election. And it is not impossible for courts to
was due. Though Adams argued that Congress must both "receive and consider" petitions, he
also said that this duty was fulfilled by reference to a committee, where a petition might "sleep
the sleep of death." 3 CONG. GLOBE 134, Register of Debates, XII, p. 2000; see also supra note
292. Even Higginson concedes that modem practice realities constrain the response due
petitions. See Higginson, supra note 4.
297 Lawson and Seidman address the duty of courts to respond to judicial petitions, but
they base the right under Article MI, not the Petition Clause. See Lawson & Seidman, supra
note 4, at Part III.A.
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respond. In fact, courts have an elaborate mechanism for processing petitions.
Indeed, history shows that the judiciary, unlike Congress, has always given
petitioners some form of response, often including hearings and even appeal
rights. More importantly, citizens typically have more invested in their civil
complaints (as compared, for example, to a letter to the executive) and expect a
meaningful response.
The answer is that courts are different. They do have a duty to give a
considered response to petitions, but the source of that duty is due process, not
the Petition Clause.298 By its very terms, the Due Process Clause addresses the
process by which the government may deprive a person of his property. The
process must be "due," or in other words, fair and reasonable. A cause of action
is a property interest,299 so, unlike other forms of petitions,30 0 the government
may not simply ignore a civil complaint or deny it without consideration. To do
so would be the equivalent of the government depriving a person of property
without due process of law.
In fact, when the two clauses are read together, the Court's narrow reading
of due process as applied to initial court access in the Boddie and Kras line of
cases 301 may make more sense. In the usual case, the government is not
depriving the plaintiff of a property right if it bars access to court. Another
private party, by refusing to settle the dispute, frustrates that right, but the
government does not. So long as the government does not require judicial access
as the only means to resolve a dispute, it has not interfered with a plaintiff's
property rights. 302 Once the government allows a plaintiff to file his claim and
thereby assumes control over its disposition, however, it must do so fairly and
reasonably-in other words, afford due process.
The government has a different obligation under the Petition Clause. The
Petition Clause, unlike the Due Process Clause, embraces and places special
298 The duty to respond may also derive from the duty of federal courts under Article M
to exercise their 'Judicial power." See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 4, at manuscript p. 20
("A court's obligation to consider matters raised before it and to inform the parties of its
dispositions is simply part of what it means to possess '[t]he judicial Power' vested by Article
In.").
2 99 See Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985) ("[A] chose in action is a
constitutionally recognized property interest...."); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust, 339
U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (noting that the right to have others "answer for negligent or illegal
impairment of... interests" is a form of property right).
300 Under Bi-Metallic, there is no due process duty to respond to petitions to the
executive and legislature if those petitions address matters of general concern. See discussion
supra notes 260-62.
301 See discussion supra Part IA.2.
302 This factor---exclusive means of resolving the dispute-was crucial to the Court's
holdings in its court access cases under the Due Process Clause, Boddie and Kras. See id.
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value on the citizen's initial request. Rather than telling the government that it
must not reach out and interfere with a citizen's property rights, the Petition
Clause mandates that the government must let the people come to it. It does so
for good reason: the ability to apply for justice is the starting point of all
justice.303
Thus, in the realm of the courts, there is a "good fit" between the right to
petition courts and the right to due process. The right to ask for relief from courts
(as opposed to the other two branches) is especially significant because it triggers
independent obligations of the government under the Due Process Clauses.304
The Petition Clause, with all of its attendant "strict scrutiny" protections under
the First Amendment, protects the initial filing of the complaint,30 5 and the Due
303 See Note, Suits Against the Government, supra note 12, at 1122, n.93. The author
notes:
More than any other litigation-related activity, filing a complaint is a citizen's
presentation of ajudicial petition to the government and thus attains special status in the
context of the Petition Clause. ... This is because a complaint is the first opportunity for
the citizen to relate the basis of the grievance and forms the sole basis for determining the
issues to be litigated.
Id. Courts in other contexts have held that the filing of a complaint warrants more deference
than subsequent pleadings or motions. For example, courts have lessened the standards of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, see infra note 436, when evaluating a complaint, as
opposed to a subsequent pleading or motion. In Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929
F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit en bane held that the improper purpose clause of
Rule 1 1(b)(1) cannot apply to an otherwise meritorious complaint, even though a court could
sanction a party for filing a meritorious motion for an improper purpose:
The reason for the rule regarding complaints is that the complaint is, of course, the
document which embodies the plaintiff's cause of action and it is the vehicle through
which he enforces his substantive legal rights. Enforcement of those rights... may benefit
the public, since the bringing of meritorious lawsuits by private individuals is one way the
public policies are advanced.
Id. at 1362.
304 Compare the due process duty in response to executing petitions, supra notes 260-62,
300.
305 The initial claim for relief would encompass not only the original plaintiff's first
complaint, but any other form of affirmative claim for relief, whether by amendment,
counterclaim, intervention, or third party practice. But, as to these other forms of claims for
relief, typical government regulation, such as pleading rules that limit the ability to state
additional claims in a single case, probably would survive strict scrutiny. Rule 15, for example,
limits plaintiff's ability to amend her complaint to state new claims. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15
(providing that after a specified time, plaintiff may amend her complaint only upon leave of
court). The govemment's interest in preserving orderly management of a case is compelling
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Process Clause, and its somewhat lower "reasonableness" standard of protection,
steps in from that point forward.30 6 These due process standards, not the stricter
First Amendment standards, govern responsive pleadings and motions,
discovery, trial procedure, and post-trial attacks on the judgment.
Finally, the question remains as to the proper characterization of an appeal.
Is an appeal part of the process that follows the initial filing of a complaint or is it
a new petition to be protected under the First Amendment? This is an important
question because Court precedent suggests that due process does not require an
appeal in civil suits. 307 The Petition Clause could fill the void left by the due
process cases if an appeal is considered a new petition or a new grievance to a
new court. Though this argument has some appeal (pardon the pun), I conclude
that the Petition Clause does not convey any right of access to the appellate
courts.
First, common sense dictates that the Petition Clause cannot guarantee an
absolute right to take an appeal to higher courts. Otherwise, this single clause
would override the constitutional structure of the federal courts. It would require
Congress to establish levels of appellate or review courts even though Articles I
and EI of the Constitution impose no such duty.30 8 Furthermore, the duty would
have no natural limit. The government arguably would have to provide endless
avenues for appeals from all petitions filed with all three branches of
government.
Even in cases where Congress already has authorized appellate or other
supervisory review by courts of appeal, that review is still part of the process by
which the government responds to a judicial petition. To be sure, appeals and
petitions of error raise new grievances in that they attack more specifically a
particular ruling of the trial court (rather than the underlying conduct of the
defendant), but they nevertheless arise out of that same basic grievance and
should be considered the same petition. Otherwise, most phases of civil litigation
could be characterized as a new petition for redress of grievance. A discovery
motion, for example, typically complains more about the other party's litigation
and the infringement on the right of access would be minimal given that the pleader could file
the claims separately in another action. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
306 For a discussion of the standards that govern First Amendment and Due Process
challenges, see infra Part IV.C.
307 The Court has not yet ruled whether due process requires an appeal in an ordinary
civil case, but it has held that due process does not require appeals of criminal convictions. See
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,611 (1974).
30 8 Article m1 of the Constitution requires only one court, the Supreme Court, and Article
m leaves to the discretion of Congress whether it will establish additional inferior courts. See
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1. Article I allows, but does not require, Congress to establish a system
of lower courts. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 ("Congress shall have the Power... to
constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.").
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conduct than the underlying subject matter of the initial claim. Likewise, motions
to reconsider, motions for new trial, and motions for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, often raise the same legal and factual attacks to the trial court's
rulings that are made on appeal. Such requests for review, whether in the trial or
appellate court, are all part of the process by which the government responds to
the initial petition for redress of grievance. They therefore should be governed by
the reasonableness standard of due process, not the Petition Clause's strict
scrutiny.
In sum, the Petition Clause preserves and favors the initial request for
justice. The request, standing alone even without any form of response, serves
the important aims of the Petition Clause. It informs the government and gives
citizens access. In the courts, this access extends only to the filing of an initial
claim for relief in the original court,309 but this petition, unlike petitions to other
branches of government, has special significance. It triggers the protections of
the Due Process Clause, which in turn guarantees a fair response.
C. A Right to File Only Winning Claims
Another question about the breadth of the right to petition is the nature or
quality of the petition. Does the right of access to court guarantee the right to file
any form of civil complaint, whether meritorious or not? This is perhaps the
most difficult question in defining the right to petition courts. The text of the
Petition Clause does not give much guidance. It refers only to "grievances," not
the merit of those grievances. Yet, the Court has imposed a "win-lose"
distinction for judicial petitions: only winning claims are within the absolute
protection of the Petition Clause. Though this standard seems unduly restrictive,
it mirrors the Court's interpretation of protected speech and has some support in
both policy and historical practice.
Unlike other questions confounding definition of the right to petition courts,
the Supreme Court has addressed whether a "merits" qualification applies to the
right to petition courts. In Bill Johnson's Restaurants v. NLRB,310 the Court
explained that "baseless" litigation was not protected:
[S]uits [that lack a "reasonable basis"] are not within the scope of First
Amendment protection: "The first amendment interests involved in private
litigation-compensation for violated rights and interests, the psychological
benefits of vindication, public airing of disputed facts-are not advanced when
the litigation is based on intentional falsehoods or on knowingly frivolous
claims. Furthermore, since sham litigation by definition does not involve a bona
309 As noted, this right may in addition guarantee a summary denial.
310 461 U.S. 731 (1983); see also discussion supra notes 101-07.
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fide grievance, it does not come within the first amendment right to petition."
Just as false statements are not immunized by the First Amendment right to
freedom of speech... baseless litigation is not immunized by the First
Amendment right to petition.311
The Court's imposition of at least some form of merits standard likely is
correct. First, it makes practical sense. Without an ability to limit court access to
at least non-frivolous claims, the courts could grind to a halt. Not only would
government and its sponsors, the taxpayers, incur considerable expense, but
other citizens also would suffer harm. The public generally would have less
access to justice if the courts were overwhelmed with frivolous claims, and the
defendant in particular would suffer reputation injury and financial loss if forced
to defend suits that have no merit.
Furthermore, imposition of at least some form of merits standard for
protected petitions is consistent with the Court's definition of protected
legislative and executive petitions. In Noerr, the Court imposed a "sham"
limitation on petitioning immunity. If the lobbying efforts are not genuinely
aimed at obtaining governmental action, the purported petition is not protected
and may be subject to antitrust liability.312 Likewise, in McDonald,3 13 the Court
imposed a truth limitation on an executive petition. If the petition, though
genuinely aimed at obtaining governmental action, contains false statements and
the petitioner knew of or recklessly disregarded its falsity, the petitioner may be
subject to defamation liability.
The problem is setting the proper standard for determining what suits are
baseless. This problem is multi-dimensional. First, the Court has confused the
issue. It has issued two opinions that seem to state contradictory tests. Second,
even when the Court's test is extracted from these two cases, significant
questions remain concerning whether this particular test is correct and consistent
with the Petition Clause as a whole.
The initial hurdle is deciphering the Court's cases to determine the Court's
test. In Bill Johnson's Restaurants, the Court adopted a win-lose test as the
ultimate standard for imposition of damages under the labor laws.314 If the
311 Bill Johnson's Restaurant, 461 U.S. at 743 (quoting Balmer, supra note 4).
3 12 See Eastern R.RI Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
144 (1961). This standard does not turn on improper motive. Indeed, a petitioner may have a
bad motive-such as to hurt his competitor-and still be protected so long as he meant to
influence government action through his petition. See discussion supra notes 75-84.
313 McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
314 Bill Johnson's Restaurants is itself somewhat confusing as to the proper test. The
Court gave two tests for determining whether a suit is baseless and therefore not protected
under the First Amendment, depending on whether the litigation at issue is concluded or still in
progress. For on-going state court litigation, the Court adopted the test for summary judgment.
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employer wins the state suit, the employer cannot be liable at all under the labor
laws, without respect to the employer's intent in filing the suit.3 15 On the other
hand, if the employer loses his suit in the state court, the suit loses its protection
and the NLRB may impose attorney's fees and other damages against the
employer.316 Ten years later, in 1993, the Court in Professional Real Estate
Investors v. Columbia Pictures Industry, Inc.317 held that a claim that is
objectively reasonable, regardless of the motive of the plaintiff, is immune from
antitrust liability under Noerr-Pennington. A suit that survives summary
judgment by definition is objectively reasonable and protected.318
The NLRB should determine for itself whether the state case presents "any genuine issues of
fact' and, if it does not, the suit wan-ants no protection and the NLRB may enjoin it. See Bill
Johnson's Restaurants, 461 U.S. at 745-46. On the other hand:
When a suit presents genuine factual issues, the state plaintiff's First Amendment interest
in petitioning the state court for redress of his grievance, his interest in having the factual
dispute resolved by ajury, and the State's interest in protecting the health and welfare of
its citizens, leads us to construe the Act as not permitting the Board to usurp the traditional
fact-finding function of the state-court jury or judge.
Id. at 745. If the suit withstands this test and proceeds to conclusion in the state court, the test
is, as discussed in the text, whether the state court plaintiff wins or loses suit. See id at 747.
The Bill Johnson's Restaurants opinion is confusing for the further reason that the Court
variously referred to the test, as "sham," "meritorious," or "a reasonable basis"-not "win-
lose." But the Court's ultimate holding unequivocally equates 'rneritorious" with winning for
determining liability after the suit is completed:
In instances where the Board must allow the lawsuit to proceed, if the employer's
case in the state court ultimately proves meritorious and he has judgment against the
employees, the employer should also prevail before the Board, for the filing of a
meritorious lawsuit, even for a retaliatory motive, is not an unfair labor practice. f
judgment goes against the employer in the state court, however, or if his suit is withdrawn
or is otherwise shown to be without merit, the employer has had its day in court, the
interest of the State in providing a forum for its citizens has been vindicated, and the
Board may then proceed to adjudicate the... unfair labor practice case. The employer's
suit having proved unmeritorious, the Board would be warranted in taking that fact into
account in determining whether the suit had been filed in retaliation of the exercise of the
employees'... rights. If a violation is found, the Board may order the employer to
reimburse the employees whom he had wrongfully sued for their attorney's fees and other
expenses.
Id.
315 See id.
316 See id.
317 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
318 In Professional Real Estate Investors, the claim at issue did not survive summary
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These are two different standards. In Bill Johnson's Restaurants, whether a
suit survived summary judgment merely determined whether the NLRB could
enjoin the suit. If the suit survived summary judgment, the plaintiff could
proceed to trial but he might be liable for considerable damages under the labor
laws if he later lost his suit. In ProfessionalReal Estate Investors, the Court held
that a plaintiff could not be subject to any damages if his suit survived summary
judgment. Such suits were absolutely protected. Thus, Professional Real Estate
Investors does not set the constitutional standard unless the Court meant to
change the standard. But the Court in Professional Real Estate Investors did not
overrule Bill Johnson's Restaurants. Indeed, it cited Bill Johnson's Restaurants
with approval. 319 This requires us to distinguish the two cases (for the Court
itself did not do so).
The decisions are not inconsistent if Professional Real Estate Investors is
read as setting the standard under the antitrust laws, rather than the Petition
Clause. Indeed, both cases were exercises in statutory construction in which the
First Amendment played only a part.320 The different policies underlying the two
statutes could explain the variance in the standards.321 For example, as noted by
the Court in Bill Johnson's Restaurants, the usual suit in the labor context is one
judgment, yet the Court held that it was objectively colorable and therefore immune from
antitrust liability. See idU at 65. A claim that survives summary judgment, by definition,
presents genuine issues of fact, which, if ultimately found in plaintiffs favor, would entitle
plaintiffto judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
319 The Court based its holding in part on Bill Johnson's Restaurants:
Whether applying Noerr as an antitrust doctrine or invoking it in other contexts, we
have repeatedly reaffirmed that evidence of anticompetitive intent or purpose alone cannot
transform otherwise legitimate activity into a sham. Indeed, by analogy to Noerr's sham
exception, we held that even an "improperly motivated" lawsuit may not be enjoined
under the [NLRA] as an unfair labor practice unless such litigation is "baseless." Our
decisions therefore establish that the legality of objectively reasonable petitions "directed
toward obtaining governmental action" is "not at all affected by any anticompetitive
purpose [the actor] may have had."
ProfessionalReal Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 58-59 (citation omitted).
320 In Professional Real Estate Investors, the Court applied the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine which at its essence, is a question of statutory interpretation. See discussion supra
notes 77-80. In Bill Johnson's Restaurants, the Court noted that it must be "sensitive to these
First Amendment values in construing the NLRA in the present context' and that it previously
had been reluctant "to infer a congressional intent to ignore the substantial State interest 'in
protecting the health and well-being of its citizens."' 461 U.S. at 741-42.
32 1 See generally James D. Hurwitz, Abuse of Governmental Processes, The First
Amendment, and the Boundaries of Noerr, 74 GEO. L.J. 65, 102-05 (1985) (distinguishing Bill
Johnson's Restaurants from antitrust application of petitioning immunity based on differences
in application of labor and antitrust laws).
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by a powerful employer against individual employees with far fewer resources.
The typical case in the antitrust setting, on the other hand, is between commercial
competitors. Thus, the Court can give more protection in the antitrust context
because the burden on the defendant is less.322 But there comes a point at which
even a tremendous potential for abuse and burden on the defendant cannot justify
any further weakening of the plaintiffs ability to file a civil suit. This is the
constitutional "floor," which presumably is determined by Bill Johnson's
Restaurants win-lose test.
That the win-lose test is the constitutional standard also is suggested by the
Court's statements of the purposes underlying the right to petition courts. In Bill
Johnson's Restaurants, the Court said that the First Amendment interests in
private litigation were "compensation for violated rights..., psychological
benefits of vindication, [and] public airing of disputed facts."323 Public airing of
facts may be served by a lesser test, such as an objectively reasonable standard,
but the other two aims, actual compensation and vindication, can be served only
by winning claims. Thus, a reasonable reading of Bill Johnson's Restaurants and
Professional Real Estate Investors is that the former's win-lose test is the
constitutional test, while the latter's objectively reasonable test is a policy
limitation.
Having found (with some effort) the Court's test for constitutionally
protected civil suits, the next question is whether this "win-lose" standard is
correct. It seems contrary to the text of the Petition Clause and at least some of
the policies behind the right to petition generally. The Petition Clause speaks of
"grievances," not an absolute or "winning" right to relief An arguable purpose
of a petition to the government is for the government, not the petitioner, to decide
if the petition is worthy of redress. Aside from cases where the claim is
"fraudulent or knowingly frivolous," a citizen does not necessarily "know"
whether his petition is deserving of redress. As noted by the Court, a social value
derives from the public airing of disputed facts. The submission of a bona fide
dispute (even if not a winning claim) to a neutral body of government to resolve
is an alternative to force.
In addition, the win-lose test does not seem to square with at least one of the
Court's tests for other petitions. In Noerr, the Court set a subjective test for
protected petitions-whether the petition is a genuine attempt to influence
government action. This subjective test can be reconciled with the text of the
Petition Clause. If the petition is not a genuine attempt to influence government
action, the petition, though a petition, is not one 'for redress of grievances,"
322 Cf DeVaney v. Thriftway Mktg. Corp., 953 P.2d 277, 284 n.1 (N.M. 1997)
(suggesting that Noerr-Pennington has '"more stringent requirements" than that required under
the Petition Clause).
323 461 U.S. at 743 (quoting Balmer, supra note 4).
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regardless of its contents or underlying "merit." The Bill Johnson's Restaurants
Court did not explain why it departed from the Noerr standard. It did not even
cite Noerr.324
One answer may be that the Court in Bill Johnson's Restaurant saw an
objectively determinable standard that it could apply, whereas in Noerr no such
standard was available. A win-lose test for most executive or legislative petitions
would be unworkable. Legislative or executive petitions usually state only the
preference of the petitioner, by, for example, asking the legislature to vote for or
against a pending bill or asking the executive to appoint (or not) a particular
person to a government post. To be sure, there are "winners" and "losers" to the
extent that the government decides to act or not act on the petition, but these
"decisions" depend not only upon the statements in the petition itself but also on
unstated influences, such as the mere whim of the government agent or of other
constituents. The petitioner would have no means whatsoever to predict the
outcome of this request and thus such a test would deter petitions and would
deprive the government of the views of the people.325
324 The Court cited California Motor Transport, which was an application of Noerr, but
it did not quote the Noerr test for sham petitions. See id. at 741. The Court in Professional Real
Estate Investors, however, as an antitrust case, cited Noerr and came closer to the Noerr
subjective test. Though the Court rejected a merely subjective test for sham litigation, it
nevertheless tied its objective test to the state of mind of a reasonable litigant:
[T]he lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could
realistically expect success on the merits. If an objective litigant could conclude that the
suit is reasonably calculated to elicit a favorable outcome, the suit is immunized under
Noerr, and an antitrust claim premised on the sham exception must fail. Only if
challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a court examine the litigant's subjective
motivation.
The existence of probable cause to institute legal proceedings precludes a finding
that an antitrust defendant has engaged in sham litigation.... [P]robable cause to institute
civil proceedings requires no more than a "reasonabl[e] belie[f] that there is a chance that
[a] claim may be held valid upon adjudication."
Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus. Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60, 62 (1993).
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens argued that a case might be unreasonable and thus
properly termed a sham, even though "some form of success on the merits-no matter how
insignificant-could be expected." Id. at 68 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
325 The Court in Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984), seemed to overlook this
function of legislative and executive petitions and their differences from judicial petitions.
There, the Court held that an employer's contact with the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) to report its employees was not a protected petition. The Court relied upon Bill
Johnson's Restaurants and distinguished the INS report on the ground that it did not state a
request for redress of a legally cognizable wrong:
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A civil complaint, on the other hand, does not merely state voter preferences.
It purports to state facts and law and invoke established rules of decision.326 The
petitioner has a specific claim of right. Unlike the typical legislative or executive
petition, the government has set standards, both with regard to substance and
procedure, for determining whether a judicial claim should prevail. Though a
judicial petitioner may not "know" whether his claim will win, that
determination is not based solely on the whim or political leaning of the
government agent. In sum, a judicial petition is more amenable to a win-lose test
than the typical executive or legislative petition.
Moreover, the Court in adopting the win-lose test may have meant to track
its precedent under the Speech Clause. In speech cases, the Court looks to the
The reasoning of Bill Johnson's Restaurants simply does not apply to petitioners'
situation. The employer in that case, though similarly motivated by a desire to discourage
the exercise of NLRA rights, was asserting in state court a personal interest in its own
reputation.... Petitioners in this case, however, have not suffered a comparable, legally
protected injury at the hands of their employees. Petitioners did not invoke the INS
administrative process in order to seek the redress of any wrongs committed against ther.
Indeed, private persons such as petitioners have no judicially cognizable interest in
procuring enforcement of the immigration laws by the INS.
Id. at 897 (citations omitted). This appears to be an erroneous interpretation of the Petition
Clause. First, it is contrary to Noerr. Other than a simple citation to California Motor
Transport, the Sure-Tan Court did not address no distinguish Noerr. The Noerr petitioner did
not suffer a legally cognizable wrong at the hands of his competitor-its petition was a
lobbying effort to the governor asking him to veto legislation. Second, the Sure-Tan approach
frustrates the notice function of legislative and executive petitions. For the reasons discussed in
the text, Sure-Tan may be a proper limitation of the right to petition courts or administrative
agencies acting in an adjudicatory manner, but it otherwise too narrowly defines the right to
petition the legislature and executive, both of which need citizen input to function. Indeed, the
framers of the Petition Clause anticipated that petitioners would ask Congress for acts that it
could not grant, but it nevertheless preserved the right to petition for that act. This is apparent
from the debate on the right to instruct. See discussion supra notes 216, 270-73. James
Madison, for example, argued that constituents may ask representatives to act contrary to the
Constitution or against the public good and that representatives should and could not obey the
instructions. See House Debate (Aug. 15, 1789), reprinted in 2 SC-vARTZ, supra note 143, at
1096 ("Suppose they instruct a representative, by his vote, to violate the
constitution .... Suppose he is instructed to patronize certain measures, and from
circumstances known to him, but not to his constituents, he is convinced that they will
endanger the public good.").
326 To some extent this would be true of some executive petitions, such as claims for
relief filed with administrative agencies. To the extent that the executive acts in an adjudicatory
manner, the standards for judicial petitions should apply. Cf. California Motor Transp. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) (expanding the right to petition to both courts and
adjudicatory administrative agencies).
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character of the speech. It may impose additional subjective standards (such as
the New York Times actual malice standard),327 but it first looks to the
underlying speech itself to determine whether it is false, true, or opinion. In 1985,
two years after Bill Johnson's Restaurants, the Court in McDonald expressly
applied the New York Times standard to false statements made in executive
petitions,328 and Bill Johnson's Restaurants itself mirrors the Court's approach
in speech cases.329
In Bill Johnson's Restaurants, the Court cited Gertz v. Welch,330 a seminal
case applying New York Times to private speech. The Court stated that "[j]ust as
false statements are not immunized by the First Amendment right to freedom of
speech, baseless litigation is not immunized by the First Amendment right to
petition."331 In Gertz, the Court held that false speech, though speech, is not
within the protection of the First Amendment.332 In Bill Johnson's Restaurants,
the Court in essence did the same-it held that though a losing suit may be a
327 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). There, the Court held that a
public official could not recover civil damages for defamation unless the defendant acted with
"actual malice"--knowing or reckless disregard for the falsity of the statement. See also
discussion infra notes 340,343,401-02,420-27.
328 See infra notes 398-400. Commentators and historians have challenged McDonald as
contrary to historical practice. See Smith, supra note 4, at 1196-97 (arguing that the McDonald
Court erred in not granting absolute immunity); Spanbauer, supra note 4 (arguing that the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine is a proper limitation on petitioning but that McDonald did not
provide enough protection to petitioning activity). For further discussion of this speech doctrine
as applied to the right to petition, see infra Part IV.B & D.
329 The Court in Bill Johnson's Restaurants had no occasion to directly apply the New
York Times defamation standard because it was a labor case, not one for defamation. Though
the defamation truth limitation in theory would apply to factual statements in judicial petitions,
as a practical matter such application is moot because the common law immunizes court filings
from defamation liability. See infra note 403.
330 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
331 Bill Johnson's Restaurants v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983) (citations omitted).
332 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340; see also supra note 221; infra notes 334-38, 422-27. At
times, the Court has characterized other speech as not within the protection of the First
Amendment. For instance, it originally characterized commercial speech as outside the First
Amendment's guarantee, though today it gives commercial speech some limited protection.
Compare Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (holding no protection for commercial
speech), with Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976) (recognizing that the First Amendment protects truthful commercial
advertising). Even Justice Black, who championed an absolute view of the Speech Clause,
engaged in defining the right of free speech so that it did not cover all arguably expressive
actions. See, eg., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 609-10 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting)
(concluding that flag burning is not protected speech). See generally NOWAK & ROTuNDA,
supra note 4, at ch. 16.
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request for redress of a grievance, it, like false speech, is not within the
protection of the First Amendment.
Admittedly, the analogy between false speech and losing civil suits is not
perfect. First, it is more difficult to determine whether a civil suit will win than it
is to determine whether speech is false. The outcome of a civil suit depends not
only on the truth of the facts but also on a number of other factors, such as the
ability of the opposing lawyers, the developing status of the law, and the attitude
of the judge and jury. A restriction on filing losing claims therefore may have a
greater chilling effect than one prohibiting false speech. Moreover, the filing of a
losing claim in a court (so long as it has at least some merit) has greater potential
than airing false speech for staving off violence and for promotion of law and
ideas. But the filing of losing suits also imposes greater burdens than general
speech. A civil suit triggers a host of responsibilities and burdens on government
and individuals, such as bearing the costs of litigation, that mere speech does
not.333 Thus, though the competing interests and values necessarily differ for the
two activities, the relative balance of interests for false speech and losing claims
may approximate each other.334
Balancing of interests is the means by which the Court derived its definition
of protected speech. Gertz did not hold that false speech has no value at all, only
that it has no "constitutional value when the relative interests are balanced
against each other:' 335
Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's
interest in "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on public issues. They
belong to that category of utterances which "are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality. -336
The Court in Bill Johnson's Restaurants balanced competing interests in much
the same manner as it did in Gertz. It cited both the interest of the employer in
exercising its rights as a litigant and the interest of the state in providing
remedies to a litigant who feels aggrieved.337 The Court also discussed at length
333 For further discussion of the burdens imposed when a plaintiff files a civil suit, see
discussion infra Part IV.B-C.
334 This is not to say that they strike the same balance. As I explain in Part IV.B,
balancing tests necessarily require individual application and assessment
335 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340.
336 Id. at 340 (citations omitted).
337 See Bill Johnson's Restaurants v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731,745-47 (1983).
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the potential abuses and costs of filing suit.338 Thus, the Court developed a two-
tier test for protection of civil suits, with absolute protection applying only to a
narrow category ofjudicial petitions-winning Suits. 33 9
Analogy to the Court's speech cases also helps answer the policy concerns
arising from the Court's narrow win-lose definition of protected judicial
petitions. Narrow definition of the absolute right to apply only to winning suits
does not mean that the ability to file losing suits will have no protection. As in
the case of speech, some additional protection may be mandated by the First
Amendment. In Gertz, for example, the Court recognized that the First
Amendment required protection of some false speech-activity not otherwise
within the protection of the First Amendment-in order to avoid chilling the
exercise of true speech. In Part IV, I discuss, in greater detail, this "breathing
room" doctrine and its application to the right to petition courts, but I raise it here
to address some of the policy concerns arising from a narrow definition of the
right to petition courts.
Narrow definition of the absolute right to petition courts as applying only to
winning suits, coupled with additional protection for losing suits under the
breathing room doctrine, provides constitutional protection while giving courts
flexibility in assessing governmental restrictions on court access. This approach
would start with the premise that the activity-the filing of losing claims-is not
protected and that the governmental restriction is permissible in so far as it
impacts the ability to file losing suits. A court then would look to the impact of
the restriction on protected activity-the ability to file winning claims-and
balance the relative interests to determine how much, if any, protection is needed
for the ability to file losing suits in order to avoid chilling the filing of winning
claims.
Take the example of an award of the costs of defending a suit, including the
defendant's attorney's fees. These are some of the compensatory damages
arising from a wrongful civil suit, and compensatory damages are a form of
government restriction that can run afoul of the First Amendment just as a
criminal penalty can.340 Accordingly, just as the Court allows states to impose
338 See id.
339 The Court granted higher protection to suits while they are still pending. See id.; see
supra note 314. This distinction may be an application of the "breathing room doctrine," as
discussed further in infra Part IV.D.
340 The Court in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), explained:
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts have applied a
state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their
constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that that law has been applied
in a civil action [for defamation] and that is common law only....
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compensatory damages for some cases of false speech but not for true speech,341
it, in Bill Johnson's Restaurants, allowed an award of attorney's fees against
losing suits but absolutely protected winning suits from such damages.342 In both
applications, the absolute right is protected but the non-protected activity is not
immune from liability. The latter activity is protected if the absolute right needs
breathing space. Under New York Times, for example, false speech about public
figures is protected by the actual malice standard.3 43 In Bill Johnson's
Restaurants, the Court arguably imposed a different form of breathing room by
holding that the NLRB may not enjoin civil claims that survive summary
judgment.344
The alternative approach--more broadly defining the right to petition courts
to include losing but meritorious suits--would require strict scrutiny of any
restriction on filing both winning and losing suits.345 If losing (but non-frivolous)
suits were within the literal right to petition, the government might be able to
assess some costs, such as filing fees, against losing but colorable claims, but as
in the case of true speech, it likely could not impose larger penalties, such as
attorney's fees. Though the Court has permitted the government imposition of
some costs on the exercise of other First Amendment rights, these fees may not
exceed "reasonable" limits, 34 6 and the Court's defamation cases strongly suggest
Id. at 265; see also Whelan v. Abell, 48 F.3d 1247, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that the
Petition Clause may limit awards of damages pursuant to common law torts of malicious
prosecution and abuse of process: "We know that a state cannot constitutionally impose
liability based on proof of libel and slander in their unreconstructed forms, so there is
nothing inherently sacrosanct about common law torts.").
341 Cf Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (holding that the
First Amendment requires private figure plaintiff to prove falsity of speech in defamation suit
against media defendant); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (holding that criminal
defamation law violated the First Amendment because it punished true speech made with ill
motive). See generally NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 4, §§ 16.33-35.
342 See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, 461 U.S. at 747. In one area of agreement, the Court
also held that winning suits are immune from imposition of attorney's fees and other damages.
See Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 n.5
(1993) ("A winning lawsuit is by definition a reasonable effort at petitioning for redress and
therefore not a sham.").
343 See supra note 327; infra Part IV.B, Part V.D.
344 See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, 461 U.S. at 747. This resembles the Court's prior
restraint on speech doctrine, which is discussed infra notes 443-47.
345 Under strict scrutiny analysis, the Court asks whether the restriction serves a
compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. The strict scrutiny test and
its application in speech cases and to the right to petition is discussed infra Part V.C.
346 In Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992), the Court
invalidated a permit and fee requirement for parades and assemblies. The Court explained:
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that large fees in the form of compensatory damages are may not be assessed on
activities absolutely protected under the First Amendment.347
The Forsyth County ordinance requiring a permit and a fee before authorizing public
speaking, parades, or assemblies in "the archetype of a traditional public forum," is a prior
restraint on speech. Although there is a "heavy presumption" against the validity of a prior
restraint, the Court has recognized that govemment, in order to regulate competing uses of
public forums, may impose a permit requirement on those wishing to hold a march,
parade, or rally. Such a scheme, however, must meet certain constitutional requirements.
It may not delegate overly broad licensing discretion to a government official. Further,
any permit scheme controlling the time, place, and manner of speech must not be based
on the content of the message, must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and must leave open ample alternatives for communication.
I. at 130 (citations omitted). That the fee was nominal did not save it because the ordinance
gave too much discretion to the administrator in assessing the fee. See id. at 136-37 ("A tax
based on content of speech does not become more constitutional because it is a small tax.'). In
dictum, however, the Court suggested that states could constitutionally assess fees in greater
than nominal amounts by distinguishing a prior case: "[it] does not mean that an invalid fee can
be saved if it is nominal, or that only nominal charges are constitutionally permissible," Id
(quoting Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)). Lower courts have since required
the fee to be at least reasonable. See Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. City of
Cleveland, 885 F. Supp. 1029, 1033 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (rejecting argument that only nominal
fees are constitutional and allowing a $50 fee because it was "reasonably related to the
expenses incident to the administration of the ordinance and to the maintenance of public
safety and order"); see also David Goldberger, A Reconsideration of Cox v. New Hampshire:
Can Demonstrators Be Required to Pay the Costs of Using America's Public Forums?, 62
TEX. L. REV. 403, 409-10 (1983). ("[T]he state may recoup the actual costs of governmental
services that are generated by the use of public property -for speech activities, as long as the
charge is not so great as to appear to the judiciary to be oppressive or completely preclusive of
speech.').
347 See supra note 340. Admittedly, this discussion mixes two distinct speech doctrines-
defamation (New York 7iYmes) and public fora (Forsyth)-and attempts to apply them to a First
Amendment right to which they have never before applied. Application of the New York Times
defamation doctrine to fee awards may be a better fit than the Forsyth public fora doctrine
because the defendant's attorney's fees, like a damages award in defamation cases, are not
costs incurred by the government. Application of the public fora doctrine is further complicated
by the fact that Forsyth and other license fee cases involve speech in traditionally open public
fora. The Court has distinguished between the types of fora in which a person seeks to speak
and allowed the government to impose greater restrictions on speech in public property not by
tradition designated as open for public communication. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). The Court, as to these fora, noted "[i]n addition to
time, place, and manner regulations, the state may reserve the forum for its intended purposes,
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort
to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view." Id. Some
commentators have applied these distinctions to the right to petition courts and have argued
that restraint on the right to petition courts is open to greater regulation because courts are
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Under this second approach (more broadly defining the right to include
losing suits), the government still could attempt to deter frivolous suits, but its
restrictions must be narrowly tailored to achieve only that specific aim. The
government likely could not assess attorney's fees against losing but not
frivolous suits. This prohibition may be a desirable policy result in many cases
(as the Court evidently believed in Professional Real Estate Investors), but if
made a constitutional mandate, the rule would take away the government's
ability to ever penalize and deter colorable but otherwise abusive suits. In other
words, under this approach as applied to the facts of Bill Johnson's Restaurants,
as long as the employer's suit was not frivolous (i.e., it stated some colorable
claim), the NLRB could not impose damages against the employer even if the
employer ultimately lost and had filed suit solely to retaliate against its
employees. On the other hand, a more narrow definition of the right coupled
with the breathing room doctrine, gives the courts flexibility to look at
governmental policy, such as that reflected in the labor laws, and award damages
in some cases of abuse.
Finally, a win-lose test also comports with Anglo-American tradition with
regard to imposition of court costs. Indeed, courts have long required losing (but
not winning) plaintiffs to pay at least some form of costs. England has the
"English rule," dating back to at least the early seventeenth century, whereby the
losing party pays not only incidental costs, but the attorney's fees of the winning
party.348 The American colonies likewise imposed costs, including attorney's
public fora. See McGowan & Lemley, supra note 4. However, this overlooks that the issue in
petition cases usually is not speech in the courthouse but instead the ability to file a civil suit,
which activity is an "intended purpose" of courthouses.
348 See generally Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247
n.18 (1975) (summarizing the history of the "English rule"). Early English practice imposed
severe punishments on plaintiffs who lost cases:
Anglo-Saxon courts employed a simple system for guarding against false suits: the
complainant unfortunate enough to lose his cause also lost his tongue, or, if that option
proved distasteful, was compelled to pay his opponent compensation, called wer, which
was fixed according to the complainant's status. Each complainant was required to
provide sureties---borh--who were subjected to the same penalties if the complainant
could not be found.
These... sanctions, imposed in the action itself, were prompt and probably
effective ....
The system of taxing fixed wer in response to false suits did not long survive the
Norman conquest. It gave way to a new and more flexible system that evolved from
Norman traditions-amercement.
The amercement system did not exact a previously fixed penalty from the losing
plaintiff and in strict theory was not automatically applied to every case. In practice,
however, immediately following the determination of the underlying suit, judges found
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fees on losing parties, though the amount of those fees was often subject to
limits.349 To be sure, American courts today are more reluctant than English
courts to impose the high costs of the other side's attorney's fees even on losing
parties,350 but this so-called "American rule" did not come into force until the
virtually all losing plaintiffi to be in the King's mercy for a false claim. Liability then
attached for some monetary penalty, which was assessed or "affeered" by honest men of
the neighborhood. Once the penalty had been ascertained, the losing plaintiff or his
pledges would pay it to the court.
Note, Groundless Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A HistoricalAnalysis, 88
YALE L.J. 1218, 1221-22 (1979). Holdsworth describes how England in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries moved to cost statutes under which the losing party reimbursed the
winning party for his litigation expenses:
Though from an early date the Chancellor in the exercise of his equitable
jurisdiction, had assumed the fullest power to order the defeated party to pay costs, it was
only by decrees that the principle made its way into the common law. The amercement of
the vanquished party was perhaps considered a sufficient punishment But a payment to
the king or lord was not much satisfaction to the successful party; and so, side by side
with the amercement we get the gradual growth of the rule that the vanquished party must
pay costs. The amercement gradually became merely formal, and finally disappeared; but
the law about costs has increased in bulk and complexity from the thirteenth century
onwards.
4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 137, at 536-37; see also Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J
849, 853 (1929) (describing the development of English awards of costs and fees against losing
plaintiffs and noting that "[i]n 1607 the final step was taken when it was provided that a
defendant might recover costs in all cases in which the plaintiff would have had them if he had
recovered").
349 The origin of the American rule reportedly was colonial dislike of lawyers, which
prompted legislatures to set limits on how much attorneys could recover from the losing party.
The operating assumption was that fees would be paid by the losing party:
During much of the eighteenth century, virtually all the colonies tried to regulate fees
by statute. To be effective, such legislation had to prescribe both the fees a lawyer could
charge his client and those that could be recovered from a defeated adversary. The laws
governing attorney fee awards, in other words, served less as a way to shift or not shift
fees from one party to another than as a way to limit the amount of those fees. Once the
fee was set, it was taken for granted that it could be recoveredfrom a losing party.
John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rules on Attorney Fee Recoveiy, 47 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBs. 9, 10-11 (1984) (emphasis added).
350 The American rule applies only to attorney's fees: American courts regularly make a
losing plaintiff pay at least some of the defendant's other expenses. The practice of assessing
costs against losing parties is so routine that a federal statute allows the clerks of the court to
tax the costs, without judicial oversight. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1994) (providing that "a judge
or clerk or any court of the United States may tax as costs" certain listed items, such as marshal
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mid-nineteenth century, and it always has been riddled with exceptions that
allow courts to penalize losing parties with fee awards.351
Moreover, there is some evidence that this was not just the historical practice
in courts. At least some losing judicial petitioners to early legislative bodies also
bore the risk of fees and costs. For example, when the House of Lords
entertained judicial petitions in the seventeenth century, it had the power not only
to impose costs against losing petitioners but also to make petitioners post
security before their petition could proceed.352 This practice continued, at least to
and clerk fees, court reporter fees, printing costs, and witness fees).
351 An award of fees today requires statutory authority at least in federal court. In 1796,
the Supreme Court, in its cryptic statement of what would become the American rule
recognized that Congress had the power to authorize awards of costs against the losing party:
"The general practice of the United States is in opposition to it; and even if that practice were
not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, until it is changed, or
modified, by statute." Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 306 (1796) (reversing an award
of $1600 in attorney's fees). Since the inception of the nation, Congress has enacted statutes
allowing awards of attorney's fees. The early statutes often were simply directions to federal
courts to follow state practice. See generally Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 421 U.S. at 247-61
(surveying history of federal cost and fee statutes). But fees were commonly awarded. In fact,
Congress complained that "losing litigants were being unfairly saddled with exorbitant fees for
the victor's attorney" and, in 1853, enacted a new statute limiting the amount of attorney's fees
that the winning party could collect See id. at 251-54 (tracing the history of current day 28
U.S.C. § 1923 and noting that "with the exception of the small amounts allowed by § 1923, the
rule 'has long been that attorney's fees are not ordinarily recoverable") (citations omitted).
Today, a number of doctrines and statutes allow the assessment of attorney's fees against the
losing party. See id at 257-69. See generally John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney
Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1570-90
(1993) (summarizing the common law exceptions and the more than 2000 state and 200 federal
statutes shifting attorney's fees).
352 See HART, supra note 137, at 38 (describing the costs and security procedure in the
House of Lords in the 17th century). Hart, however, also suggests that the more common
practice may have been simply to deny a frivolous petition. See id. at 37. Sir Blackstone
explains that "losing" petitions under some systems met with even greater restrictions, but that
in England the petition was subject to only minimal restrictions:
In Russia we are told that the czar Peter established a law, that no subject might petition
the throne, till he had first petitioned two different ministers of the state. In case he
obtained justice from neither, he might then present a third petition to the prince; but upon
pain of death, if found to be in the wrong. The consequence of which was, that no one
dared to offer such third petition; and grievances seldom falling under the notice of the
sovereign, he had little opportunity to redress them. The restrictions, for some there are,
which are laid upon petitioning in England, are of a nature extremely different; and while
they promote the spirit of peace, they are no check upon that of liberty.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 145, at * 139.
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some extent, in colonial America. In 1746, Rhode Island passed a law requiring
petitioners who asked the General Assembly for relief from a trial court
judgment "to pay all lawful costs and damages, that he, she, or they have put his,
her or their antagonists unto, in defending against such a petition" unless the
petitioner won the requested relief.353 Whether other colonial legislatures also
had this practice is open to question, but most tended to follow judicial customs,
which as noted, allowed for imposition of costs and attorneys' fees against a
losing plaintiff.354
In sum, though this is a difficult question, the Court's precedent, historical
practice, and even policy considerations reasonably support the conclusion that
the right to petition courts-in its absolute form-does not protect losing claims.
This definition does not render the right meaningless. Like true speech, the filing
of winning claims is substantial activity that merits protection. For example,
because a citizen has a right to file a winning claim, any restriction, such as a
motive restriction, 355 that burdens that right is suspect. More importantly, as in
speech cases, the narrow definition of the right does not necessarily give
3 5 3 See 6 RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONs
1757-1769, at 95-96 (Knowles, Anthony & Co. 1861) (noting January 27, 1746 Act).
354 Colonial legislatures apparently imposed 'Judicial restrictions" when acting as a court,
but the record is admittedly thin as to actual cost procedures and the criteria for their
assessment. See 4 CONNECrICUT RECORDS 246 (1698) (setting out procedures for petitions
against other individuals, including service, and "if upon the tryall of the cause it doth appear
that either the petitioners or the person or persons cited does or have given the other any unjust
trouble, the party wronged shall be allowed his just costs and damages as in other cases"); 9
CONNECtiCUT RECORDS 61 (1744) (providing for service of "all original and judicial
writs... in civil cases, and petitions and memorials wherein there shall be any party or parties
to be notified, returnable to any superior or county court or to the General Assembly" and
providing for payment of costs to appellee on appeal); see also Lawson & Seidman, supra note
4.
355 A surprising number of statutes and other regulations impose "motive restrictions" on
court filings. Some laws could be applied to punish even a winning suit if filed for a proscribed
purpose. Indeed, such applications were at issue in both Bill Johnson's Restaurants (the NLRA
and a motive to retaliate against striking employees) and Professional Real Estate Investors
(the antitrust laws and an anti-competitive motive). This focus on motive restrictions is not
surprising. The Court has long been hostile to motive restrictions on speech. See Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (reversing verdict for emotional distress arising out of
comic parody even if published to humiliate and harm: "[Wjhile such a bad motive may be
deemed controlling for purpose of tort liability in other areas of the law, we think the First
Amendment prohibits such a result in the area of public debate about public figures"); see also
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964) (reversing conviction for criminal defamation:
"If upon a lawful occasion for making a publication, he has published the truth, and no more,
there is no sound principle which can make him liable, even if he was actuated by express
malice") (quoting State v. Burnham, 9 N.H. 34, 42 (1837)). In a companion article, I will
discuss the validity under the Petition Clause of motive restrictions on filing civil complaints.
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government free rein to impede meritorious but losing suits. Rather, the
definition gives the courts flexibility. It is a starting point for determining the
appropriate additional protection to give to the right. In Part IV, I will show that
as is the case of false speech, some protection of losing suits will be necessary in
order to not chill the right to petition courts.
D. A Right to File Only Claims Within the Court's Jurisdiction
Finally, I offer one additional definitional element (though the right may
require many more) of the right to petition courts. The right protects only claims
within the court's jurisdiction. This proposition seems simple. It is a corollary to
Bill Johnson's Restaurants and the conclusion that the right of court access under
the Petition Clause extends only to winning claims. If a claim is not within the
court's jurisdiction, it is not a winning claim. Even a lesser standard of merit,
such as the Professional Real Estate Investors objective test, would not include a
right to bring claims that are outside the court's jurisdiction. This argument may
be easy to accept when applied to constitutional limitations on a court's
jurisdiction such as those imposed by due process or Article I but it is not so
simple when applied to jurisdictional limits imposed by Congress. Such a
restriction seemingly is an act by "Congress" that "abridges" the right to petition
federal courts.
I start with jurisdictional limits imposed by the Constitution. The
Constitution established a new system of government. Each branch of
government has limited powers. It can act only as the Constitution provides.
Though the concept of "separation of powers" has evolved beyond that
envisioned in 1789, the new federal government did effect some changes from
the pre-existing models of government in the states.356 The Constitution moved
away from the concentration of power in a supreme legislature to a more even
distribution or balance of power among three branches. The drafters presumably
wrote the Petition Clause with this change in mind.3 57
Given the constitutional scheme of the new government, a fair reading of the
Petition Clause is that the right to petition is distributed according to the powers
of the branches of government under the Constitution. In other words, the right
does not include the right to file any type of petition with any branch of
government, without regard to the constitutional powers or limitations of that
branch. A citizen, for example, would not have the "right' to file a civil lawsuit
at the White House, or to ask a court to enter into a treaty with a foreign nation.
This is not to say that a citizen may be puni, zed for misdirecting his petition to
356 For a discussion of the evolving concept of separation of powers, see supra notes
171-74, 181, 193, 201-03 and accompanying text
357 See supra notes Part II.B.
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the wrong branch, only that the right in its absolute form does not extend to filing
a petition with the wrong department of government.358
In changing the language to "the government," the drafters of the Petition
Clause likely did not give much thought to the question of jurisdictional
allocation and misdirected petitions.359 They had no experience with the
problem. Previous American models of the right to petition extended only to the
legislature and did not raise the issue. Nevertheless, members of the First
Congress were mindful of constitutional divisions of authority when they dealt
with petitions. They were concerned that the correct governmental branch
address the petition, and the House, the most frequent recipient of petitions,
regularly referred petitions to the executive.360 The First Congress even
respected divisional authority between its two houses. The Senate, for example,
refused to allow a petition to be read that should have been directed to the
House.361
This jurisdictional element of the definition of the right to petition is
particularly significant when applied to federal courts. Federal courts have
358 This is an area in which courts likely would decide to extend breathing room and
prevent penalties for some activity that is not protected by the right-filing a complaint at the
White House-so as to not chill the exercise of a protected right-filing a protest with the
President on a related matter. The breathing room doctrine is discussed at infra Part IV.D.
359 Nor have courts or scholars given this issue sufficient attention, though some have
raised the question. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 4, at manuscript p. 5 ("Is the right to
petition satisfied if at least one institution of the government is available to receive petitions, or
must all institutions, or certain specific institutions, be available to receive petitions in all
circumstances?'); see also Note, First Amendment Right of Access, supra note 138, at 1060
n.34 (suggesting that justiciability limits on federal courts would limit the ability to petition
those courts). Some litigants have begun to challenge standing limitations under the Petition
Clause. For example, amicus briefs in Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997), argued that the
Ninth Circuit's restrictive application of the "zone of interests" test to deny standing violated
the right to petition the government. See Amicus Brief of the Ass'n. of Cal. Water Agencies,
1996 WL 282521, at *9-10. The Supreme Court did not reach the issue, holding instead that
petitioners had standing.
360 The editors of the Documentary History of the First Federal Congress explained:
Petitioners were expected to observe certain conventions and petitions that failed to
accord with accepted formulas could be challenged on those grounds alone. First and
foremost, a petition was expected to be clear and correct about the authority to whom it
appealed. Handling misaddressed documents required some delicacy in order to avoid
unintended encroachments on constitutional prerogatives.... One petition, addressed to
the House but presented to the Senate on 3 February 1791, was not even allowed to be
read in that body.
8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 184, at xviii.
361 See iL
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limited powers. They can hear only those "cases" and "controversies" specified
in Article ]1.362 Under this view, a citizen would not have a "right" to file in
federal court a petition that does not state a "case" or "controversy" within the
court's Article M power.363 Such a jurisdictional limitation is consistent with the
view of courts expressed in Marbury v. Madison,364 only a few years after
ratification of the Petition Clause. There, Chief Justice Marshall recognized that
although a citizen has a right to protection of the laws whenever he suffers an
injury, he nevertheless does not have a right to present his claim to the Supreme
Court if Article II does not give the Court power to hear his claim.365 Thus, a
fair reading of the Petition Clause, when viewed under the entire constitutional
scheme, is that it does not include the right to petition federal courts on matters
outside of their Article III jurisdiction.
This leaves the question of the power of Congress to limit the jurisdiction of
the federal courts. This is a different issue than the Article I[ limits. Under this
assumption, Congress, not the Constitution, is restricting access to federal courts,
and the Petition Clause expressly says that Congress shall not abridge the right to
petition. But, since the mid-nineteenth century, the Court has held that the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts depends on a statutory grant of authority
from Congress. 366 Congress has never given the federal district courts the full
power available under Article 111.367 Does this congressional refusal to extend
362 Article H sets forth nine categories of cases and controversies over which federal
courts may assert jurisdiction. These in turn fall into two broad categories-those disputes
involving the powers of the federal government and those involving interstate controversies.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
363 This limitation would include many of the justiciability limits on federal court power,
such as standing. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, at ch. 2 (2d ed.
1994).
3 64 5U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3 65 The Court declared unconstitutional the statute that allowed Marbury to apply directly
to the Court for relief because this exceeded the Court's power under Article I. See id.
366 Article II provides for one court, the Supreme Court, and leaves to Congress the
question whether it will establish any additional courts. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 1. ('The
Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."). The Court has read this
delegation to Congress to establish lower federal courts, if any, as requiring a statutory grant
from Congress even as to the subject matter of the lower courts. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8
How.) 440 (1850). The need for statutory authority was reaffirmed by the Court in 1989 when
it held that pendent party jurisdiction was not permissible without an express statutory grant.
See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
367 For example, Congress has chosen to grant federal courts a power to hear diversity
cases that is more narrow than that which Congress could grant under Article Ill. Among other
things, § 1332 of the Judicial Code imposes a jurisdictional amount of $75,000 for diversity
claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Supp. II 1996). See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 363, at
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jurisdiction to the federal courts constitute an abridgement of the right to petition
those courts? If so, the right to petition could be an important new argument for
those who have long contended that Congress does not have the ability to limit
federal court jurisdiction.368
A possible response is that congressional restriction does not violate the right
to petition because Article III does not require Congress to establish federal
courts at all. In other words, the limited extension of jurisdiction to federal courts
is not an abridgement of the right to petition the courts, but arguably a facilitation
of the right, by creating courts to hear at least some types of judicial petitions.
However, this may argue too much. If Congress is free to restrict access to the
lower federal courts simply because the courts are not required under the
Constitution, then the right to petition federal courts could become almost
meaningless. Carried to an extreme, the argument would allow Congress to
impose unreasonable preconditions on filing suit in the district courts simply
because those courts are not constitutionally required. Under this view, the only
court left for citizen petitions would be the Supreme Court which Article III
requires and does not put within the discretion of Congress.369
Historical practice may provide a better answer. Courts have always limited
access by jurisdiction. The First Congress extended only narrow jurisdiction to
the federal courts, far less than that available under Article 111.370 For example, it
did not give lower federal courts the power to hear cases raising solely federal
questions.371 This history suggests that the drafters of the Petition Clause did not
view the clause as a limitation on their power to control federal subject-matter
jurisdiction. Therefore, there is some historical basis for concluding that the right
to petition extends only as far as the power of the federal courts, as granted both
by Article DI and by Congress. But the line between jurisdictional limits and
other restrictions on court access by Congress is a difficult one to draw. It is an
intriguing question that merits further thought.372
274-310.
368 For a summary of the authorities and their arguments against congressional restriction
of federal court jurisdiction, see CHEMERJSKYsupra note 363, at 186-205.
369 However, Congress may have the power to limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
under the "Exceptions" Clause of Article 111. See generally id. at 172-86.
370 See The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. XX, §§ 9, 13, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77, 80-81.
371 See id.
372 One interesting question is whether Congress could limit the power of the federal
courts where the state courts cannot hear the case. This would in effect deny the petitioner the
right of access to any court. Some authorities have suggested that such a limitation would
violate due process. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 363, at 186-205. However, as
demonstrated by Boddie, the Court assumes that due process does not require any form of court
in most cases because the litigants may resort to other means to resolve their claims. The right
to petition, however, does not turn on the presence of informal means to resolve disputes and
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Finally, under this theory, the right to petition state government as that right
applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment 373 would encompass the jurisdictional limits of state governments.
For instance, a citizen would not have the "right" under the Petition Clause to ask
Florida's legislature to repeal a New Jersey minimum wage law. These limits
would similarly restrict a citizen's right to petition state courts. State courts, like
federal courts, have subject matter restrictions, 374 and they also have
jurisdictional limits imposed by federal due process requirements. 375 Both types
of restrictions seemingly would limit the right to petition state courts. In other
words, a citizen would not have a First Amendment right to file a complaint in
state court against a defendant over whom the state cannot assert personal
jurisdiction.
In sum, a plausible reading of the Petition Clause would impose
"jurisdictional" limits on the ability to petition. Though this interpretation is not
mandated by the literal terms of the clause, it helps make sense of the right in
terms of our system of government at least as it exists today. As with other
definitional elements of the right to petition courts, such as the win-lose
limitation discussed above, this jurisdictional limitation does not mean that the
government could freely punish people who submit a petition to the wrong
department of government. As I discuss in the next section, such punishment
depending on its form, likely would have too much of a chilling effect on the
right to file the petition with the correct branch. But this latter question asks how
to protect the narrow right not how to define the right in the first place.
might be the better avenue of attack. One could argue that the right to petition 'the
government" applies to all forms of government, federal and state combined, see supra note
191, and that Congress is free to restrict federal court jurisdiction, but only so long as there is
some court available to which it may present its claims.
373 See supra note 22.
374 Though state courts are often called courts of "general" or unlimited subject-matter
jurisdiction, this description usually refers to the state court system as a whole, as compared to
the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts as a whole. Many individual state courts have
limited subject-matter jurisdiction. A small claims court, for example, usually limits the cases
to a maximum amount in dispute. In addition, some state courts are dedicated to types of cases,
such as divorce or probate actions.
375 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (setting forth general
due process limits on state court assertion of jurisdiction over absent defendants). Federal
courts also have due process limits on their power to assert jurisdiction over particular
defendants, but the limitation is under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, not the
Fourteenth Amendment. The exact parameters of this limitation are not defined because, for the
most part, federal courts follow the geographic jurisdictional limits of the states in which they
sit. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k) (setting territorial limits of federal court jurisdiction).
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IV. PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT OF COURT ACCESS UNDER THE PETITION
CLAUSE
Having found and defined the narrow right of court access under the Petition
Clause, the question becomes the degree of protection due that right. Courts do
not invalidate a governmental action simply because it touches upon a
constitutional right, but they instead look to the actual and potential impact of the
government action in relation to the interests served by both the constitutional
right and the governmental action. At times, this analysis takes the form of
different levels of judicial scrutiny--strict scrutiny versus rational basis, for
example-that reflect varying degrees of deference to government policy
decisions.376 In other areas, such as cases brought under the Speech Clause, the
Supreme Court has an army of standards and tests for particular applications.377
The speech cases provide a good starting point for assessing the right of court
access under the First Amendment, but in the end, the proper analysis will
depend on the type and aim of the government action at issue and its relative
impact on the right of court access.
A. Governmental Actions That Potentially Infringe on the Right of
Court Access
A wide variety of governmental actions may infringe on a citizen's right of
access to the courts. These actions fall into two broad categories. The first group
of actions are individual actions that impact a person's ability to gain access to
court, such as a move by a government official that prevents a plaintiff from
filing his civil suit. The other category reflects broader government policy:
formal regulations or statutes that directly or indirectly restrict or control access
to court.
A significant portion of the constitutional litigation surrounding the right to
petition courts arises under Section 1983.378 These private damage suits typically
37 6 For example, the Court applies "strict scrutiny" in equal protection challenges to
statutes that discriminate between citizens based on "suspect classifications" or involving
fundamental rights, but applies a more deferential "rational basis" review to statutes that make
other distinctions on non-fundamental issues. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note
4, § 14.3.
37 7 For example, in cases alleging defamatory speech, the Court has created distinctions
between public and private figures and applied different standards of liability and burdens of
proof depending on these distinctions. In cases involving commercial speech and speech in
public fora, the Court has devised a reasonable time, place, and manner test for government
regulation. See generally id. at ch. 16.
37 8 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) ("Every person who under color of any statute... of any
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challenge individual acts that uniquely impact the plaintiff. Section 1983
plaintiffs have alleged that government officers intentionally covered up
evidence and thereby prevented them from preparing and filing a civil
complaint.379 They have alleged that court clerks have lost their complaints. 380
They have charged that governmental employers have retaliated against
employees for exercising their right to file a civil complaint against the
government. 381 One plaintiff even alleged that a judge's barking dog
unconstitutionally barred his access to court.382
The tough legal question in these cases usually is (or should be3 83) the
existence and nature of the right of court access (e.g., whether the right extends
beyond the initial filing of the complaint). However, once the right is defined,
whether as I propose in this Article or otherwise, the primary issues should be
factual, such as whether the government agent actually deprived the plaintiff of
access to court and whether the agent had the requisite intent to deprive the
plaintiff of his right of access. Rarely should the court in these cases of individual
government action need to balance competing policies because the government
agent usually is not acting pursuant to official government policy.384
state... subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen... the deprivation of any rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured....').
379 See Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1983) (alleging interference with right
to file wrongful death suit through intentional cover-up of district attorney's murder of
plaintiff's daughter).
380 See McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1972) (alleging that the clerk of court
negligently handled complaint).
381 See San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424 (3d Cir. 1994) (claiming that a state
university professor was fired in retaliation for filing suit against the university).
382 See Monsky v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1997) (claiming that plaintiff was
harassed by judge's dog).
383 As noted earlier, courts usually do not address the distinction between a right of court
access under the Petition Clause as opposed to other bases, such as due process or the prisoner
doctrine. See discussion supra notes 123-25.
384 Some ofthese government "action" cases, however, raise questions of the proper legal
standard. For example, courts in retaliation claim cases usually struggle with defining the rights
of government employees, as opposed to those of ordinary citizens. In the context of speech,
where the plaintiff alleges that the government employer fired him because of his speech, the
Court has developed varying standards for protection of the employee's right to speak, turning
primarily on whether his speech was political. See Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
Whether any such distinction should apply in cases alleging retaliation for filing suit, and, if so,
what type of distinction, are questions currently under debate by the federal courts of appeal.
See Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d at 424 (surveying different positions); see also Margo Pave, Public
Employees and the First Amendment Petition Clause: Protecting the Rights of the Citizen-
Employees Who File Legitimate Grievances and Lawsuits Against Their Government
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The resolution of the remainder of the court access cases will not be so
simple. In these, the government, pursuant to official policy, has deliberately
acted in an institutional manner, usually through a regulation or statute, to control
access to court and the complaining party is seeking to avoid application of these
controls.385 These restrictions come in a variety of forms. Some, such as a
number of rules of civil procedure, directly control court access. Pleading rules,
for example, demand that plaintiff state the claim in a certain manner.386 Filing
fee requirements condition a plaintiff's access on payment of money.387
Likewise any form of sanction, whether through procedural rule, the court's
inherent authority, or tort damages, burdens access to courts. Even informal
rules, such as holiday court schedules, can impact access to court.388
In addition, a surprising number of statutes outside of the judicial procedural
context impact court access even though that impact is not the specific aim of the
statute. As demonstrated by the Noerr-Pennington line of court access cases, the
antitrust laws would reach court filings, absent the Court's narrow interpretation
of the antitrust laws to exclude such activity.389 Bill Johnson's Restaurants
showed that the labor laws would have a similar impact.390 Countless other laws
could apply to court filings. Lower courts, for example, have narrowly construed
obstruction of justice statutes,391 and even the civil rights laws,392 to avoid their
Employers, 90 Nv. U. L. REV. 304 (1995).
385 Even policies and practices of government institutions other than courts sometimes
are intended to restrict court filings. For example, the court in Acevedo v. Surles, 778 F. Supp.
179 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), found that a policy of a state hospital to bill indigent patients for medical
services only if and when they sued the state violated the patients' right of access to court. See
supra note 226.
3 86 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, for example, mandates that aplaintiffplead certain
elements in a civil complaint in federal court. Though these are minimal standards (often
termed "notice pleading"), a complaint is defective and subject to dismissal if these standards
are not met. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8; FED. R. Civ. P. 12(bX6).
387 Filing fees were the subject of the due process cases in the mid-1970s, beginning with
Boddie. See discussion supra Part IA.2.
388 See Morrison v. Lipscomb, 877 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1989) (addressing a Petition Clause
challenge to a holiday court schedule).
389 See discussion supra notes 75-88.
390 See discussion supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text
391 In United States v. Hylton, 710 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1983), the Fifth Circuit held that a
tax protester's filing of a criminal complaint for trespass against IRS agents could not constitute
criminal impediment of an IRS investigation under 26 U.S.C. § 7212, which bars a citizen from
"corruptly" impeding an IRS investigation. See 26 U.S.C. § 7212 (1994). Though the case
involved a criminal rather than civil complaint, the court rested its narrow construction of the
IRS statute on the cases applying the Petition Clause to civil complaints:
As the United States Supreme Court has held, the right to petition for redress of
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collision with the right of access to court.
grievances is "among the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the bill of rights."
Inseparable from the guaranteed rights entrenched in the first amendment, the right to
petition for redress of grievances occupies a "preferred place" in our system of
representative government, and enjoys a "sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious
intrusions." Indeed, "[i]t was not by accident or coincidence that rights to freedom in
speech and press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has held expressly that the first amendment right to petition protects the
individual[']s right to file an action with a "reasonable basis" in a state tribunal.
... [W]e have concluded that Hylton's actions represent a legitimate and protected
exercise of her right to petition for the redress of grievances. The record clearly reveals
that Hylton placed a high value upon her right to personal privacy and genuinely
attempted to protect her rights through the orderly pursuit of justice-the filing of citizen
complaints with a reasonable basis.
Hylton, 710 F.2d at 1111-12; cf. Quinon v. FBI, 86 F.3d 1222, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing
Hylton and holding that a motion to recuse the entire Eleventh Circuit could not serve as basis
for obstruction ofjustice: "[Tjhe filing of a non-fraudulent pleading cannot, taken alone, form
the basis for a legitimate obstruction ofjustice investigation").
392 The issue does not arise often, but the civil rights laws could be applied to restrict at
least some civil court filings. In a § 1983 action, for example, a plaintiff could allege that a
person acting under color of state law brought a civil suit against her for a racially
discriminatory motive. The few courts that have addressed application of petitioning immunity
in civil rights actions have primarily addressed forms of petitioning activity other than civil
court filings, and they are split as to whether any petitioning immunity applies in this context.
Compare Barnes Found. v. Township of Lower Merion, 927 F. Supp. 874, 876-77 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (dismissing §§ 1983 & 1985 claims against neighbors based on their alleged lobbying
for enforcement of regulations: "It is irrelevant that the neighbor's petitioning may have been
motivated by racism. Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, it does not matter what factors fuel
the citizen's desire to petition government. As long as there is petitioning activity, the
motivation behind the activity is unimportant."), with LeBlanc-Stemberg v. Fletcher, 781 F.
Supp. 261,267 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to discrimination claim
against neighbors who allegedly circulated petitions and advocated incorporation of village to
oppose orthodox Jewish houses of worship). The LeBlanc court noted:
Taking the plaintiffs' allegations of defendants' motives as true, we are not prepared
to conclude that defendants' conduct is protected by the first amendment. The "first
amendment... may not be used as the means or the pretext for achieving 'substantial
evils' which the legislature has the power to control."... Particularly when the process
invoked has no inherent safeguards to ensure that the rights of others are not abused,
society's interest in protecting against discrimination must be accommodated. The value
of the right to petition is not diminished by recoguizing that the political process may not
be subverted to achieve unlawful goals.
Id.; see also Kolln, supra note 119, at 1064-67 (arguing that the Petition Clause does not limit
application of the Fair Housing Act).
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Unlike isolated acts by a rogue government agent, institutional restrictions
reflect considered policy judgments. The government has a reason for its
restriction on court access. Courts cannot simply ignore these policies. In most
cases, proper analysis of regulations requires courts to balance the respective
interests at stake. This analysis will take different forms but in essence will
require the courts to look at the nature and purpose behind the restriction and its
impact on the right of access. This is not a new process. The courts have been
doing this for years in speech cases against a similar array of governmental
restrictions on speech.
B. Applicability of Speech Doctrines to the Right of Court Access
The right of petition, like that of speech, is a First Amendment freedom.
They are both "precious" freedoms at the core of our republican government.393
The Court more than fifty years ago in Thomas v. Collins394 declared that the
rights were "inseparable:"
It was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and
press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably
to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances. All these, though not
identical, are inseparable. They are cognate rights, and therefore united in the
First Article's assurance.395
Indeed, speech and petition have overlapping functions, such as the interchange
of ideas and citizen participation in government.
As Thomas recognized, however, speech and petitioning are "not identical."
Petitioning has a separate, indeed longer, history of protection than speech.396 It
serves the distinct role of allowing the citizen to target his speech to lawmakers
and giving him at least initial access to the government-aims not necessarily
achieved by general speech. Accordingly, a number of courts and commentators
have argued, and some continue to assert, that the right to petition merits higher
3 93 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,432-33 (1963); see also supra notes 60-62.
394 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
395 Id. at 530 (citation omitted).
396 See Spanbauer, supra note 4, at 17 (surveying the relative histories of the rights to
petition and speech and noting that "[t]he rights of speech and press evolved much more
slowly in England than the right to petition"); see also Smith, supra note 4, at 1180-81 (noting
that "in England after 1702, the right to petition in practice was an absolute right against the
government" and that "[i]n contrast, prior to the American Revolution, several of the other
rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, including the cognate rights of speech, press, and
assembly, were subjected to widespread suppression").
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protection than other First Amendment rights.397
In 1985, the Court in McDonald v. Smith398 rejected this argument and
refused to grant absolute protection to petitions. There, McDonald wrote
President Reagan to urge the President not to appoint Smith as a United States
Attorney and, in the process, allegedly made false and defamatory statements
about Smith. When Smith later sued for defamation, McDonald claimed that his
statements were absolutely protected under the Petition Clause. The Court
applied the New York Times "actual malice" standard399 to the defamation and
refused to give McDonald's speech special protection solely by virtue of his
putting it in a petition:
To accept petitioner's claim of absolute immunity would elevate the
Petition Clause to special First Amendment status. The Petition Clause,
however, was inspired by the same ideals of liberty and democracy that gave us
the freedoms to speak, publish, and assemble. These First Amendment rights are
inseparable, and there is no sound basis for granting greater constitutional
protection to statements made in a petition to the President than other First
Amendment expressions.4 00
Though speech and petition rights are co-equal and related, not all speech
tests should apply with equal measure to all petition cases. The speech tests are
the result of a balancing of interests and the specific tests differ even as to speech
cases. For example, in the New York Times line of defamation cases, the Court
makes distinctions based on the type of speech and the status of the alleged
victim, affording greater protection to political speech and speech about public
figures than to speech about private matters and private individuals.40 1 It does so
because the interest in protecting speech is greatest when the speech addresses
public issues and the interest in protecting the victim is least when he is a public
figure who has free access to the media to tell his version and attempt to remedy
the falsehood4 02
As it happens, the New York Times balance aptly applied to the petition in
McDonald. The action was for defamation, so the government "regulation" at
397 See Spanbauer, supra note 4, at 17 (arguing that petition is a superior right to speech
but not absolute); Smith, supra note 4, at 1183 (arguing that petition is a near absolute right).
398 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
399 For a discussion of the New York Times standards for defamation, see supra note 327;
infra notes 401-02,420-26.
400 McDonald, 472 U.S. at 485 (citations omitted).
401 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); discussion infra notes 401-
02,419-26.
402 SeeGertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323,344-46 (1974); discussion infra notes 421-26.
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issue and the policies supporting it were the same as in the New York Times line
of cases-redress of reputation injuries and deterrence of misinformation
through tort liability. Likewise, the countervailing interests were similar.
McDonald's petition and its contested speech addressed a public figure and
matters of public importance-the appointment of a new public prosecutor.
Having already struck the proper balance of these interests in New York Times, it
made no sense to reach a different balance in McDonald.
This identity of interests does not necessarily carry over to judicial petitions.
First, the government interest in regulating the activity differs. Defamation
liability does not attach to statements in civil complaints. The common law
immunizes civil complaints from defamation liability and therefore seemingly
recognizes that civil litigation involves different interests than general speech,
which is not subject to such protection.40 3 Of course, civil complaints are subject
to other restrictions404 (otherwise this discussion would be moot), but these
restrictions involve government policies and interests different than those
reflected in the tort of defamation. The limits on filing civil suits usually are not
concerned about injury to reputation but instead other potential hanns.
Unlike speech and other petitions, petitions to courts trigger an elaborate
system of procedural responses by the government. This comes at considerable
cost to the government and its taxpayers. The cost is not merely financial. Other
citizens feel the impact of one person's filing of a civil complaint. Unlike the
general populace's seemingly endless ability to receive speech, court process is
not inexhaustible or free. Each petition to the court consumes judicial resources
that otherwise could be spent on other petitions. The defendant feels a unique
403 The Restatement of Torts extends to civil litigants an absolute privilege from
defamation liability arising from the communications "preliminary to a proposed judicial
proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course and as a part of, a judicial proceeding
in which he participates, if the matter has some relation to the proceedings." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTs § 587 (1977). The Restatement explains the policy behind this privilege:
The privilege.., is based upon the public interest in according to all men the ulmost
freedom of access to the courts ofjustice for the settlement of their private disputes. Like
the privilege of an attorney it is absolute. It protects a party to a private
litigation.., irrespective of his purpose in publishing the defamatory matter, of his belief
in the truth or even his knowledge of its falsity.
Id. at cmt. a.
404 The Restatement explains that the privilege does not extend to other forms of liability:
"One against whom civil ... proceedings are initiated may recover in an action for the
wrongful institution of the proceedings... if the proceedings have terminated in his favor and
were initiated xvithout probable cause and for an improper purpose." Id.; see also id. § 586,
cmt. a (explaining that absolute privilege for attorneys in civil litigation extends to defamation
but not"the disciplinary power of the court of which he is an officer").
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impact. He cannot ignore the petition or simply issue public denials. He must
formally participate at considerable cost to himself, just to try to prevent further
loss of property. Moreover, unlike most speech, the government is a participant
in this "harm" to the defendant.
Second, civil filings do not correspond well with the distinctions on the
speech side of the defamation formula-public versus private speech. The
typical civil suit does not fall into either category. At first glance, a distinction
might be made between civil suits raising political questions and ordinary civil
complaints between private parties. But even a civil tort complaint against one's
neighbor raises some issues of public concern. It asks for an application, and
sometimes an outfright change, in the law that can impact all citizens. A civil
complaint no matter how common, therefore is not the equivalent of private
speech between private parties. Yet, this same civil complaint usually is not at
the same level of public importance as political speech. The defamation
categories of speech simply do not work for civil complaints.
In sum, though some specific speech tests might work in some petition
cases, such as McDonald, they often will be a poor fit, particularly in access to
court cases. This is not to say that the general speech doctrines are useless. They
provide an excellent starting point for Petition Clause analysis. The specific
speech tests took years to develop. Courts should repeat this process and look to
the particular interests at stake in regulating right of access to court. In other
words, courts in Petition Clause cases should apply the methods of the speech
cases such as their strict scrutiny and breathing room balancing tests, but not
necessarily their results.
C. Strict Scrutiny ofRestrictions on Court Access
The Court has long applied "strict scrutiny" to judge regulation of First
Amendment freedoms, including the right to petition.405 This standard has many
405 In Button, the Court explained:
[O]nly a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's
constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms. Thus it is
no answer to the constitutional claims ... [to say] that the purpose of these regulations
was merely to insure high professional standards and not to curtail free expression. For a
state may not, under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore
constitutional rights.
However valid may be Virginia's interest in regulating the traditional illegal
practices of barratry, maintenance and champerty, that interest does not justify the
prohibition of the NAACP activities disclosed by this record.
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,438-44 (1963); see also discussion supra notes 61-63.
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articulations, but it generally requires courts to look to whether the government
has a compelling state interest in regulating the exercise of the right and whether
the regulation is narrowly drawn to achieve that goal with minimal impact on the
right. Unlike other standards of review, this standard is not deferential to the
government. Only a compelling state interest will justify even a minimal impact
on the exercise of a First Amendment right. Thus, as the Court in Thomas
recognized, First Amendment freedoms, including the right of petition, get more
protection from government intrusion than do other constitutional rights, such as
due process:
[Tihe preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable
democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment... gives these liberties a
sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions. And it is the character
of the right not of the limitation, which determines what standards governs the
choice.
For these reasons, any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by
clear public interest threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and
present danger. The rational connection between the remedy provided and the
evil to be curbed, which in other contexts might support legislation against
attack on due process grounds, will not suffice. These rights rest on firmer
foundation.... Only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give
occasion for permissible limitation. It is therefore in our tradition to allow the
widest room for discussion, the narrowest range for its restriction, particularly
when this right is exercised in conjunction with peaceable assembly.40 6
This added scrutiny is an important distinction for, and "benefif of, the right
of court access under the Petition Clause, as compared to any claim of court
access under due process. Even putting aside the Court's narrow application of
due process to court access under cases such as Boddie,40 7 the Court always has
applied a "lesser" reasonableness standard to questions of due process. 40 8 As the
Court stated in Jones v. Union Guano,4 09 it will not invalidate a precondition to
filing a civil suit under due process if "the condition imposed has reasonable
relation to a legitimate object."410 Strict scrutiny under the Petition Clause raises
the standard by which the court will judge such a precondition. The Petition
Clause requires that the state narrowly tailor its restriction-not just reasonably
aim-to a compelling state interest-not just a legitimate object. What might
pass due process reasonableness analysis, therefore, may not survive strict
406 Thomas v. Collins, 407 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (citations omitted).
407 See generally discussion supra Part I.A.2.
408 See supra notes 24-27.
409 264 U.S. 171 (1924); see also discussion supra notes 24-25.
410 IOd at 181 (emphasis added).
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scrutiny.
Strict scrutiny, however, need not be the death knell for government
regulation of court access. Though in other contexts many statutes fail to pass
this exacting scrutiny, some survive. Otherwise, the test would be meaningless.
For example, in United States v. Haniss,4 11 the Court upheld under strict
scrutiny the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act against challenges based on the
First Amendment rights of expression, press, and petition. Chief Justice Warren,
writing for the Court, noted that Congress had a "vital national interest' in
regulating lobbying to prevent the voice of the people from otherwise being
"drowned out by the voice of special interest groups. '412 He also noted that the
statute was narrowly drawn and not a direct prohibition on a lobbyist's right of
access but instead only a disclosure requirement.413 Any deterrent effect on
exercise of First Amendment rights was only minor and indirect and therefore
did not override the strong governmental interest in regulating lobbyists. 414
Similarly, many government regulations touching upon access to court may
pass strict scrutiny. In fact, Harriss provides a good analogy for perhaps the most
prevalent restriction on access to courts-pleading rules. Pleading standards for
complaints are forms of informational disclosures, aimed in part to ensure that
pleaders have valid claims.415 These "disclosures" in the initial complaint do not
apply merely to losing claims; they apply equally to winning claims. Pleading
standards may not deter winning claims, but they nonetheless "burden" the initial
filing of a winning claim. But the burden is minimal and is supported by a
compelling state interest. The governmental interest that the Harriss Court
deemed compelling was the desire to give all persons a fair chance to air their
views to Congress. In setting pleading standards, the government similarly helps
411 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
412 Id at 625.
413 See id.
4 14 The Court explained:
It is suggested, however, that the Lobbying Act... may... act as a deterrent to their
exercise of First Amendment rights .... But, even assuming some such deterrent effect,
the restraint is at most an indirect one resulting from self-censorship.... The hazard of
such resiraint is too remote to require striking down a statute which on its face is
otherwise plainly within the area of congressional power and is designed to safeguard a
vital national interest.
Id. at 626.
415 See JAMES FRIDENTMAL Er AL., Cm PROCEDURE § 5.2 (2d ed. 1993) (summarizing
the functions of modem pleading: "First, they permit the elimination from consideration of
contentions that have no legal significance.... The second purpose of modem pleading is to
guide the parties and the court in the conduct of cases").
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give all persons access to court by ensuring that legitimate complaints are not
drowned out by a flood of invalid claims.
Letting other plaintiffs be heard is not the only interest behind pleading
standards and other restrictions that deter frivolous civil complaints. They help
defendants. As noted above, the mere filing of a complaint can harm a defendant
in many ways,416 and the government has an interest in protecting its citizens
from this harm. Moreover, as also noted above, every time a citizen files a civil
complaint, the government (or more aptly, its sponsor, the taxpayers) incurs
considerable costs. 417 The government certainly has an interest in promoting
efficient use of its resources and in avoiding the waste of taxpayer money. Given
these governmental interests, whether restrictions aimed at deterring frivolous
suits pass strict scrutiny will depend, not on the compelling interest prong, but
instead on the actual burden the restrictions place on the filing of winning
claims. 418
These are just a few examples. This general discussion cannot give a listing
of restrictions on court access that do or do not pass strict scrutiny. Indeed, the
strict scrutiny test necessarily looks at the particular circumstances of each
regulation in light of the implicated interests and burdens on right of access. The
point here is that because of the unique nature of courts and the burdens imposed
by petitioning courts, the government likely will have compelling interests in
regulating court access that it might not possess with regard to other First
Amendment freedoms. These compelling interests justify at least some controls
on court access, and whether a particular restriction passes strict scrutiny usually
4 16 See discussion supra pp. 675-76; see also Bill Johnson's Restaurant v. NLRB, 461
U.S. 731,740-41 (1983).
4 17 See discussion supra p. 675; see also infra note 418.
4 18 For example, filing fees are aimed in part to deter frivolous suits, see Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,381 (1971), but if the fees act as a total bar or extreme deterrent for
filing winning claims, either by their amount or as assessed against indigents, they likely will
not pass the minimal impact prong of strict scrutiny. See Note, First Amendment Right of
Access, supra note 38, at 1064-66 (arguing that filing fees as assessed against indigents would
not pass strict scrutiny). Further complicating the analysis of filing fees, though, are the
additional justifications for filing fees, which may add more weight to the compelling interest
side of the equation. See id at 1064 ('Filing fees may be justified on three grounds: cost
recoupment, deterrence of unmeritorious litigation, and resource allocation."); Boddie, 401
U.S. at 381 (same). Indeed, legal commentators have argued that the government has a
legitimate and, arguably compelling interest, in recovering the total cost of processing civil
complaints. See generally Rex E. Lee, The American Courts as Public Goods: ho Should
Pay the Costs of Litigation?, 34 CATH. U. L. REv. 267 (1985) (address by Solicitor General in
which he argues that society should consider requiring court users to pay for court services);
Phillip L. Spector, Financing the Courts Through Fees: Incentives and Equity in Civil
Litigation, 58 JuDICATURE 330 (1975) (analyzing different policies and effects of charging
"substantially higher fees" for court use).
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will depend on the breadth of the regulation and its actual impact on access.
D. "Breathing Room "for Court Access
As discussed in Part III, I propose that the right of court access under the
Petition Clause is a narrow right-it protects only the right to file winning claims
within the jurisdiction of the courts. While strict scrutiny may apply to
government restriction of this absolute right, the question remains whether courts
should extend added protection to activity outside of this narrow right in order
not to "chill" exercise of the narrow right.419 In other words, should courts give
"breathing room" to the right to file winning claims by protecting some losing
claims?
The New York Times line of cases best illustrates the breathing room
doctrine. There, the Court gives true speech, that protected under the First
Amendment, breathing space by protecting some false speech, speech not
otherwise within constitutional protection. In New York Times itself, the Court
did this by requiring a defamation plaintiff to prove that the defendant either
knew or recklessly disregarded that his speech was false.420 Under this standard,
false speech is protected if the defendant merely uttered it negligently.421
In Gertz v. Welch,422 the Court further clarified and refined this breathing
4 19 For a general discussion of the concern about "chilling" exercise of First Amendment
freedoms, see Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the
"Chilling Effect," 58 B.U. L. REv. 685 (1978).
420 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). The suit arose out of
an "editorial" advertisement in the New York Times that, among other things, criticized the
Montgomery, Alabama police department and solicited financial support for the civil rights
movement. The commissioner of police for Montgomery brought a defamation suit, and the
jury awarded him $500,000. The New York Times admitted that some of the statements about
the police were false but appealed claiming that the award infringed freedom of speech and
press. See id. at 256-64.
421 The actual malice standard is not the only form of breathing room that the Court gives
speech concerning public issues. In New York Times, the Court also imposes a higher standard
of proof and requires public figure or official plaintiffs to prove the actual malice by clear and
convincing evidence, not merely by the preponderance of the evidence. See 376 U.S. at 285.
See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 4, § 16.33.
422418 U.S. 323 (1974). Attorney Gertz represented the family of the victim in a suit
against a Chicago police officer who allegedly killed their son. See id. at 325. Though the
officer was convicted of murder, Welch, publisher of a John Birch Society newsletter, charged
that Gertz was part of a national conspiracy to discredit law enforcement and substitute a
national police force supportive of the communist party. See id. at 325-26. Gertz filed a libel
action in federal court, and the jury awarded him $50,000. See id. at 327-29. The trial court
entered judgment for Welch on the ground that New York Times immunized this speech, and
the Supreme Court reversed. See id. at 329-32.
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room doctrine. It explained that the degree and type of breathing space in
defamation cases depended on a balancing of dangers or, put another way, the
relative values of redressing false speech and promoting true speech:
The need to avoid self-censorship by the news media is [ ] not the only
societal value at issue. If it were, this Court would have embraced long ago the
view that publishers and broadcasters enjoy an unconditional and indefeasible
immunity from liability for defamation....
The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel is the compensation
of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood. We
would not lightly require the state to abandon this purpose ....
Some tension necessarily exists between the need for a vigorous and
uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in redressing wrongful injury.... In
our continuing effort to define ... these competing concerns, we have been
especially anxious to assure to the freedoms of speech and press that "breathing
space" essential to their fruitful exercise. To that end this Court has extended a
measure of strategic protection to defamatory falsehood.42
3
The Court explained that New York Times involved speech about public officials
and about issues of great moment of the day, the civil rights movement, and
therefore warranted "extra" protection.424 Speech about private individuals and
private matters demands a separate balancing. 425 Because the dangers to the
423 Id. at 341-42 (citations omitted). The Court also elected to set general rules of
application rather than allow courts to balance these interests in each case:
Theoretically, of course, the balance between the needs of the press and the
individual's claim to compensation for wrongful injury might be struck on a case-by-case
basis.... But this approach would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain
expectations, and it could render our duty to supervise the lower courts unmanageable.
Because an ad hoc resolution of the competing interests at stake in each particular case is
not feasible, we must lay down broad rules of general application.
Id. at 343-44.
424 See id. at 334, 342.
425 In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), the Court applied the New York
Times actual malice standard to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and noted
that its application depended on the balancing of interests:
We conclude that public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here
at issue without showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact
which was made with "actual malice," i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or
with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true. This is not merely a "blind
application" of the New York Times standard, it reflects our considered judgment that such
a standard is necessary to give adequate "breathing space" to the freedoms protected by
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private plaintiff are greater and the value of the speech is less, private speech
does not mandate the same degree of breathing room. 426 Accordingly, a private
plaintiff need not prove that the defendant knew or recklessly disregarded the
falsity of his speech.
The Court in Gertz warned, however, that this different balance does not
give the states free rein to punish in any way they wish false speech about
individuals. A severe punishment of false speech may chill true speech just as
much, if not more, than a negligence standard for determining the defendant's
awareness of his wrong. Accordingly, the Court held that presumed and punitive
damages for defamation are impermissible infringements upon speech.427 These
the First Amendment
Id. at 56.
426 The Gertz Court further explained these differences:
[W]e have no difficulty in distinguishing among defamation plaintiffs. The first remedy of
any victim of defamation is self-help-using available opportunities to contradict the lie
or correct the error and thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation. Public
officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of
effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false
statements than private individuals normally enjoy. Private individuals are therefore more
vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater.
... [Public officials and public figures also assume some of the risk of defamation].
No such assumption is justified with respect to a private individual. He has not accepted
public office or assumed an "influential role in ordering society."... Thus, private
individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures;
they are also more deserving of recovery.
For these reasons we conclude that the States should retain substantial latitude in
their efforts to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation
of a private individual.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-46.
427 The Court explained that its refusal to apply the New York Times actual malice
standard to private speech was not based on a belief that the concerns at issue in New York
Times were not present:
Rather, we endorse this approach in recognition of the strong and legitimate state
interest in compensating private individuals for injury to reputation. But this
countervailing state interest extends no further than compensation for actual injury ...
The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort law, for it allows recovery of
purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss.... The largely
uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages where there is no loss unnecessarily
compounds the potential of any system of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the
vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms.... More to the point, the States have no
substantial interest in securing for plaintiffs such as this petitioner gratuitous awards of
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penalties are too likely to deter true speech and go beyond the state's legitimate
interest in redressing the harm suffered by private individuals. In other words,
true speech about private matters merits added protection through this form of
breathing space.
Buffer zones might similarly protect the right of court access under the
Petition Clause. The right to file winning claims may need breathing room
through some protection of losing suits. The easiest example is a criminal
penalty for filing a losing suit. The sanction would not directly infringe on the
right protected by the First Amendment because the Petition Clause (under my
proposed definition) protects only winning suits, but the threat of criminal
penalties would deter all but the most brave, or perhaps irrational, litigants from
filing even a winning claim. Such criminal penalties hence would destroy, albeit
indirectly, the right guaranteed by the Petition Clause. As is the case of punitive
damages in defamation cases, such penalties would not be valid because they do
not give enough breathing room to the First Amendment right to file winning
claims.
On the other hand, as discussed in Part IllI.C, the imposition of actual
damages in the form of costs, including attorney's fees, against losing suits likely
is not too great a risk, as a constitutional matter. To be sure, imposition of
attorney's fees may deter even winning suits, but, as in Gertz, it is a lesser risk
and one that more closely fulfills a legitimate state goal-compensation of the
"victim" of the losing suit through payment of his expenses. This is not to say
that all states should impose such costs and fees on losing suits. For their own
policy reasons, states may decide to grant greater protection to court access. The
question here is what is constitutionally permissible, and the Court in Bill
Johnson's Restaurants specifically allowed the NLRB to impose against a losing
plaintiff damages in the form of the defendants' attorney's fees.4 28
Another obvious breathing room issue is whether the original New York
Times form of breathing room-the actual malice standard-is necessary for
court access. 429 Some commentators and courts have claimed that right of access
money damages far in excess of any actual injury.
We would not, of course, invalidate state law simply because we doubt its wisdom,
but here we are attempting to reconcile state law with a competing interest grounded in
the constitutional command of the First Amendment It is therefore appropriate to require
that state remedies for defamatory falsehood reach no farther than is necessary to protect
the legitimate interest involved.
Id. at 348-49.
4 28 See supra note 314-16.
429 But see McGowan & Lemley, supra note 4, at 395 (arguing that there "is no interest
compelling the adoption of speech-protective rules in the litigation context that is similar to the
interest in uninhibited debate that supported the actual malice rule in New York Times).
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demands such protection. They argue that the plaintiff must actually know, or at
least recklessly disregard, that his complaint is baseless (or, under my definition
of the right to petition courts, a losing suit) before a court may punish him for
filing it.430 This argument was implicitly rejected in Bill Johnson's Restaurants,
where the Court allowed the NLRB to impose sanctions on the employer simply
because it lost the suit. To be sure, the sanctions there required a motive
element-a retaliatory motive as defined by the federal labor laws-but, as the
Court has noted in the context of New York Times, motive is a different question
than "actual malice."431 The New York Times actual malice standard looks to the
defendant's awareness of the validity of his action. Bill Johnson's Restaurants
did not require any such awareness by the employer.
The Court's implicit rejection of the New York Times actual malice standard
for protection of court access likely is justified. In Gertz, the Court did not extend
the actual malice protection to speech about private, as opposed to public,
persons because the government has a stronger interest in compensating private
victims of defamation and because such speech about private individuals has less
societal value. In most applications of court access, the balance similarly is tilted
toward compensation of the victim. Like the private defamation plaintiff, the
430 Some commentators argue that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, see supra notes
12, 303; infra note 436, should have an actual malice rather than mere negligence standard.
Rule 11 has a reasonable inquiry standard under which a plaintiff may be sanctioned for filing
a baseless complaint even if he did not actually appreciate that the claim was baseless. See
Spanbauer, supra note 4, at 60-62 (arguing that Rule 11, "[b]y replacing the subjective bad
faith requirement with an objective standard... now encompasses merely negligent conduce'
and is "an invalid restriction of the constitutional right of access to the courts via the First
Amendment Petition Clause"); see also Note, Suits Against the Government, supra note 12, at
1127 (arguing for a higher standard than New York Times-actual knowledge-in applying
Rule 11 to citizen suits against the government); cf Stephen B. Burbank, Sanctions in the
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power,
11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 997 (1983) (raising the "difficult' question as to whether the Supreme
Court has power under the Rules Enabling Act to sanction for non-willful conduct). For two
reasons, the Rule 11 reasonable inquiry prong likely is not'an unconstitutional invasion of
necessary breathing space for the right to file civil suits. First, the Court implicitly rejected an
actual awareness standard in Bill Johnson's Restaurants. See supra note 431. Second,
breathing room can take different forms. Rule 11 already provides breathing room to winning
suits in the form of a lower merits standard. The rule does not punish losing suits that had some
merit at the time of filing, and thus it offers a substantial amount of breathing room for winning
claims even without allowing for the state of mind of the filer.
431 In Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967), the Court explained that
the New York Times actual malice standard requires that the defendant have a "high degree of
awareness of [the] probable falsity" of the speech, not "bad or corrupt motive" or "personal
spite, ill will or a desire to injure plaintiff' through the speech. See id. at 82, 84 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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victim of an invalid suit does not have a self-help option. 432 The typical civil
defendant does not have access to the media. Even if he did, he could not redress
all of the harm of a wrongful civil suit. To the contrary, the government forces
him to participate and incur costs. Similarly, the value of the petitioning activity
is not necessarily as great as that of political speech. As noted above,4 33 civil
complaints to courts do not fit into the two New York Times categories but rather
fall somewhere between. Therefore, the balance of values and interests for most
civil suits likely falls closer to Gertz than to New York Times.
A possible exception is a civil suit against the government or its officials.
Most such suits will present issues of high social value. Civil rights actions
against the government present issues, at least as important; if not more so, than
general speech about public officials. A simple tort action against the
government will not raise issues of such high import, but it still serves an added
interest over that in a private tort suit, one of government accountability. On the
other side of the equation, the interest in compensating the victim is less in suits
against the government than in the typical civil suit. The victims here are the
government defendants. Unlike private citizens, the government and its officials
have access to mass media to state their views and to counter any reputation
harm arising from the complaint. To be sure, the government defendants still
would be burdened-they, like any other civil defendant434 must respond and
incur costs-but that burden is more easily absorbed by all taxpayers than by a
private individual. Therefore, though the mix is not quite the same as that for
defamation cases against public officials, the balance of interests still may justify
application of breathing room in the form of an actual malice standard.435
432 The opportunity for such self-help through the media was a factor in the Gertz Court's
distinction between private and public plaintiffs in defamation cases. See discussion supra note
426.
4 33 See supra Part IV.B.
43 4 The government's duty to respond and its extent of harm, of course, depends on the
degree to which the government has waived sovereign immunity. Whether the right to petition
affects sovereign immunity is the subject of debate. See generally Lawson & Seidman, supra
note 4; Pfander, supra note 4.
435 Some courts and commentators agree that suits against the government deserve
special protection, but they advance different reasons for and variant forms of the protection.
Some courts, for example, have held that plaintiffs who sue the government (as opposed to
another private party) are absolutely immune from a subsequent action for malicious
prosecution by the government See, e.g., City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 727
(Cal. 1983); Cates v. Oldham, 450 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 1984). One Note argues that suits against
the government are "double petitions"--they are petitions (1) to the government (2) against the
govemment-and therefore demand special protection in the form of an actual knowledge
standard before the plaintiff may be sanctioned for bringing a wrongful claim against the
government. See Note, Suits Against the Government, supra note 12, at 1127.
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Another potential source of breathing room is adjustment of the substantive
merits standards for the initial filing of a civil suit. In other words, move the
threshold for filing (as opposed to a subsequent award of damages) to something
other than "winning" claims. Most procedural rules, including Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,4 36 impose a far lower standard of merit for the
initial filing of the suit. They merely require the plaintiff to have a modicum of
evidence and law to support his claim and the fact that plaintiff later loses his suit
does not mean he violated this initial filing standard.4 37 The question is whether
the Petition Clause mandates such lower standards in order to give breathing
room to the winning claims. An initial answer would seem to be no. If a court
may later impose compensatory damages, including substantial attorney's fees,
on losing suits, then procedural rules, which impose lesser sanctions, do not have
to allow losing suits.
This argument overlooks the different points in time at which the "winning"
standard applies. There is a difference between telling a litigant, on the one hand,
that he must have enough support to win a suit before he files it, and, on the other
hand, warning him that he will have to pay substantial costs if he ultimately loses
his suit. If the winning standard is applied at the beginning of the suit, as a
prerequisite to filing, it would bar a suit that a plaintiff could win but needs
discovery to support. Some breathing room at the point of filing therefore likely
is necessary to avoid chilling the filing of winning claims. Indeed, this distinction
436 Rule 11 (b) sets forth a certification requirement:
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing,
submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information,
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,-
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost
of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery; and -
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence
or, if specifically so identified, are reasonable based on a lack of
information or belief.
FED. R. Civ. P. 1 l(b).
4 37 See FED. 1K CIV. P. 1 l(b)(2), (3); supra note 436.
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is reflected in the Court's two-tier test for baseless suits in Bill Johnson's
Restaurants. There, the Court held that the NLRB may not enjoin an employer's
suit if that suit has enough factual and legal merit to withstand summary
judgment.438 The test is not whether the claim is a winning one, but instead a
lesser standard-whether the suit presents genuine issues. Thus, suits not within
the literal definition of the right have some protection and that protection is
consistent with the Court's breathing room doctrine.439
This timing element of breathing space also is justified under the "prior
restraint" doctrine that the Court applies in speech cases. The prior restraint rule
is one under which courts view subsequent punishment, as opposed to prior
restraint, as the preferable means of controlling improper and unprotected
speech.440 The Court does not absolutely forbid prior restraints in all
circumstances, but it does impose a "heavy presumption" against prior
restraints.441 This rule, like the New York Times actual malice standard, is an
application of the concern about chilling speech, but the prior restraint rule
addresses a more extreme application. The subsequent punishment at issue in
New York Times and Gertz deters speech, but prior restraint stops speech.442
Courts should similarly hesitate before issuing a prior restraint on access to
court. To enjoin a person from filing a complaint is to deny him access, just as to
438 See supra notes 101-04,314-16.
439 To be sure, the Court did not expressly base this distinction on a breathing space
rationale, and whether the federal government can enjoin a state court suit necessarily involves
a number of policy considerations in addition to those underlying the breathing room doctrine.
See infra note 443. However, the Court's sliding scale of merit is consistent with breathing
room doctrine.
440 This doctrine is rooted in the freedom of speech and, in particular, the freedom of the
press. In fact; the Court has stated that the primary purpose of the Press Clause of the First
Amendment is to prevent prior restraints. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
The Pentagon Papers case is the prime example. There, the government tried to enjoin the New
York Times and the Washington Post from publishing secret government documents about the
Vietnam War. See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
441 See Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,419 (1971).
442 Professors Nowak and Rotunda explain this preference:
Historically, prior restraint has always been viewed as more dangerous to free
speech, but why? The marketplace theory of free speech supports this historical
distinction between prior restraint and subsequent punishment While subsequent
punishment may deter some speakers, at least the ideas or speech at issue can be placed
before the public. But prior restraint limits public debate and knowledge more severely.
Punishment of speech, after it has occurred, chills free expression. Prior restraint freezes
free speech.
NoWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 4, at 1020 (emphasis added).
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enjoin someone from speaking is to deny him speech. The prior restraint rule
should give a plaintiff the benefit of the doubt in most cases and allow him to
exercise the broad initial right to file the complaint while withholding any
punishment until after a determination that the person filed a losing claim.
Therefore, as in speech cases and as reflected in the Court's two-tier standard in
Bill Johnson's Restaurants, courts should be particularly cautious against
enjoining443 or otherwise preventing the filing of civil suits. 4
In sum, application of the breathing room doctrine, like strict scrutiny,
necessarily depends on the particular regulation at issue. It is a balancing process.
The above discussion merely highlights the guideposts for more detailed
analysis. In the companion articles, I will address breathing room in the context
of actual statutes and regulations that do not directly impede the right to file
winning civil suits but come close to that right and therefore threaten a chilling
effect.
E. Avoidance of Vague and Overbroad Restraints on Court Access
Two other speech doctrines also reflect the Court's concern about
unnecessarily chilling the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. The vagueness
doctrine demands an exacting clarity in statutes that regulate First Amendment
activity. The overbreadth rule invalidates statutes that substantially restrict both
non-protecting undertalings and activity secured under the First Amendment.
These canons unite in their purpose to avoid undue deterrence and have some
potential application in the safeguarding of the right of court access under the
Petition Clause.
The vagueness doctrine in general application is a due process inquiry. The
concern is that a statute is so poorly phrased that it does not put a person on
443 Of course, other doctrines require courts to exercise such caution when determining
whether to enjoin proceedings in other courts. In fact, the Anti-Injunction Act severely curtails
the ability of a federal court to enjoin state court proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994).
Under a technical reading of the Petition Clause, the ability to enjoin ongoing state court
proceedings is a separate question from" enjoining initial access to state courts. Because the
Petition Clause extends only to the initial filing of the action, not to its subsequent procedure
and resolution, only the latter question is within its literal terms. However, the breathing room
doctrine may mandate that government not unduly interfere with actions once filed, and due
process likewise would impose some limits. See discussion supra notes 298-306.
444 The Court has held that acts other than injunctions can constitute a prior restraint. For
example, the Court has characterized a permit or fee precondition for assembly and speech in a
public forum as a prior restraint. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123,
130 (1992) (holding that an "ordinance requiring a permit and a fee before authorizing public
speaking, parades, or assemblies ... is a prior restraint on speech").
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notice of what behavior is permissible and what is outlawed.445 The Court has
been especially vigilant in applying the vagueness doctrine to laws that regulate
First Amendment freedoms. The Court in Button warned that statutes touching
on such rights, including the right to petition, must be stated with "narrow
specificity" in order to avoid chilling exercise of the person's rights:
[S]tandards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free
expression... It makes no difference that the instant case was not a criminal
prosecution and not based on a refusal to comply with a licensing
requirement... [T]he danger [is] tolerating, in the area of First Amendment
freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper
application. These freedoms are delicate and. vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society. The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost
as potently as the actual application of sanctions. Because First Amendment
freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area
only with narrow specificity.
446
What constitutes sufficient "specificity" is a complex question. The Court
has given some guidelines. First, courts should have more tolerance for
imprecision where the harm the government seeks to avoid is great and where
the harm does not lend itself to detailed description.447 Second, if the statute
turns on a subjective interpretation, it is more likely to be declared impermissibly
vague.448 Third, courts should give greater indulgence to rules that have a
particular meaning within a learned trade, such as attorney disciplinary rules.449
Finally, and most importantly, when applying each of these standards, courts
should demand greater specificity of statutes that affect First Amendment
445 In Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926), the Court stated the
due process test: "[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." Id. at 391.
446 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963) (citations omitted); see discussion
supra notes 61-63.
447 Professors Nowak and Rotunda explain this tolerance: "If a threat is greater and its
regulation or prohibition cannot be expressed more concretely, the Court will tolerate
comparatively more vagueness. For example, a statute forbidding reckless walking would be
unconstitutionally vague, while a statute forbidding reckless driving is not void for vagueness."
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 4, at 1001 (emphasis in original).
448 See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 (1971) (finding as
unconstitutionally vague a statute that turned on a subjective standard of "annoyance").
44 9 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 665 (1985) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and judgment, and dissenting in part) ("Given the tradition of the legal
profession and an attorney's specialized professional training, there is unquestionably some
room for enforcement of standards that might be impermissibly vague in other contexts.").
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rights.450
These guidelines should govern regulations that control court access, and
courts should invalidate unnecessarily vague restrictions on filing civil
complaints. This is true even though civil litigation usually is instituted by
learned professionals-lawyers. These rules are not immune from attack. 451 The
Court, for example, recently invalidated a Nevada attorney disciplinary rule as
unconstitutionally vague even though the rule was based on the ABA's Model
Rule and in wide usage.452 This rule limited what a lawyer could say in public
about a pending case, and the Court found that because its illustrative listing of
prohibited speech was arguably inconsistent with its listing of permitted speech,
the rule was unconstitutionally vague.453
The overbreadth doctrine provides similar protection to First Amendment
freedoms. The flaw of an overbroad statute is that the statute prohibits both
activity that the government is free to regulate and activity protected under the
First Amendment. Not just any potential improper application will invalidate a
statute that otherwise properly reaches activity within the police power of
government. The test is whether the statute substantially burdens protected
activity4 54
The overbreadth doctrine is closely related to that of vagueness, and the
Court usually addresses the two concepts together. The doctrine interacts with
the vagueness rule where a statute does not define clearly the point at which its
regulation stops, so that the statute arguably bars both protected and unprotected
behavior. The statute is either overbroad-because it touches upon both types of
activity-or vague-because it does not clearly state that it does not reach
protected endeavors. Thus, to the extent that stricter standards apply to judge
vagueness of regulations affecting access to court, those heightened standards
also determine whether the regulations are overbroad 4 55 A statute that
450 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) ("[W]here a vague statute
abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit those
freedoms.') (internal quotations marks omitted).
451 See, e.g., Martha Elizabeth Johnston, ABA Code of Professional Responsibility: Void
for Vagueness?, 57 N.C. L. REV. 671 (1979).
452 See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). The Court noted that
Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177 was "almost identical to ABA Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.6." Id. at 1033.
453 See id. at 1048-51.
454 See id. at 1077 ("The 'overbreadth' doctrine applies if an enactment 'prohibits
constitutionally protected conduct.' To be unconstitutional, overbreadth must be
'substantial.") (citations omitted).
455 In addition, the overbreadth doctrine creates a special rule of standing in cases under
the First Amendment. If the statute applies to activity protected under the First Amendment, the
plaintiff himself need not have engaged in the protected activity to challenge the breadth of the
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substantially burdens the filing of both winning and losing claims would be
invalid under the overbreadth doctrine even though it was intended to regulate
and deter losing suits.
V. CONCLUSION
Now is the time to carefully consider an individual's right of access to court
under the Petition Clause, before it is lost or becomes a source of ill-considered
results. This Article offers a proposal for properly defining and protecting the
right. Though I contend that the right of court access under the Petition Clause is
a narrow right, I believe that it is a meaningful right. It fills the void left by the
Court's due process decisions. The Petition Clause alone guarantees the average
person the right to come to court and ask for redress of his claim. Otherwise, the
government could impose undue restrictions even on suits that stated winning
claims. On the other hand, because the right is a narrow one, its recognition and
enforcement will not bring about wide-scale changes to civil procedure or other
law. As I hope to demonstrate in subsequent articles, application of this new right
of access to court will be one of adjustment, not overhaul.
statute. As the Court explained in Button, the plaintiff in this circumstance may challenge the
statute and a court may invalidate it to avoid chilling the exercise of protected activity by
others:
[The instant decree [banning the NAACP from encouraging litigation] may be
invalid if it prohibits privileged exercises of First Amendment rights whether or not the
record discloses that the [NAACP] has engaged in unprivileged conduct. For in
appraising a statute's inhibiting effect upon such rights, this Court has not hesitated to take
into account possible applications of the statute in other factual contexts besides that at
bar.
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,432 (1963). Presumably, this standing rule would apply, for
example, to a litigant who had a "losing" claim, activity unprotected by the right of access
under the Petition Clause, but still had an argument that a procedural rule also applied to bar
the protected activity of filing a winning claim.
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